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 This three-paper dissertation analyzes the context and outcomes of post-disaster buyouts 
completed in North Carolina after hurricanes in 1996 and 1999, with attention to race and social 
equity issues. Buyouts are a mechanism for removing development from areas at risk for 
disaster. As climate change and urbanization worsen flooding in the United States, more 
communities are considering buyouts. However, research has not caught up with this expanding 
practice. In particular, an understanding of the long-term outcomes of buyouts is lacking. 
The first paper examines the motivations for and outcomes of buyouts decisions in two 
high-poverty African American communities that made different decisions about buyouts. Case 
comparison reveals that differences in leadership, perceptions of climate risk, and competing 
priorities motivated the different decisions. Buyouts reduced future flood impacts, increased 
participants’ home values, and provided the opportunity to move to a lower poverty 
neighborhood. However, they also broke up social networks, contributed to disinvestment near 
buyout land, and risked loss of history and memory in marginalized communities threatened by 
climate change.  
The second paper examines the geography of buyouts with respect to race and 
segregation. Using regression analysis, the paper finds that buyouts are associated with 




residential segregation. The association of race and buyouts is not a result of higher levels of 
poverty in African American neighborhoods or disproportionate exposure to flood risk. 
 The third paper analyzes the association between buyouts and 20-year neighborhood 
change. Using spatial regression, this paper finds that buyouts are negatively associated with 
growth in housing units. Buyouts are also associated with racial turnover in nearby 
neighborhoods. These results suggest that buyouts encouraged disinvestment in local housing 
stock, and that white flight occurred in areas where buyout participants were most likely to 
relocate.  
The final chapter analyzes implications for research and practice. These implications 
include reducing negative neighborhood impacts and intangible losses associated with buyouts 
while supporting wealth-building opportunities for low-income participants. Both community 
planning and policy change are needed to support these outcomes. Better data are also critical to 
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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
Coping with flooding is a monumental problem facing the United States in the twenty-
first century. In 2016, Hurricane Matthew ravaged eastern North Carolina; in 2017, Hurricanes 
Harvey and Maria devastated greater Houston and the entire island of Puerto Rico; 2018 brought 
Hurricane Florence back to parts of North Carolina still struggling to recover from the 2016 
disaster, and Hurricane Michael was the first Category 5 hurricane to make landfall in the United 
States in nearly 25 years. Combined, these hurricanes have caused more than $300 billion in 
damages in the United States, part of a decades-long trend of increasing losses (Gratz et al., 
2008; Hirsch & Archfield, 2015; Pielke & Downton, 2000; Slater & Villarini, 2016). In three of 
the last four years, severe inland flooding in the Midwest and the Deep South destroyed over a 
billion dollars of property, crops, and infrastructure (NOAA National Centers for Environmental 
Information, 2019).   
Flooding has plagued civilization since the beginning of time, but new, modern forces are 
shaping and exacerbating the impact of flooding in our world. Anthropogenic climate change is 
bringing more intense storms and sea level rise, increasing the frequency of flood events (Hirsch 
& Archfield, 2015; Lall et al., 2018). At the same time, sustained growth and development in 
vulnerable areas is also driving flood losses (Klotzbach, Bowen, Pielke, & Bell, 2018; Pielke et 
al., 2008). Aging infrastructure often fails to adequately handle floodwater under increased 




a 100-year floodplain, and twice as many live in the 500-year floodplain, nearly one in ten U.S. 
residents (Furman Center, 2017).  
Because of the increase in flooding frequency and impact, the wellbeing of people, 
property, and economies depends on our ability to reduce the impact of flooding. Communities 
try to prevent flooding disasters in many ways. Over the past 25 years, scholars and practitioners 
have recognized the value of land use strategies, like preventing development in floodprone areas 
(Beatley, 2009; Berke & Campanella, 2006; Burby et al., 1999; FEMA, 2013; Holway & Burby, 
1993; Mileti, 1999; Stevens, 2010). There are many reasons to prefer land use strategies over 
engineered solutions. Land use strategies are less expensive to implement and require only 
enforcement rather than active maintenance and investment. They keep development out of 
harm’s way and encourage green infrastructure that absorbs floodwater during a disaster. 
Engineered strategies offer a false sense of complete security from flooding, and their failure can 
have catastrophic impacts that can accelerate the power and destruction of floodwaters.  
Land use strategies are just as important to implement in areas where development 
already exists as they are in places where development can be prevented. One instrument for 
changing land use patterns in developed communities is strategic property acquisitions, or 
“buyouts.” A buyout program for the purpose of hazard mitigation changes land use by removing 
pre-existing development located in risky areas and turning the parcels into open space. The 
earliest documented hazard mitigation buyout in the United States occurred in Soldiers Grove, 
Wisconsin in 1978, when a locally led effort relocated an entire riverside business district to 
higher ground nearby (Beatley, 1998; David & Mayer, 1984). Buyouts became more visible 
among planners and emergency managers when several Midwestern towns implemented major 




floods. The North Carolina buyout programs after Hurricanes Fran and Floyd, which are the 
focus of this dissertation, again demonstrated the scale of buyout possibilities when the state 
completed buyouts of nearly 5,000 residences. In the 2000s, small and large communities have 
used buyouts, especially after disasters like Hurricane Ike, Superstorm Sandy, and Hurricanes 
Matthew, Harvey, and Maria, for example.1  With growing concerns about how climate change 
will increase future flooding, many scholars see buyouts as a primary tool to cope with climate-
driven flooding through managed retreat, which reduces flood risk by “moving exposed people, 
assets and human activities” (Oppenheimer & Glavovic, 2019) out of high-risk areas (Hino, 
Field, & Mach, 2017; Siders, 2018). 
Buyouts can occur through via multiple funding streams. Currently, the Federal 
Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) administers three programs that have bought 
out over 38,500 floodplain residences on a voluntary basis (Siders, 2017). The largest of these is 
the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), which specifically serves post-disaster areas 
(FEMA, 2015a). Authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act of 1988, HMGP awards up to 20 percent of the total FEMA award for disaster damages to 
advance mitigation during reconstruction (FEMA, 2015a). State governments, the typical direct 
recipients of HMGP funds,2 may elect to use some or all of these funds for buyouts, subject to 
the requirement that the land remain open space in perpetuity. Other primary sources of funding 
for buyouts include the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Community 
                                                             
1 In the 2000s, some states and cities used buyouts as a rebuilding tool, as opposed to hazard mitigation, by allowing 
the land to be redeveloped by a new owner, for example in Louisiana’s Road Home Program and New York City’s 
post-Sandy Built It Back program (Green & Olshansky, 2012; Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017; Maly & Ishikawa, 
2013; Maly et al., 2017). This dissertation focuses exclusively on buyouts for hazard mitigation, not for rebuilding. 




Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR), along with state and local funds. 
This dissertation focuses on HMGP buyouts in North Carolina, implemented after Hurricanes 
Fran and Floyd in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Planners and researchers advocate for post-disaster buyout programs because they change 
land use to reduce overall flood exposure. The American Planning Association’s Planning 
Advisory Service report, Planning for the Next Generation, expresses the typical case for post-
disaster buyouts and summarizes the challenges to changing land use patterns during disaster 
recovery:  
“Disasters can create opportunities for land-use change, particularly in precluding rebuilding in 
hazardous areas and relocating those uses elsewhere. Nonetheless, major land use changes rarely 
happen even aſter a disaster. The main reason is that disasters do not usually destroy all the buildings 
and infrastructure in a particular area. Therefore, some property value and ownership rights and 
patterns remain; pressures to rebuild what existed before are incentivized through many insurance 
schemes” (Boyd, Hokanson, Johnson, Schwab, & Topping, 2014). 
 
Buyout programs attempt to take advantage of the “opportunities” provided by disasters while 
overcoming the challenges of property values, ownership rights, and neighborhood development 
patterns that survive the disaster. Buyouts accomplish this objective by offering residents the 
chance to move to a less risky area through a voluntary process which provides a payout based 
on property value. Through buyouts, the public sector reduces its overall exposure to costs that 
they typically cover during and after disaster, including National Flood Insurance payouts (Perry 
& Lindell, 1997; Tate, Strong, Kraus, & Xiong, 2015; White, 2011).  
However, there is more to consider about the effects of buyout programs than the 
reduction in flood exposure. There are a number of potential drawbacks. Buyout programs 




with survivors’ trauma. There is evidence that buyout participants sometimes feel pressure to 
sell, perhaps because governments have an incentive to maximize participation in order to 
achieve benefits of scale, such as assembling enough open space to hold future floodwaters or 
reducing public maintenance responsibilities in buyout areas (de Vries & Fraser, 2012; J. C. 
Fraser, Elmore, Godschalk, & Rohe, 2003). Planners may advocate for post-disaster construction 
moratoria which ostensibly allow communities time to have a dialogue about redeveloping in a 
different and more resilient way (Boyd et al., 2014); however, moratoria have also been used to 
advance a pre-determined buyout objective because residents who cannot start committing their 
own resources toward rebuilding in place are more likely to take a buyout later (Brokopp Binder 
& Greer, 2016; de Vries & Fraser, 2012). One study of eight buyout programs finds that local 
decisions about where to acquire buyouts lack transparency and depend on political factors 
(Siders, 2018).  
Buyouts may be especially likely to affect marginalized communities. Marginalized 
populations have greater vulnerability to disaster and lower home values, both factors that may 
cause concentrations of buyouts in areas where marginalized populations live (Boyd et al., 2014; 
de Vries & Fraser, 2012; Siders, 2018), leading to concerns that governments are trying to push 
out low-income people of color or dismantle their communities (Bullard & Wright, 2012; 
Freudenberg, Calvin, Tolkoff, & Brawley, 2016; Olshansky & Johnson, 2010; B. Phillips, 
Stukes, & Jenkins, 2012). On the other hand, marginalized populations are among those most in 
need of permanent flood risk reduction due to disproportionate physical and social vulnerability. 
None of these complexities mean that buyouts are inherently unjust or unwise, but they 
warrant a closer investigation of the ways in which buyouts may reflect existing social 




ways in which buyout programs engage longstanding sources of inequality, such as political 
representation and racial turnover in neighborhoods (Loughran & Elliott, 2019; Siders, 2018). 
Understanding the ways in which historic and economic marginalization interface with buyout 
implementation and outcomes is the primary motivation for my dissertation. By developing a 
better empirical understanding of the role of inequality in buyouts, researchers, policymakers, 
and affected communities can identify strategies that disentangle buyout programs from 
longstanding systems of disempowerment.  
Dissertation Summary 
This dissertation includes three interrelated, standalone papers that deal with social equity 
in North Carolina’s buyout program. This buyout program began after Hurricane Fran caused 
widespread devastation in North Carolina in 1996, and it was expanded after Hurricane Floyd 
caused even more damage in 1999 (North Carolina Emergency Management, 2000). With 
HMGP funding, the state and participating local governments completed buyouts of 4,800 
properties funded by HMGP between both storms (North Carolina Emergency Management, 
2017). These buyouts are the focus of this dissertation. The state is in the process of 
implementing another major buyout program after Hurricanes Matthew and Florence in 2016 and 
2018, respectively, but these buyouts are not yet complete and so they are not included in this 
dissertation. 
The design and administration of the post-Fran and post-Floyd buyout programs in North 
Carolina fall in a landscape of buyout programs which vary across states and years. One variable 
which sets apart these different programs is the balance of state and local roles in program 
administration and support. In some cases, states take complete administrative control of the 




purely as a pass-through to local governments that wish to administer buyouts, without providing 
any additional capacity or funding. In the case of post-Fran and post-Floyd buyouts, North 
Carolina fell in between these two extremes. The state solicited application packages from local 
governments, which had to agree to implement the buyout program. However, the state remained 
highly engaged in the program, committing technical assistance to local governments and gap 
financing for individual property owners. This administrative design reflects a balance between 
state-centric and local-centric buyout program designs.  
Scholars Alex Greer and Sherri Brokopp Binder identify two other characteristics which 
set buyout programs apart from one another: the degree of government involvement beyond the 
buyout real estate transaction and the level of financial incentive for individuals to participate 
(Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017). The North Carolina buyouts that followed Hurricanes Fran and 
Floyd differed slightly with respect to level of financial incentive; in both cases, properties were 
purchased at pre-flood fair market value, but after Floyd, the state provided significant additional 
incentive funding, sometimes doubling the value of the buyout for the participant, as detailed in 
Chapter Two of the dissertation. As for post-government involvement, the state did not remain 
involved in the buyout program, and did not require local governments to do anything other than 
take ownership and prevent development on the land. However, some local governments elected 
to take proactive measures; a good example of the variety of these interventions is provided by 
the City of Kinston, again detailed in Chapter Two. Kinston enacted a construction moratorium 
in the buyout area to discourage rehabbing houses for future occupancy. The City also facilitated 
infill and greenfield development to provide housing for buyout participants. Program design 
decisions like these can influence the decisions of individual homeowners as well as the 




elements, degree of financial incentive and government involvement, are discussed throughout 
the dissertation papers and in the conclusion chapter.  
The first paper of this dissertation uses qualitative methods to examine the motivations 
for and outcomes of buyouts in two high-poverty African-American communities in 1999. In one 
community, the town decided to buy out an entire neighborhood, while the other town decided 
against buyouts. Using a comparative case study approach based on interviews, the media record, 
administrative data, and other sources, the findings suggest that differences in leadership, 
perceptions of climate risk, and competing priorities shaped the different decisions. The 
community that implemented buyouts gained demonstrated flood risk reduction, but there were 
negative consequences as well, such as loss of social networks and disinvestment in areas around 
the buyout. The community that forwent buyouts gained greater national attention and retained 
their historic location, but the population suffered repeat catastrophic loss in 2016. The 
comparison of these two cases raises several issues related to social equity in buyouts to which 
researchers and practitioners should attend. These matters include the relative lack of 
disincentives for local governments to pursue buyouts in marginalized communities, challenges 
of designing a fair process for decision-making about buyouts, preserving history and memory in 
racial and ethnic minority communities, and the social consequences of buyouts that are 
especially acute in poor communities. 
The second paper uses frameworks of justice to explore the geography of the buyouts 
with respect to race and segregation. The primary data sources are an administrative dataset of 
the buyouts and the Census. Using regression analysis, the paper finds that buyouts are 
associated with neighborhoods with greater shares of African Americans, and with counties with 




buyouts is not a result of higher levels of poverty in African American neighborhoods or 
disproportionate exposure to flood risk. There are a few possible explanations for these results. 
One is that decisions about where buyouts occur may reflect implicit or explicit racial bias. 
Another is that the historic disinvestment in African American neighborhoods may lead officials 
to disproportionately select those areas for buyouts or may lead residents of those areas to 
disproportionately accept buyouts. 
 The third paper explores the association between buyouts and 20-year change in 
neighborhoods where buyouts occur and in neighborhoods adjacent to buyouts. Primary data 
sources are similar to those used in the previous paper: an administrative dataset of buyouts and 
Census data. Using spatial regression techniques, this analysis finds that buyouts have a negative 
association with growth in housing units. It also finds that buyouts are associated with racial 
turnover in the neighborhoods near buyouts, where the share of whites decreased and the share of 
African Americans increased. These results suggest that buyouts encouraged disinvestment in the 
local housing stock, and that white flight and racial steering occurred in areas where buyout 
participants were most likely to relocate.  
The final chapter, the conclusions, ties these results together with an analysis of 
implications for research and for planning and policy. These implications include the role of 
planning, improved engagement and accountability in buyouts, and reducing unwanted and 
unintended consequences. The dissertation closes with an exploration of new approaches to 
buyouts and resilience more broadly. These approaches include learning from the deep history of 
relocation programs designed to address urban housing and development, whole community 
relocation, and a renewed emphasis on reducing social sources of vulnerability as opposed to 
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CHAPTER TWO. SOCIAL EQUITY AND LOCAL CLIMATE ADAPTATION: 
LEARNING FROM BUYOUTS IN MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES 
 
Marginalized populations experience the worst and most profound impacts of climate 
change globally and in the United States (Dodman & Satterthwaite, 2008; Martinich, Neumann, 
Ludwig, & Jantarasami, 2013; NAACP, 2015; Paavola & Adger, 2006; Roberts, 2009). These 
effects are expected to worsen in coming decades. A longstanding social equity concern is that 
climate adaptation efforts may not adequately address the needs of poor or marginalized people. 
Further, some adaptation interventions have the potential to worsen the vulnerability of 
marginalized populations; adaptation efforts that make climate impacts worse for other 
populations or places are termed maladaptation (Barnett & O’Neill, 2010; Juhola, Glaas, Linner, 
& Neset, 2016). 
Understanding the nature and breadth of potential maladaptation effects among 
marginalized populations is challenging. Climate adaptation interventions are nascent compared 
with other relevant policy arenas like environmental planning, community development, and 
hazard mitigation. Many places are primarily in the adaptation planning phase, rather than 
implementation (Woodruff & Stults, 2016). The newness of climate adaptation practice makes it 
difficult to evaluate the long-term outcomes of adaptation measures. This may be especially true 
for analyzing maladaptive impacts in marginalized communities, as political pressure may lead 




planning have tended to be wealthier communities (Hamin et al., 2014; Shi, Chu, & Debats, 
2015), which may bias our understanding of impacts in poorer places. 
For all these reasons, it is difficult to capture maladaptive impacts in marginalized 
communities. However, it is possible to draw lessons from closely aligned policy fields that have 
a longer history of implementation. In particular, the disaster management field has experience 
with many of the same weather hazards that are associated with climate change, and many 
strategies to mitigate the impacts of these hazards are relatively well known and well researched 
(Dovers, 2009; Preston, Mustelin, & Maloney, 2013). Research on social equity issues in hazard 
mitigation programs may provide insights applicable to climate adaptation.  
In this paper, I use case studies of hazard mitigation to explore decision-making, 
outcomes, and the context of race and poverty in environmental relocation. “Environmental 
relocation” refers to a targeted, voluntary program, run by a governing organization, which 
moves residents and development out of the way of climatic hazards (Oppenheimer & Glavovic, 
2019). These cases focus on buyouts, an oft-used environmental relocation program in the 
United States. In a typical buyout program, a government body offers to buy private property 
located in a risky area in order to demolish any land improvements and permanently ban further 
development.  
The cases in this paper focus on the community scale of buyout decision-making and 
outcomes. Scholars have often described climate adaptation as an essentially local process, to the 
point where it has become a heuristic in the literature (Corfee-Morlot, Cochran, Hallegatte, & 
Teasdale, 2011; Preston et al., 2013; Satterthwaite, Huq, Reid, Pelling, & Romero Lankao, 




climate adaptation, both from a process standpoint, including the motivations for and barriers to 
action, and from an outcomes perspective, identifying the potential for local adaptation along 
with concerns about equity and effectiveness.  
To better understand community-scale buyout decisions and outcomes in marginalized 
communities, this paper asks three interrelated research questions: How did the local decision-
making process lead to one community participating in the buyout program and the other not 
participating? What were the long-term consequences to participants and to the community of 
these different local decisions? How did the context of marginalization shape the buyout decision 
process and its outcomes? 
 The evidence to answer these questions is provided by two case studies of buyout 
decision-making and long-term recovery in Princeville, North Carolina and Lincoln City, a 
neighborhood of Kinston, North Carolina. These two communities are located in Eastern North 
Carolina on rivers which flooded after Hurricane Floyd in 1999. Both suffered widespread 
destruction of housing and infrastructure as a result. The City of Kinston implemented a 
nationally recognized buyout of hundreds of contiguous properties (NOAA, 2017). In contrast, 
the Town of Princeville, one of the oldest African American towns in the United States, decided 
against implementing buyouts and rebuilt in place. In 2016, Hurricane Matthew re-flooded both 
places. These comparative cases provide twenty years of perspective on the local decisions about 
pursuing buyout programs and the impacts of these decisions on the participants and 
communities. To bring forth evidence about how the context of marginalized communities 
shaped these decisions and outcomes, I focus on two interrelated sources of marginality: 
minority racial identity, in this case African American, and economic deprivation, defined as 




 This paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, I review the case for learning 
from hazard mitigation to better understand climate adaptation. Next, I summarize the current 
research on local climate adaptation and concerns about equity. I then review the methods, data, 
and findings from the two case studies. Using this evidence, I find that differences in leadership, 
understanding of climate risks, and competing priorities shaped the different directions of the 
decisions. As a result of buyouts, Kinston reduced its flood risk and participants gained home 
equity, but the buyout broke apart social networks and contributed to a cycle of disinvestment for 
residents left behind. Princeville, as a result of forgoing buyouts, retained its historic location and 
gained greater celebrity, but sadly suffered repeat devastation in 2016 as a result of Hurricane 
Matthew. Case comparison demonstrates several social equity problems to which environmental 
relocation programs like buyouts must attend: likelihood of concentrated relocations in 
marginalized communities, fairness and justice in the decision-making process, recognition of 
marginalized histories, and unintended consequences of relocation for poor people.  
 This research adds to scholarship on buyouts and climate change adaptation in three 
ways. First, it explores the long-term outcomes of buyouts, a major gap in the body of research 
on buyouts. It also examines the community scale as a level of analysis relevant to buyout 
decision-making, which is more typically researched at the household level. This research also 
offers lessons for inclusive climate adaptation. The conclusions about the positive and negative 
impacts of buyouts in marginalized communities will help climate adaptation specialists 
anticipate similar potential impacts in other environmental relocation programs. Third, this paper 
provides an explicit foundation to learn from a hazard mitigation practice for the purposes of 
climate adaptation. 




Despite major overlap in threats and policy responses, climate adaptation and hazard 
mitigation research and practice have developed in parallel tracks (Glavovic & Smith, 2014). 
Climate adaptation is a relatively new field of practice, but many climate weather hazards and 
their mitigation techniques are well known and well researched by the disaster management field 
(Dovers, 2009; Preston et al., 2013). Especially in the case of flooding, the strategies to reduce 
impacts have been familiar to fields like floodplain management, urban planning, engineering, 
coastal management and emergency management for decades. Therefore, the flood hazard 
mitigation strategies of recent decades can provide useful insights for climate adaptation research 
and practice. 
This study focuses on buyouts, a hazard mitigation intervention increasingly in use in the 
United States. Buyouts are an environmental relocation intervention, and as such, they provide 
an opportunity to better understand “strategic retreat” climate change adaptation strategies which 
move “people, assets, and human activities” out of high-risk areas (Oppenheimer & Glavovic, 
2019). In fact, two recent papers characterize post-disaster buyouts as managed retreat for 
climate change (Hino et al., 2017; Siders, 2018). Buyouts use private property transactions to 
reduce the exposure of the built environment to floodwaters, ideally to the benefit both of 
residents and of government, which decreases its need to expend funds for flood control 
infrastructure and disaster response (Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017). Buyouts are particularly 
relevant to communities that face sea level rise or increased risk of flooding as a result of climate 
change. They also pertain to any community that considers an organized, voluntary relocation in 
response to climate risks. The cases presented in this paper provide an opportunity to draw 




communities that will consider relocation to cope with serious climate impacts to property, 
livelihoods, and lives. 
Local Climate Adaptation: Governance and Outcomes 
 In response to climate threats, local governments worldwide have begun to consider that 
climate change adaptation will be, at least in part, their responsibility. In fact, cities and other 
local governments have emerged as leaders in climate adaptation in advance of other, larger 
scales of government (Hughes, 2015; Measham et al., 2011; Nordgren, Stults, & Meerow, 2016). 
These adaptations span land use, engineering, social education and empowerment, and 
institutional approaches like market-based tools and policy changes (Noble et al., 2014).  
Much of the research literature has assumed that adaptation is a natural fit for local 
government action, to the point where this assumption has been called a heuristic (Measham et 
al., 2011; Preston et al., 2013). There are many advantages to the local scale for adaptation, 
summarized in the bottom left quadrant of Table 1-1. Local government often controls planning, 
land use, and development, which are major drivers of vulnerability. Local government can 
reduce exposure to climate hazards through wise decisions about development approval and 
future land use (Measham et al., 2011). Other land use tools that local governments typically 
wield, such as zoning, building standards, and protected areas, are among the most effective, 
permanent strategies to reduce climate vulnerability (Noble et al., 2014). Finally, proponents 
argue that the highly localized impacts of climate change merit solutions crafted by local leaders 










Motivations for Action 
Leadership/ policy entrepreneurship 
Strong understanding of climate change impacts 
 
Barriers to Action 
Limited funding 
Limited staff capacity 
Election cycle disincentivizes 
long-term thinking 
Poor horizontal or vertical 
intergovernmental 
integration 




Local government often controls land use, so can deter 
greater vulnerability through development and future 
land use decisions 
Local governments often can enact or enhance zoning, 
building codes, and protected areas, which are 
longlasting and effective tools to reduce climate 
vulnerability 
Local governments can address localized climate impacts 
Concerns 
Risk of worse outcomes for 
marginalized populations 
Local might not be the right 
scale for action 
 
Given these advantages of local action on climate adaptation, researchers have used case 
studies and multi-city evaluations to understand why some places pursue adaptation and others 
do not, summarized in the top row of Table 1. Without a regulatory reason to act, cities that do 
take action often have strong internal leadership who champion climate adaptation (Carmin, 
Anguelovski, & Roberts, 2012; Hamin et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2015; Tanner, Zaman, Acharya, & 
Gogoi, 2019). In cities that are taking action, staff also demonstrate elevated understanding of 
the risks that they face (T. Lee & Hughes, 2017; Shi et al., 2015; Tang, Brody, Quinn, & Chang, 
2010). Early adoption of climate change adaptation is also associated with higher municipal 
spending per capita and stronger vertical and horizontal relationships in (Aylett, 2015; Shi et al., 
2015; Valdivieso, Andersson, & Villena-roldán, 2017; Westerhoff, Keskitalo, & Juhola, 2011). 





There are other barriers to local action on climate adaptation as well. Finite resources like 
funding and staff capacity are unsurprisingly found to limit local climate action (Aylett, 2014; 
Moser, Ekstrom, Kim, & Heitsch, 2019; Nordgren et al., 2016; Shi et al., 2015). The election 
cycle limits the incentive for elected leaders to take action for long-term benefit to the 
community, especially when it may be costly or unpopular in the short term (Michel-Kerjan, 
2010). Other obstacles to engaging in a process of local adaptation planning or action include 
poor horizontal or vertical integration of adaptation in government and competing priorities for 
decision-makers (Carmin et al., 2012; Ekstrom & Moser, 2014; Hlahla, Nel, & Hill, 2019; 
Lawrence, Sullivan, Lash, Ide, & Cameron, 2015; Measham et al., 2011; Mukheibir, Kuruppu, 
Gero, & Herriman, 2013). 
Some of the local economic and development priorities that compete with climate change 
adaptation are disincentives to act. Local governments often are incentivized allow development 
in risky places, like scenic coastlines, because it supports the local tax base and the local 
economy, a phenomenon deeply studied in the hazards field but also recognized by climate 
adaptation researchers (Burby, 2006; Cutter, Emrich, Gall, & Reeves, 2017; Kenworthy, 1997; 
Michel-Kerjan, 2010; Shi, 2019; UCS, 2018; D. Young & Essex, 2019). Compounding this 
problem, in the United States, the federal government builds large scale flood protection 
infrastructure, funds emergency response, and subsidizes flood insurance. Local governments do 
not bear the full cost of response and recovery that may result from development in risky areas, 
so they are not incentivized to make land use decisions that consider these full costs. 
Finally, scholars have raised concerns about outcomes of local climate adaptation, 
particularly equitability and effectiveness, summarized in the bottom right quadrant of Table 1. 




inequality worse by protecting populations with wealth and social privilege and harming 
marginalized populations (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Graham, Barnett, Mortreux, Hurlimann, & 
Fincher, 2018; Hughes, 2015; McManus, Shrestha, & Yoo, 2014; Shi et al., 2016; Vargo et al., 
2016). Researchers raise concerns about the effectiveness of local action. The local scale may 
limit the scope of climate adaptation compared with approaches that also incorporate regional, 
national, and international action (Bulkeley, 2010; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013; Nalau, Preston, & 
Maloney, 2015). Other scales of government may be better equipped to overcome the 
institutional, political, administrative, and fiscal barriers to local adaptation efforts (Bauer & 
Steurer, 2014; Shi, 2019). Although increasing numbers of local governments are planning for 
climate change adaptation, implementation remains limited (Woodruff & Stults, 2016). For this 
reason, scholarship on the effectiveness or equitability of local climate adaptation action also 
remains limited. This paper aims to fill this gap through analyzing not just decision-making 
about buyouts, but also the outcomes of those buyouts in marginalized communities.  
Case Studies  
Two cases of communities in North Carolina shed light on buyout decision-making and 
the consequences of taking a buyout, or not, for racially and economically marginalized 
participants and communities. On September 16, 1999, Hurricane Floyd made landfall in North 
Carolina, drenching Eastern North Carolina. Flooding worsened for days in the eastern third of 
the state, as upstream watersheds in the state capitol metro area and elsewhere drained into the 
coastal plain, spilling over into countless towns where it exceeded estimates of the 500-year 
flood.  
After Hurricane Floyd, the State of North Carolina committed to reducing flood risk in 




was awarded federal Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) dollars to spend on hazard 
mitigation during disaster recovery. HMGP is a flexible program which allows states to invest in 
hazard mitigation actions of their choice. The program typically funds 75 percent of eligible 
projects, leaving a 25 percent match requirement from other sources. Of all the HMGP funds that 
the State of North Carolina dedicated for residential mitigation, all were programmed for 
buyouts, as opposed to elevations or retrofits which are also eligible under HMGP. To generate 
as many buyouts as possible, North Carolina partnered with local governments to solicit 
homeowner applications and administer HMGP locally. The state government provided the 25 
percent match funds for the projects. In Kinston, officials eagerly took on a large buyout effort, 
while in Princeville, officials decided against administering a buyout. The purpose of the case 
studies is to examine the motivations for these different decisions, explore how the decisions 
influenced long-term outcomes for participants and communities, and analyze how the context of 
marginalization, both as African American communities and as poor communities, shaped 
decision-making and outcomes. 
Case study data and methods 
Disaster research often employs the case study methodology because it engages the 
temporal, political, and geographic “contextual complexity” (Rufat, Tate, Burton, & Maroof, 
2015, p. 470) of the social phenomena of disaster (B. Flyvbjerg, 2006; Leavy & Phillips, 2014; 
B. D. Phillips, 2014; Yin, 2014). Case study methods are particularly important to these cases 
because research has shown that these contextual factors affect the outcome of hazard-related 
relocation decisions (Iuchi, 2014; Sipe & Vella, 2014).  
Data for the comparative case analysis come from a variety of data sources. These 




plans, meeting minutes, and declarations; American Community Survey and Census data; the 
news media record; field notes from site visits; and participation-observation as a volunteer 
planner for a community design charrette in Princeville in August 2017 following Hurricane 
Matthew. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 19 key informants during field visits 
between June 2016 and October 2017. A purposive sample of key informants captured 
perspectives from current and prior local government officials, non-government community 
leaders, and outside professionals who contributed to the recovery and/or buyout program in both 
places after Hurricane Floyd. A snowball selection process was used to identify and interview 
(former) residents who did and did not participate in the buyout in Kinston and residents who 
experienced rebuilding in Princeville without a buyout. In addition to interview transcripts and 
notes, a contact summary form for each interview summarized interim findings and questions in 
key thematic areas following each interview (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013). 
Interview transcriptions and notes were analyzed following McCracken’s five-stage 
analysis (McCracken, 1988; Piercy, 1998). In this method, interview data are analyzed in a 
process that moves from the specific to the thematic and general. Transcripts and writeups are 
reviewed for information potentially relevant to the research questions; individual pieces of 
information are analyzed in relation to extant literature and then in relation to other pieces of 
information from the transcript. Notes and analyses are then compared across transcripts, themes 
are developed, and analysis by thematic area yields conclusions, whose evidence can be traced 
back to any of the previous levels of analysis.  
In addition, the Kinston case benefitted from administrative data on the buyouts. The City 
of Kinston provided access to buyout property transactions from the year 2001. The records 




geolocated, and analyzed. City officials cannot locate buyout records from other years. The 2001 
buyouts records represent 42 percent of all Hurricane Floyd buyouts in Kinston and are not a 
random sample of all buyouts. Therefore, findings are interpreted with caution and analysis is 
limited to descriptive statistics. Newspaper articles were found using a LexisNexis search with 
keywords “Princeville,” “Kinston,” “Lincoln City,” “Floyd,” and “buyout”. The case study 
analysis triangulates original findings with academic research on Kinston or Princeville. In 
addition to using multiple sources of data to answer research questions, research included 
engaging with the cases for over four years, debriefing with other scholars of North Carolina 
disasters, and negative case analysis to strengthen the findings (Phillips, 2014). 
Case selection 
The case selection was motivated by the opportunity to study two communities which 
made different decisions about running a hazard mitigation buyout program. The two 
communities selected in this study – one town, Princeville, and one neighborhood within a small 
city, Lincoln City within Kinston – were selected on the basis of demographic and geographic 
similarities, as well as similar levels of catastrophic flooding damage from Hurricane Floyd. 
Princeville turned down the offer of a buyout program, while Kinston pursued the buyout 
program enthusiastically. These instrumental cases (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Braun & Clarke, 2009) 
are used to draw out generalizations about local action on climate adaptation in marginalized 
communities. 
Princeville and Lincoln City 
Table 2 illustrates that residents of Lincoln City and Princeville were almost exclusively 
African-American, and both places had slightly more senior citizens than the state average. Both 




income and higher family poverty rate than Princeville. Single family homes were most common 
in both places, but in Princeville, almost half of the households owned their homes, while in 
Lincoln City, only about a quarter did.  
Table 2. Demographic and Housing Characteristics of Princeville, Lincoln City Before Buyout 
 Lincoln City* Princeville North Carolina 
Population 3,666 1,652        6,628,367  
Percent African American 99.4% 96.9% 22.0% 
Percent 65+ 12.6% 13.6% 12.1% 
HS diploma or higher 42.8% 42.7% 70.0% 
College or higher 1.8% 2.7% 12.0% 
Median income (1989 $)           6,803          10,568            26,647  
Families below poverty 56.6% 35.3% 9.9% 
Occupied housing units           1,423  621    2,517,026  
Owner occupied 25.6% 48.5% 68.0% 
Single family homes 41.3% 51.7% 67.9% 
Mobile homes 12.8% 14.5% 15.0% 
Source: Census 1990. Note: Lincoln City data refers to Lenoir County Census Tract 103, which includes most of 
Lincoln City as well as some other areas of Kinston. See Appendix 2.1 for map. 
Princeville and Lincoln City have some qualitative differences. Princeville has a special 
history as the first town chartered by African Americans in the United States. Founded in 1865, 
the town prides itself on a legacy of self-determination. Lincoln City, on the other hand, is not an 
independent administrative unit. Both communities had experienced repeated flooding from 
nearby rivers before Floyd, but Kinston had flooded in 1996 while Princeville had not flooded 
since the 1950s.  
Kinston, North Carolina 
Motivations for buyout decision 
In Kinston, the decision to pursue a buyout program was championed through its 
planning department, which expressed strong commitment to the objective of hazard mitigation. 




urgency of this objective, and planning staff recommended that the city council adopt a goal to 
remove all residences from the floodplain (FEMA, 2013). The Planning Department had even 
pre-prepared the materials for an HMGP application for buyouts after its success with a smaller 
buyout program after Hurricane Fran (Greer, 2015; G. Smith, 2011). To encourage the uptake of 
buyouts, the City of Kinston enacted a temporary construction moratorium in the areas targeted 
for buyouts to discourage rebuilding before buyout offers were made (de Vries & Fraser, 2012; 
McCann, 2006). Kinston’s hazard mitigation objective accommodated other development goals, 
such as vibrancy of the downtown district. Concerned about impacts of out-migration on the 
town’s businesses, Kinston recruited infill redevelopment in other areas and offered an extra 
$10,000 to homeowners to relocate within the municipality (FEMA, 2013; J. C. Fraser et al., 
2003).   
The decision for Kinston to participate in the state’s buyout program opened up a 
decision for individual property owners, who had to apply for a buyout. Property owners’ 
objectives tended to differ from those of local and state officials. In interviews, participants 
regarded buyouts as a chance to move to a less distressed neighborhood and avoid the 
monumental task of rebuilding. A former resident and community leader explained that the 
“good” of the buyout was that it “helped people get out of a place they wanted to get out of for 
years but didn’t have the money to get out.” Underscoring the perceived distress of the 
neighborhood, a city official described Lincoln City homes as “pitiful,” and called the buyout 
“the offer of a lifetime.” Some families lacked feasible alternatives. A former resident who was a 
child when the buyout occurred described her parents’ initial attempt to rebuild. “Well, we 
wanted to [return to our home]…I remember they tried to redo everything and then it was just 




the opportunity for residential mobility were the primary incentives for individual property 
owners, in contrast to the hazard mitigation goals of state and local officials. 
In fact, low home values along with state and local policies made not taking a buyout 
substantially more expensive for most homeowners. The older homes in Lincoln City required 
elevation to meet the local building code if it was determined that the storm caused “substantial 
damage,” or damage that required renovations costing more than 50 percent of a property’s 
value. An interviewee explained the situation:  
“If the houses had actually had some value, they probably could have stayed or it 
wouldn’t have been a substantial damage situation. So, you got a house worth 
twenty thousand dollars and you have to fully replace the electrical in it, you got 
at least ten thousand dollars of work and in almost every case it was substantial 
damage case and they couldn’t rebuild.”  
Without the option of HMGP funding to elevate, which had been available after Fran but not 
after Floyd, homeowners would have had to pay out of pocket to elevate their homes. Few 
homeowners even held flood insurance that would cover losses to their existing structure. In the 
end, 97 percent of eligible property owners in Lincoln City accepted the buyout, leading to a 
large tract of contiguous buyout properties (FEMA, 2011, 2013; McCann, 2006). The 
combination of state and local policies toward hazard mitigation shaped homeowners’ financial 
incentives to encourage buyouts and discourage rebuilding.  
Outcomes  
Administrative data suggests that Lincoln City buyout participants increased their home 
equity, moved to neighborhoods with lower levels of poverty, and reduced their flood 
vulnerability. The state realized that the low value of buyout participants’ homes (average of 
$26,067 in Lincoln City) would preclude purchasing a new house on the private market, so the 




average value of the new homes was twice as high as the original homes (see Table 3), providing 
additional home equity to participants. In addition, according to interviewees, many participants’ 
replacement homes were younger than their previous residences and had less deferred 
maintenance. These higher value homes did result in some foreclosures, however, among 
residents who could not afford the higher utilities or property taxes that came with their new 
properties, according to interview data. The town also facilitated infill redevelopment and 
attempted, only partially successfully, to spur new development that would serve buyout 
participants. 
Table 3. Home Value, Original and Post-buyout, 2001 
  n Stan. Dev. Min. Max. 
Value of Original Property $26,021 198 $17,024 $59 $94,235 
Value of Post-Buyout Home $62,046 95 $27,750 $5,404 $128,730 
 
In addition to increasing their home values, participants moved into less distressed 
neighborhoods with lower poverty, as interviewees described was a primary objective for 
household participation. According to administrative records, only five percent of participants 
relocated within the same Census tract as Lincoln City, where the poverty rate was 57 percent 
before Hurricane Floyd. On average, buyout participants moved to a Census tract with a 15 
percent poverty rate.  
Critically, the City of Kinston achieved its goal of reducing the number of residences in 
the floodplain. With HMGP funding from Hurricanes Fran and Floyd, the City of Kinston 
removed over 850 housing units from the floodplain in Kinston (North Carolina Emergency 
Management, 2016). Of all the buyout participants captured in the city’s administrative records, 




Eastern North Carolina, setting rainfall records in 17 counties, and flooding riverine communities 
once again, including Kinston and Princeville (State of North Carolina, 2017). In Kinston, 
floodwater filled many low-lying areas including the land where Lincoln City homes once stood. 
The 850 homes that likely would have flooded had been removed from this vulnerable area, 
reducing destruction and suffering.  
While the benefits to buyout participants included higher home values, lower poverty 
neighborhoods, and lower flood risk, there were also negative impacts to participants and their 
former neighbors. Previous to Hurricane Floyd, tight social networks in Lincoln City had 
provided important day-to-day benefits like carpooling and childcare. For example, one 
interviewee’s father owned a car, and before Hurricane Floyd, he had driven his neighbors to 
their shared workplace, a factory. When the household took the buyout, those former neighbors 
had to leave their jobs because they lacked their own transportation. Geographic proximity in 
Lincoln City had grounded social networks that provided services of economic value, and as the 
buyout generated geographic dispersion, these networks and services diminished. In an interview 
fifteen years after the buyouts but before Hurricane Matthew, one town official expressed a sense 
of possible regret about breaking apart the African American community in Lincoln City for a 
flood that might not come again in their lifetimes. However, since Hurricane Matthew caused 
repeat devastation and flooding in Kinston, no one has suggested that the social price of the 
buyouts was too high.  
For residents near the buyout land, the area became a disamenity. After the buyouts were 
complete, houses were demolished and utility infrastructure removed. The pavement remained, 
and over the years since the buyouts, trees and shrubs crowded the street network and some 




1). Opportunists have used the area for dumping appliances and mattresses, and for a while, 
neighbors called the police frequently on account of suspicious behavior. A local government 
official concedes that there is no political will to implement park plans that have been proposed 
for the land over the years, explaining that “there is so much need across the entire area of 
Kinston, it would be foolish, really, to spend the money in that area when it may or may not get 
used at all.”3 As this quote suggests, the buyout land is part a cycle of disinvestment in the 
Lincoln City area.  
 
                                                             
3 Park plans have included a green infrastructure plan written by University of North Carolina graduate students in 
2002; Retrofitting Green, a plan developed by the Kinston Open Space Project Committee in 2005, which calls for 
building a greenway, arboretum, and educational and recreational features, and restoring a creek, and establishing 
demonstration forestry plots; a 2015 proposal developed by a University of North Carolina graduate student, using 
community engagement in Kinston, to monetize ecosystem services in the buyout area; and over a decade of 





Figure 1. Road into buyout land in 2017 
Not only did the landscape of abandonment develop next to remaining residents, these 
residents also lost their Lincoln City neighbors. As homeowners took the opportunity to move, 
the area was drained of its homeowning households, who had provided greater social and 
economic stability, according to former residents who were interviewed. At the same time, 
significant stock of naturally occurring affordable housing was lost in the buyout. Poorer renters 
were left with a diminished supply of low-cost rental options, and many turned to public housing 
on the east side of Kinston, further concentrating African-American poverty, according to former 
residents and local officials. Table 4 summarizes the changes in Lincoln City and Princeville 
from before the buyout decision to recent years. Median income has dropped and the poverty rate 




vacant. Today, the census tract that includes the buyout land is the most economically distressed 
rural Census tract in North Carolina (High & Owen, 2014). 
 In summary, the buyout program had significant impacts for households and the 
community in which it was implemented. Many participants gained home value, moved to areas 
of lower poverty, and reduced their future flood risk, but they also lost social ties. Neighbors to 
the buyout land and former Lincoln City renters did not gain these benefits, and instead the 
buyout land, the loss of homeowning households, and the loss of naturally occurring affordable 
housing support generated further economic deprivation in the adjacent neighborhoods. While 
the buyout generated individual opportunity and reduced flood risk, it also tore the 
neighborhood’s social fabric and further distressed its economic condition.  
 
Table 4. Demographic and Housing Change in Princeville and Lincoln City, 1990-2016*  
(U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census 1990 and American Community Survey, 2012-2016) 
 
Lincoln City Princeville 
 
1990 2012-2016 Change 1990 2012-2016 Change 
Population 3,666 1,654 -55% 1,652 2,300 +39% 
Median income (2016 $) $13,167  $11,250  -15% $20,454  $27,902  +36% 
Families below poverty 56.6% 54.5% -4% 35.3% 27.3% -23% 
Housing units 1,560 925 -41% 654 968 +48% 
Occupied housing units 1,423 668 -53% 621 845 +36% 
% Owner occupied 25.6% 18.4% -28% 48.5% 58.1% +20% 
% Mobile homes 12.8% 7.8% -39% 14.5% 34.0% +134% 
* Lincoln City data refers to Lenoir County Census Tract 103, which includes most of Lincoln City as well as 







Princeville, North Carolina 
Motivations for buyout decision 
Princeville’s decision to reject a buyout program followed a different trajectory of local 
decision-making and state and federal policy context. After Hurricane Floyd, North Carolina 
Emergency Management approached town officials about a complete buyout. Unlike the local 
champion in Kinston, an external agency suggested reducing vulnerability through a large-scale 
buyout in Princeville. The Town had a very small staff that did not include a planner, and from 
the start, town officials were defensive and reluctant even to allow a discussion about buyouts 
(Associated Press, 1999a).  
Unlike the City of Kinston or most homeowners in Lincoln City, the Princeville town 
government had a seemingly attractive alternative to buyouts. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers offered to rebuild the levee that had failed during Floyd. Federal officials determined 
that the rebuilt levee would keep the town out of the 100-year floodplain, which would make its 
residents ineligible for buyouts – thus casting the decision about buyouts as a choice between 
rebuilding the levee or taking buyouts, which provided further reason to decline a buyout 
program. However, fifteen years later, federal officials would determine that the levee did not, in 
fact, provide such a high level of protection, which is discussed later (USACE, 2016). 
There was significant public debate in Princeville about whether to pursue buyouts. The 
town polled residents and held public meetings to discuss possible buyouts (Thompson, 1999c).  
For many, moving the location of the historic town or selling their land to the government 
constituted abandonment of the work of their ancestors and the town’s legacy of African 
American self-determination (Mizelle, 2016; B. Phillips et al., 2012; Yellen, 1999). As one 




cast the possible buyouts in dramatic terms, writing that “residents had to decide whether to 
return to the now uninhabited land and rebuild, or abandon forever the place where their 
ancestors first experienced full U.S. citizenship” (Associated Press, 1999b).  One interviewee 
who assisted the Town with its Floyd recovery suggested that the Town also feared that buyouts 
would spell the end of Princeville through population loss, although no Town leaders shared this 
concern in interviews.  
Some residents, at least 75 to 100 households according to different accounts, wanted to 
be able to take a buyout (Thompson, 1999b; Yellen, 1999). Some wanted a buyout so they would 
never have to deal with flooding again (Yellen, 1999) and others wanted a buyout so they would 
have the funds to rebuild (Thompson, 1999a). As one resident explained, “I would rather take the 
buyout and get cash money in my hands and decide where to go from there," (Thompson, 
1999a).  
Ultimately, the framing of buyouts as abandonment of history prevailed. After “turmoil 
and deliberation,” on November 22, 1999, the town commission split the vote (2-2) over whether 
to participate in the buyout program. Mayor Perkins cast the deciding vote against participating 
in the buyout program, citing history by saying, “Rebuilding is staying with your heritage,” 
(Burritt, 1999).  
Outcomes 
As Princeville redeveloped in place, the rebuilt levee provided a sense of security that 
turned out to be unfounded. Before Hurricane Matthew, in a 2015 interview, a town leader 
explained that residents no longer feared flooding. “I think when people came back—and you 




However, that same year, a USACE report revealed that the levee in Princeville did not protect 
the town from the 100-year storm (USACE, 2015, 2016), even though the National Flood 
Insurance Program asserts the opposite. The following year, Hurricane Matthew devastated 
eastern North Carolina, and floodwater poured around Princeville’s levee into the town (State of 
North Carolina, 2017). If Princeville’s risk had been assessed correctly, the town could have 
rebuilt its levee and administered a buyout because the buyout program was predicated on being 
in the 100-year floodplain. However, it is impossible to know if the town would have done so. 
More certain is that anyone rebuilding with a federally backed mortgage would have been 
required to hold flood insurance, which would have significantly reduced the financial losses 
during Hurricane Matthew.  
Despite reinforcing their vulnerability to flood loss, the decision to forgo buyouts 
provided some tangible benefits for households. After Princeville decided against participating in 
the buyout program, the town and its households accessed federal, state, and charitable disaster 
recovery funding to support redevelopment to its previous population size, as illustrated in Table 
3. As a result, the profile of the housing stock changed. Before Floyd, many Princeville residents 
had lived in small, hand-built homes. On one hand, these homes were an invaluable historic 
asset, but on the other hand, some homes did not meet basic modern standards such as indoor 
bathrooms. Other pre-Floyd homes had been constructed cheaply with public money in the 
1970s, and according to interview data, these homes had aged poorly and were in serious need of 
maintenance. The media record and interview data indicate that after Floyd, with generous 
recovery aid, many homeowners in Princeville “went a bit bigger” with their replacement home, 
for example, from three bedrooms to four bedrooms in a manufactured home (AP, 2000). 




develop, the stock of mobile homes, which are more vulnerable to natural disasters than other 
housing types (Bolin & Stanford, 1991), tripled to comprise a third of the town’s occupied 
housing (see Table 2).  
The town also found some benefits to preserving its location, even as it lost the 
opportunity to rebuild in a safe location. USACE fortified the levee and the town’s population 
level has surpassed pre-flood levels in the past decade (Table 2). Not only did the decision 
against participating in the buyout program preserve Princeville’s historic location, it actually 
brought greater national attention to its unique history (Tilove, 2005). Rebuilding in place, rather 
than relocating, fit into a narrative of overcoming adversity in Princeville that caught the 
attention of politicians and celebrities. President Clinton made a visit to Princeville in 1999, and 
issued an Executive Order that created a federal council that would “do more to help this city 
that occupies such a significant place in history” (Clinton, 2000). This federal council amounted 
to a few tangible outcomes, other than a lengthy recovery plan which was never implemented. 
However, interview data suggest that the experience with Hurricane Floyd put Princeville on the 
map for outsiders, who knew little about the town’s history before the fateful decision to rebuild 
and forgo a buyout. 
After the complete devastation from Hurricane Matthew, Princeville is again in the 
position to seriously consider buyouts. Many interviewees external to Princeville saw the 1999 
decision against buyouts as a missed opportunity, especially in light of the flooding damage from 
Matthew. But both before and after Hurricane Matthew, no one within the town described any 
regret—only frustration that their levee had not protected them. The process for decision-making 




different opinions. Elevations are on the table this time, as is a potential relocation project to a 
nearby tract of land, but few final decisions have been made at the time of this writing.  
Understanding Motivations and Outcomes 
Motivations for local decision-making 
The case comparison demonstrates that the decision about whether to administer buyouts 
was shaped by internal leadership, the degree of understanding of climate risks, including 
experiential knowledge, and competing local priorities, all reasons that are in keeping with the 
local climate adaptation literature. Both cases affirm the importance of leadership and policy 
entrepreneurship from within the local government. In Kinston, the town planner served as the 
local champion, and he proactively ushered his town through the buyout process by starting to 
plan for it in advance of disaster, trusting that another hurricane would come. In contrast, there 
was no strong champion for buyouts in Princeville, even though two of the Commissioners voted 
in support of the buyouts. Both towns had support from the state and federal government in the 
form of financial resources and offers of staff capacity, but only the town with local, internal 
commitment to buyouts enacted a buyouts program. 
In addition, the different levels of understanding and prioritization of future climate risks 
also motivated the two communities in different directions. In Kinston, the town planning 
director focused on the risk of repeat flooding, to the point where he conducted advanced 
planning for a buyout program before Hurricane Floyd ever struck. This understanding of 
Lincoln City’s risk was made more tangible by Hurricane Fran, which had struck just three years 
prior, and helped garner buy-in from elected officials, which previously had not been interested 
in hazard mitigation according to interview data. In contrast, interview data suggest that the risk 




Princeville’s understanding of its flood risk. First, the town had not flooded recently. References 
to previous flooding were largely stated as proof of past generations’ ability to overcome 
adversity, unlike in Kinston, where suffering flood losses was a recent experience. Second, the 
town was given incorrect information about its flood risk—namely, that the town would be 
protected from the 100-year flood if its levee was rebuilt, which was the option that the town 
selected. Hurricane Matthew, whose flooding did not extend as far as Floyd, still inundated the 
town.  The contrast between Kinston and Princeville demonstrates that accurate information, and 
the lived experience of multiple environmental hazards, supports local action on adaptation. The 
finding that experiential knowledge of climate risk motivates buyout decisionmaking is 
supported by post-Matthew consideration of buyouts Princeville. Given the recent memory of 
Hurricane Floyd, Princeville residents are worried that future floods will endanger their town in 
its current location if recovery does not add new layers of protection. This knowledge, which is 
closely linked to a sense of exhaustion with rebuilding yet again, has helped put buyouts on the 
table in Princeville after Hurricane Matthew. 
Intergovernmental relationships also emerge as a key theme in the cases, enabling local 
action. In North Carolina, after Floyd, HMGP was administered by local governments. However, 
the HMGP buyout program is a federal program, and its widespread adoption in North Carolina 
was championed by the state government. The state contributed significant resources by assisting 
with grant applications, providing match funding that often local governments must provide, and 
offering financial assistance to individual participants for relocation. Kinston’s local leadership 
to implement the buyouts was substantially supported by state and federal priorities, which made 
it feasible and effective at the local level. (On the other hand, Princeville’s decision against 




rebuild the local dyke.) These linkages among scales of government interest adaptation scholars, 
who often, but not always, focus on dysfunction in the linkages as a barrier to taking action 
(Bauer & Steurer, 2014; Corfee-Morlot et al., 2011; Hlahla et al., 2019; Lawrence et al., 2015; 
Mukheibir et al., 2013; Nalau et al., 2015; Shi, 2019; Westerhoff et al., 2011). Examples from 
hazard mitigation programming might provide a template for interscalar climate adaptation 
programs. 
Also in keeping with the literature on local climate adaptation, the Princeville case 
demonstrates the challenge of competing local priorities when deciding to take action on 
environmental relocation. Princeville sought to sustain its history legacy through retaining its 
original location, which was at odds with the buyout. However, this competing priority differs 
from the local development agenda which is more typically described as a competing local 
priority in research on hazard mitigation and adaptation (Burby, 2006; D. Young & Essex, 2019). 
Princeville is located in an undesirable area precisely because it is an African American 
community; this was an essential survival strategy for African American land owners in the Ku 
Klux Klan and Jim Crow eras (Waggoner, 2000). Similarly, Lincoln City’s population by poor 
African American households resembles much of the South, where African American 
communities are segregated in lowlying areas (Ueland & Warf, 2006). A great deal of scholarly 
literature has dedicated itself to the worthy topic of conflict between local development 
incentives and flood risk reduction (Burby, 2006; Burby & French, 1981; Cutter et al., 2017; 
Kunreuther, 2009; Platt, 1985). Greater attention might be paid to other competing priorities 




Outcomes of local action: Flood risk reduction 
These cases demonstrate provide strong evidence that local action on environmental 
relocation can result in permanent risk reduction through land use measures. The Kinston case 
provides clear evidence which demonstrates that by removing development, the town reduces 
impacts of flooding, from personal losses to government expenditures. By comparison, 
Princeville’s rebuilt levee did almost nothing to protect the town from a storm the size of 
Hurricane Matthew.  
The buyout program in Kinston provided highly localized flood risk reduction benefit, 
another of the theorized advantages to local adaptation action over other scales of governance. 
The buyout program was highly tailored to the local context, not just because it concentrated 
buyouts in localized areas of high flood impact, but because the local government also 
considered the future housing needs of potential participants through facilitating redevelopment 
and new development. The buyout program also responded to the financial needs of participants, 
but this contextualizing actually happened at the state level through the establishment of SARF. 
Contextualization at the local and state scale made the program effective and reduced some 
potential negative impacts to participating households.  
The case studies add evidence to both sides of the scholarly debate about whether local is 
the appropriate scale for climate adaptation action. As a local program, buyouts were successful 
in addressing the very localized impacts of flooding in the town – so in this sense, local action 
did generate effective results, with the caveat that it was made possible by state and federal 
government programs as well. On a larger scale, upstream development patterns in the piedmont 
region of North Carolina very likely contributed to the degree of flooding downstream, and in 




increased development, not climate change  (Klotzbach et al., 2018; Pielke et al., 2008). In this 
larger context, a greater impact strategy would be to limit the runoff from upstream development 
and increase absorption and water storage in other parts of the watershed. Small, rural 
municipalities like Kinston and Princeville are hardly positioned to incentivize these actions in 
other places; a state or federal initiative would likely be needed. 
Problems for Environmental Relocation in Marginalized Communities 
These cases demonstrate some additional serious challenges tied to the context of buyouts 
in marginalized communities. These issues require additional research among scholars of 
buyouts and climate adaptation, and they suggest the need for policy and planning innovation. 
Concentration of environmental relocation in marginalized communities 
These cases suggest reasons that environmental relocation programs may be concentrated 
in minority and marginalized communities. In particular, there may be fewer fiscal and political 
disincentives for local governments to pursue environmental relocation in marginalized 
communities. Contrary to the concern that local governments will lose tax revenue from buyouts 
or other development restrictions, interview data indicates that Kinston did not suffer any major 
loss of tax revenue because the value of the homes bought out were so low. In addition, there 
may be fewer political disincentives to environmental relocation in segregated communities. 
According to climate adaptation research, local leaders may choose not to pursue adaptation 
projects which could be unpopular in the short term, despite being beneficial in the long term 
(Adger et al., 2009). Segregation is associated with poor political representation, so elected 





A potential disproportionate concentration of environmental relocation in marginalized 
communities speaks to a paradox in the equitability of adaptation interventions. On one hand, 
marginalized populations live in floodprone areas for unjust reasons, and to the extent that 
buyouts have ill effects on communities, they deepen this injustice. On the other hand, as Siders 
(2018) explains, “not acting—leaving low-income and minority populations in areas known to be 
hazardous or using federal funding to rebuild in those areas—also perpetuates inequality.” 
Additional empirical data on the outcomes of buyouts for participants and communities may help 
build a case for one framing or the other. Critical analysis which takes into account the 
equitability of the provision of other flood mitigation strategies, including less failsafe ones like 
grey infrastructure which nonetheless get rebuilt after failing, is also needed (Martinich et al., 
2013). 
Fairness and democracy in decision making 
 The two cases illustrate social equity problems for the process of decision-making for 
local adaptation action, especially in regard to environmental relocation. Scholarship has 
identified the ability to influence climate adaptation decisions which affect one’s wellbeing as a 
social equity priority (Graham et al., 2018; McManus et al., 2014). In Kinston, as noted 
previously, local leadership in the Planning Department played a major role in implementing the 
buyout, in keeping with literature on local adaptation. However, there is no evidence that the 
overall decision to pursue a major buyout was discussed in public with the affected 
neighborhood before that decision was made. In contrast, Princeville’s elected officials 
eventually invited residents to weigh in on the decision during multiple public meetings, despite 
initial resistance to allow discussion of the buyout. Ultimately, the decision was made by elected 




hazard mitigation planning (Godschalk, Brody, & Burby, 2003), but the transformative nature of 
removing swathes of development is likely to garner more interest due the personal and 
emotional connections that people have with places (Manzo & Perkins, 2006), as it did in 
Princeville.  
The differences in decision-makers and community representation across these two 
decision-making processes may be particularly relevant to other environmental relocation 
decisions because of the importance of policy entrepreneurship to local climate adaptation action 
(Aylett, 2014; Carmin et al., 2012; Tanner et al., 2019). In Kinston, the champion for buyouts 
was a planner, an unelected position, and the affected Lincoln City community was not formally 
represented in the decision. In Princeville, where there was no internal champion for buyouts, the 
decision was made by elected officials who represented the whole of the affected community. 
Policy entrepreneurs may not be elected officials, and elected officials may not be policy 
champions for adaptation. These cases suggest that internal champions for climate adaptation are 
not positioned to represent the interests of marginalized populations, such as poor communities 
of ethnic minorities, any more than any other local government official. 
Local government decisions about buyouts are made more complex by the dual nature of 
environmental relocation as both a household-level and a community scale intervention. HMGP 
structures buyouts as a voluntary program that individual property owners elect, but at scale, 
buyouts transform neighborhoods and towns. In reality, homeowners in both towns were limited 
in their choices by decisions made by local and state government. Some Princeville citizens felt 
that the town had unduly interfered in the individual household’s choice to take a buyout (AP, 
1999; Thompson, 1999a). In Kinston, where homeowners technically had a choice about the 




scenarios raise difficult questions about who ought to make decisions about voluntary relocation 
programs. While critiques of buyout decision-making practices are mounting, research and 
practice have not yet dealt with good alternatives, i.e. how best to structure a functional and 
participatory process to make both joint and individual decisions about environmental relocation. 
Memory, history, and marginality in disappearing places 
 The case studies also raise the importance of history and memory from the perspective of 
the affected community in environmental relocation programs. Buyouts risk the loss of history 
and memory attached to a place, a concern also found in community views of relocation due to 
toxic hazards (Shriver & Kennedy, 2005). This is evidenced most strongly in Princeville, where 
buyouts were framed as an abandonment of the town’s historic legacy as the first town chartered 
by African Americans in the United States. Even in Lincoln City, which does not have as 
singular a history as Princeville, former residents still want to preserve its memory. Hundreds of 
former residents gather each spring for a weekend reunion in which hundreds of people attend. 
Community leaders wish for a memorial – “something permanent,” as one interviewee described 
it – to their former neighborhood on the land.  
The risk of loss and memory is particularly concerning among racial, ethnic, or cultural 
minorities. Cultural and ethnic minority histories and identities are often already marginalized or 
poorly recognized (I. M. Young, 1990). Typical buyout practice in the United States, along with 
managed retreat and other environmental relocation programs, are not structured to engage the 
collective nature of deep, cultural ties to place among ethnic minorities (Hardy, Milligan, & 
Heynen, 2017; Marino, 2018). Further, when a community’s ties to place are not well understood 
by external decision-makers, conflict and distrust can result (Burley, Jenkins, Laska, & Davis, 




effective and acceptable from the perspective of the administrators and the affected community 
(Baker, Binder, Greer, Weir, & Gates, 2018; Brokopp Binder & Greer, 2016; J. C. Fraser, Doyle, 
& Young, 2006; Perry & Lindell, 1997). Therefore, attending to the retention of history, 
memory, and group identity in environmental relocation will make risk reduction more just and 
more effective.  
Unintended social impacts for poor populations  
Finally, the comparison among cases reveals ways that decisions about buyouts affected 
participants and communities in both positive and negative ways outside of hazard mitigation. 
Many of these effects are directly related to the lack of wealth and prevalence of poverty in both 
communities. For participants in Kinston, the buyout provided an opportunity to increase their 
home equity through the buyout and gap financing. This outcome, outside the scope of hazard 
mitigation, has transformative potential. Homeownership is a significant source of stability and 
wealth generation in the United States, and it remains a significant area of racial stratification 
(Dietz & Haurin, 2003; Krivo & Kaufman, 2004). Further, most participants moved to an area of 
lower poverty than Lincoln City. Neighborhood conditions, such as relative wealth or poverty, 
shape life outcomes from health to educational outcomes (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, & Saez, 2014; 
Flippen, 2004; Massey & Denton, 1993; Squires & Kubrin, 2006; Yen & Kaplan, 1999). 
Buyouts unfortunately also generated some negative community effects, tied to the 
economic conditions of the neighborhood. Buyouts caused the loss of social networks, which are 
particularly important in the day-to-day lives of poor households (M. Fullilove, 2004; Nguyen, 
Webb, Rohe, & Noria, 2016; Stack, 1975; Vale, 2002). The land itself became a disamenity for 
the residents at the margins of the neighborhood, where dilapidated and unsafe housing became 




neighborhood is echoed in interview data. In addition, the buyout resulted in the loss of 
“naturally affordable” housing units, or homes on the private market that are affordable to low- 
and moderate-income households. Kinston was exceptional in that the town worked with 
developers to generate new housing options that would be affordable to buyout participants. But 
even with this effort, the town lost 207 housing units between 2000 and 2010, the period in 
which many of the buyouts occurred (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, 2010). Effects on the 
affordable housing stock in a particular place are most acute for those who cannot afford typical 
market-rate housing.  
Each of these unintended consequences demonstrate how the buyouts generated impacts 
of particular concern for poor populations. Yet, many of these consequences have potential 
remedies, such as collective relocation (Marino, 2018; Perry & Lindell, 1997), housing 
counseling and wraparound services that are used in community development programs (Varady 
& Kleinhans, 2013), and adaptation or relocation programs which build new, resilient housing in 
less risky places. The positive elements of the Kinston buyouts, such as increasing home equity, 
demonstrate that adaptation interventions could intentionally integrate homeownership programs 
or any number of programs that build material wealth or even social and political empowerment. 
It has been noted that adaptation action is more likely to occur when it coincides with 
development priorities (Aylett, 2014). However, community and economic development 
priorities may need to actively be incorporated into adaptation strategies to address inequities in 
adaptation processes and outcomes. 
This paper has demonstrated that two marginalized communities made different decisions 
about environmental relocation based on differences in leadership, perception of climate risks, 




long-term impacts of buyouts on participants and communities by case comparison. Buyouts 
permanently reduced flood risk in Kinston, and bolstered home equity for participants. However, 
the buyout program also had negative consequences for the area around the buyout land because 
the buyout generated an environmental disamenity and supported a cycle of disinvestment. By 
comparison, not taking a buyout garnered publicity and greater recognition that benefitted 
Princeville. However, the decision resulted in devastating flood losses just 17 years later. These 
cases demonstrate that there are difficult problems to solve in designing a fair decision-making 
process, including giving the community a voice in a buyout program that has a collective 
impact, but which occurs through individual homeowner decision. They also demonstrate that 
buyout programs may not anticipate the degree of unintended social risks of environmental 
relocation, including loss of marginalized histories and loss of social networks. The analysis of 
these issues can guide the research and innovation agenda on equitable climate adaptation toward 
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CHAPTER THREE. MUDDY WATER: THE RACIAL LANDSCAPE OF POST-
DISASTER BUYOUTS 
 
Climate change is bringing more intense precipitation events to the United States (Lall et 
al., 2018). This precipitation, along with sea level rise and more intense coastal storms, increases 
flood events that impact human settlements (Fleming et al., 2018; Hirsch & Archfield, 2015; 
Slater & Villarini, 2016). At the same time, increased development in risky areas is driving up 
the frequency and severity of damaging floods (Klotzbach et al., 2018; Mileti, 1999).  
 Flooding has a disparate effect on socially vulnerable populations, including ethnic and 
racial groups that experience discrimination and marginalization. Marginalized populations may 
be more likely to live in floodprone areas (Ueland & Warf, 2006) and lack resources that others 
use to cope with flooding and rebound quickly (Finch, Emrich, & Cutter, 2010; Peacock, 
Morrow, & Gladwin, 1997). Further, strategies to manage flood risk and adapt to changes in 
flooding patterns can have disparate burdens (Anguelovski et al., 2016). For example, efforts to 
reform the National Flood Insurance Program to better reflect flood risk may exacerbate 
affordability problems for the poor (Kousky & Kunreuther, 2013).  
 This article examines how one land use strategy to manage flood risk may reflect or even 
exacerbate racial inequality. This study analyzes the distribution of post-disaster buyouts with 
respect to race and segregation in North Carolina. Post-disaster buyouts are a land use strategy 
that removes vulnerable properties from risky areas by buying them from willing homeowners. 




perpetuity. However, buyout proposals have been critiqued by scholars and community members 
for their potential racially disparate impacts. Specifically, critics have argued that buyouts 
dismantle African American communities (Bullard & Wright, 2012; B. Phillips et al., 2012), 
intentionally or unintentionally. For this reason, it is important to understand whether buyouts 
disproportionately occur in communities of color, and the implications of their distribution for 
racial inequality. 
North Carolina is an important place to study the intersection of flood resilience and 
racial justice because of its leadership in both areas. In the 1990s and 2000s, the State of North 
Carolina ran one of the nation’s most aggressive hazard mitigation programs, including buyouts, 
which later became a model for other states (Berke, Lyles, & Smith, 2014). In addition, after 
Hurricane Floyd in 1999, the State developed the nation’s most advanced floodplain mapping 
program. North Carolina is also a leader in racial justice movements. The state was the birthplace 
of the civil rights sit-in movement in the 1960s and the environmental justice movement in the 
1970s and 1980s, both of which spread across the nation. North Carolina is a microcosm of 
environmental topographies common to other states that experience major flooding, especially 
Southeastern states where watersheds include extensive coastal wetlands, agricultural plains, 
historic rural towns, and growing urbanized areas. 
 To understand the racial distribution of post-disaster buyouts in North Carolina, this 
study asks: Is the incidence of buyouts associated with the share of racial minorities in a 
neighborhood? If an association is found, could it be explained by (1) coincident higher levels of 
poverty or (2) concentrations of racial minorities in the floodplain? Using administrative and 
Census data, this study finds that the share of African Americans in a neighborhood is 




controlling for poverty and for flood vulnerability. In addition, segregation is associated with 
high-buyout neighborhoods. Two explanations are offered for the preponderance of buyouts in 
segregated, African-American neighborhoods. A procedural justice explanation suggests that 
local leaders target African American areas for buyouts out of explicit or implicit prejudice. A 
distributive justice explanation suggests that historic disinvestment in African American 
neighborhoods may make residents more interested in moving to another area through a buyout. 
 The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, I review buyouts in the context 
of flood risk management and climate adaptation. Next, theories of distributive justice, 
procedural justice, and recognition are discussed, along with their application to buyouts and 
managed retreat. Methods, data, and empirical results are presented and then discussed. Finally, I 
offer recommendations for buyouts practice and buyouts research. 
This paper fills a gap in the literature by offering empirical analysis of buyouts with 
respect to race. Scholarly critique of race in buyouts and managed retreat has employed case 
study research (Bullard & Wright, 2012; Hardy et al., 2017; Marino, 2018; B. Phillips et al., 
2012). This is the first study to examine the racial geography of buyouts across an entire state. It 
also demonstrates how race-neutral strategies for flood risk reduction can reflect and potentially 
worsen racial inequality. Ultimately, because inequality drives social vulnerability, addressing 
the ways in which buyouts exacerbate racial injustice will advance resilience.  
Buyouts and Flood Risk Reduction 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the federal approach to reducing physical 
vulnerability to flooding evolved from a minor role to a sprawling set of infrastructure programs 




that land use-based strategies are more effective than infrastructure and insurance to cope with 
flooding impacts (Beatley, 2009; Berke & Campanella, 2006; Brody & Highfield, 2013; Burby et 
al., 1999; FEMA, 2013; Holway & Burby, 1993; Mileti, 1999; Stevens, 2010; White, 2011).4 
Anticipatory land use strategies reduce development intensity in floodprone areas. Responsive 
land use strategies remove existing development located in vulnerable areas, which is the 
objective of post-disaster buyouts. The climate adaptation field recognizes buyouts as one of the 
only extant models for implementing “managed retreat” from areas at risk for increased climate 
risks in the United States (Hino et al., 2017; Siders, 2018). The lessons drawn from the 
experiences of implementing buyouts will inform interventions that advance hazard mitigation 
and climate resilience. 
The first federal post-flood buyout occurred in the late 1970s in Soldiers Grove, 
Wisconsin, where local leaders convinced federal officials that it would be less expensive and 
more effective to move the town’s downtown district away from the river than to build a levee 
(David & Mayer, 1984; Tobin & Peacock, 1982). The practice expanded when several 
Midwestern towns implemented buyouts after the Mississippi River floods of 1993 (Freudenberg 
et al., 2016; Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee, 1994; Knobloch, 2005; 
Maly, Kondo, & Banba, 2017). Since then, buyouts have been used across the nation, often after 
a flooding disaster but sometimes under blue skies as well. Typical funders include the 
Community Development Block Grant for Disaster Recovery run by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Developent (HUD) and multiple programs under FEMA, including the Pre-Disaster 
                                                             
4 Home elevations are effective in many cases compared with homes on grade, but buyouts are still more effective 
than elevations. Elevated homes may still flood depending on building standards and changes in the floodplain due 




Assistance Grant Program, the Flood Mitigation Assistance Grant Program, and the Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP).  
HMGP is the nation’s largest source of buyout funding that requires that buyout 
properties remain as open space in perpetuity.5 This program is authorized by the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1989, and it can fund any number of 
hazard mitigation activities, from residential retrofits to utility upgrades. In buyouts funded by 
HMGP, state, tribal, or local authorities receive federal funds to purchase properties located in 
vulnerable areas. Typically, the funds go through state government, which determines whether 
buyouts will be among the activities for which local governments, homeowners, or others will 
receive funding. For residential HMGP activities, states may solicit subapplications from local 
governments, which in turn solicit interest from homeowners. Participating property owners 
receive the market value of their house, which then is demolished and must remain open space in 
perpetuity. FEMA has funded an estimated 40,000 buyouts in the United States (NPR, 2019). 
Although FEMA buyouts are lauded as a wise federal investment in permanent risk 
reduction, there are concerns and critiques of buyouts—and other programs that remove 
development—from a social justice perspective. For example, environmental justice scholar 
Beverly Wright describes New Orleans’ early recovery plan sketches, which identified areas 
where previously developed land might be converted to open space, writing, “What became 
perfectly clear after a first glimpse of the new map, or, as it was called, the smaller footprint, was 
that the footprints of African Americans in New Orleans were to be erased,” (2012). Siders 
                                                             
5 HUD does not require that buyouts be maintained as open space in perpetuity, although lower levels of government 




(2018) argues that the process of implementing buyouts may exacerbate social inequalities 
through lack of transparency and a program’s vulnerability to political influences. 
Concerns about equity issues related to buyouts are compounded by a relative paucity of 
data and research on this topic. A critical first question is whether buyouts are a social benefit or 
a burden, and to whom. Because of heterogeneity in buyout program design, implementation, 
and context, and limited research on long-term outcomes (Brokopp Binder & Greer, 2016; Greer 
& Brokopp Binder, 2017), it is difficult to draw universal conclusions about who benefits and 
who is harmed by buyouts.  
However, it is possible to outline groups of stakeholders and possible benefits and 
burdens that accrue to these groups. Individual buyout participants reduce their future flood risk 
if they move to an area of lower risk. Participants also may benefit socially or economically from 
moving into a different neighborhood, though a recent an analysis of buyouts on Staten Island, 
New York, finds that most recipients moved to areas with greater social vulnerability than before 
(McGhee, 2017). Psychological stress, loss of place attachment, and loss of social networks can 
also ensue from relocation (Agyeman, Devine-Wright, & Prange, 2009; Perry & Lindell, 1997).  
Buyouts also affect stakeholders apart from buyout participants. Neighbors to buyout 
properties may benefit if the property becomes more of an amenity than the residence was to the 
neighborhood (Zavar, 2015b). Homeowners might benefit if conversion to parks and recreational 
space improves property values, although recent research on “green gentrification” also warns of 
potential displacement effects for renters when neighborhoods add environmental amenities 
(Curran & Hamilton, 2013; Sze & Yeampierre, 2018; Wolch, Byrne, & Newell, 2014). On the 




disamenity for neighbors. Residents of the local community have particular place-based 
identities, histories and cultures that could be dismantled by buyouts, if buyouts change the built, 
natural, or social environment dramatically; this concern is particularly high among ethnic and 
cultural minorities (Agyeman et al., 2009; B. Phillips et al., 2012).6 Buyouts also diminish 
housing supply, which could spur or exacerbate housing problems due to limited housing stock. 
As this analysis suggests, the context of buyouts – where they occur, who takes buyouts, what 
happens with the land, and how it impacts housing – shapes the distribution of benefits and 
burdens. Through the lens of multiple frameworks of justice, it is possible to understand how 
buyouts could both reflect and contribute to racial inequality, and why questions of racial justice 
matter for buyouts and managed retreat. 
Three Concepts of Justice and Relevance to Buyouts 
Multiple conceptualizations of justice have been adapted to environmental and climate 
policy issues in ways that sypport the analysis of racial and social equity in buyouts (Bulkeley, 
Carmin, Castán Broto, Edwards, & Fuller, 2013; Ikeme, 2003; Paavola & Adger, 2006; 
Schlosberg, 2012). Three such theories include distributional justice, procedural justice and 
recognition. Distributional justice, or an equal distribution of benefits and burdens among all 
people, builds from Rawls’ “justice as fairness” theory (Rawls, 1971). Rawls argues that all 
people should have equal access to basic goods, and where inequality in the distribution is 
unavoidable, the greatest benefit should go to the least well-off. Critical geographers extend this 
                                                             
6 Taxpayers and government also are affected, albeit less personally. Local government may lose tax revenue from 
removing homes from the tax roll, but could also save expenses if infrastructure is removed or municipal services 
are reduced (BenDor et al., 2018). On the other hand, if the buyout land becomes an amenity, neighbors’ property 
values could increase and tax revenue would go up. Federal government and taxpayers benefit if the avoided losses 




view and argue that the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens is generated and maintained 
through spatial proximity and segmentation (Harvey, 2009; Lefebvre, 1974; Soja, 2010).  
Through spatial, social, economic, and political avenues, disaster and climate change 
burdens are distributed unequally, and the burden falls more heavily on marginalized 
communities (Gutierrez & LePrevost, 2016; Klinsky & Dowlatabadi, 2009; Lal, Alavalapati, & 
Mercer, 2011; Levy & Patz, 2015; Morello-Frosch, Pastor, Sadd, & Shonkoff, 2012). 
Marginalized populations have disproportionate exposure to physical vulnerabilities and 
simultaneously, they have fewer resources to adapt. Scholars also find that interventions that 
intend to increase climate resilience can exacerbate inequalities, for example, through 
infrastructure investments or land protections that prioritize privileged populations or burden or 
displace historically marginalized populations (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Barnett & O’Neill, 
2010).  
This displacement is the primary concern of scholars who critique buyouts and other 
interventions for the retreat of development (Bullard & Wright, 2012; B. Phillips et al., 2012). 
There are other ways that buyouts may reflect and contribute to distributional racial injustice, 
too. Buyouts may reflect racial inequality because buyouts are designed as an option of last 
resort in places that are not protected from flooding by infrastructure or land use regulation 
(Bukvic & Owen, 2017; Freudenberg et al., 2016). Socially vulnerable populations, including 
racial and ethnic minorities, are more likely to live in areas that lack these protections (Martinich 
et al., 2013). One reason for a concentration of racial minorities in the floodplain is that, prior to 
the 1960s, housing discrimination and racial violence limited non-White families to less 
desirable areas, such as swampy and floodprone neighborhoods (Ueland & Warf, 2006). Another 




American families have lower wealth than white families (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006), and 
properties in floodprone areas not protected by infrastructure cost less, and therefore are more 
affordable to households of lower wealth (D. Lee & Jung, 2014). Areas with lower property 
values face a disadvantage in justifying flood protection investments by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, which must exceed benefit-cost ratio of 1.0, where “benefit” is measured by the 
market value of structures protected. Communities of color may also have less political power to 
steer local, state, and federal decisions about infrastructure.  
For all these reasons, it is not surprising that the first communities that must relocate 
explicitly because of climate change in the United States are comprised of people of color—
Native American communities in Louisiana and Alaska (Davenport & Robertson, 2016; 
Herrmann, 2016). Therefore, it is important to understand the context of buyouts with respect to 
historically marginalized populations, which is the present research objective.  
Some scholars critique the distributional equity model because its emphasis on a static 
distribution of goods does not explain the process that creates and reinforces social inequity. One 
group of these critics argue that unequal political and economic power creates distributional 
inequalities through controlling information and decision-making processes (Bent Flyvbjerg, 
1991; Forester, 1989; Habermas, 1985; Healey, 2006). Advocates for greater procedural justice 
argue for decision-making processes that engage all stakeholders and for building the capacity of 
those stakeholders to take part in decisions (Innes & Booher, 2010). The procedural justice 
framework provides theoretical reasons that buyouts could disproportionately occur in 
communities of color, or why their implementation could burden racial minorities more than 
whites. Without a process designed for adequate representation, decision-making, including 




benefits that favors historically privileged groups (Douglas et al., 2011), a point which has been 
made specifically about buyouts (Siders, 2018). Racial segregation can diminish political 
representation (Massey & Denton, 1993), one critical element of procedural justice, which is one 
reason that racial segregation is included in this research study as a key independent variable of 
interest. The procedural understanding of justice provides additional avenues for exploring ways 
in which buyouts could reflect racial and social injustice. 
A final scholarly paradigm for justice relevant to buyouts is recognition. Scholars 
developed the concept of recognition to incorporate the identities and subjective, contingent 
experiences of different groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities, in an understanding of 
justice (C. N. Fraser, 1999; Honneth, 1992; Taylor, 1997; I. M. Young, 1990). Advocates argue 
that decision-making must recognize and integrate group identity in order to achieve justice, 
including in the context of climate adaptation (Martin et al., 2016; Schlosberg, 2012). Further, 
many marginalized perspectives argue that recognition itself is the ultimate goal of struggles for 
justice that enable cultural survival (Schlosberg, 2004).   
The justice framework of recognition pertains to buyouts because buyouts can risk the 
loss of unique histories and memories, especially those of the subaltern. People develop place-
specific bonds with one another and the environment where they live, called “place attachment” 
(Altman & Low, 1992). Some research shows that place attachment is higher among racial and 
ethnic minorities (Brown, Perkins, & Brown, 2003). Because of place attachment, disruption or 
loss of one’s home or neighborhood, such as could result from buyouts, leads to trauma and 
alienation (M. T. Fullilove, 1996). In addition to psychological aspects of place attachment, 
subjective understandings of “place” contributes to the development of identity (Burley et al., 




of the group identities at the center of literature on recognition, especially where it intersects with 
other group identities such as cultural or racial identities. Through transforming landscapes, 
major land use changes negatively affect place identity (Wester-Herber, 2004). The potential for 
buyouts to cause this loss is particularly concerning for group identities that have survived long-
term subjugation and external devaluation, such as racial minorities (B. Phillips et al., 2012). 
Market pressures and climate change are already threatening cultural erasure for marginalized 
racial and ethnic groups located in risky areas (Adger, Barnett, Marshall, Brown, & O’Brien, 
2012; Durkalec, Furgal, Skinner, & Sheldon, 2015; Hardy et al., 2017). The concept of 
recognition provides a theoretical scaffolding for analyzing how buyouts could contribute to 
inequality by jeopardizing minority identities, histories, and cultural survival. 
A Note on Colorblindness 
These three concepts of justice – distributional justice, procedural justice, and recognition 
– demonstrate that multiple justice frameworks contribute to our understanding of the causes and 
effects of unequal distribution of buyouts by race. All three theories of justice suggest avenues to 
achieve justice through different public policy approaches. However, addressing racial justice in 
public policy issues like buyouts and climate adaptation is made more difficult by the modern 
ideology of “colorblindness.” Colorblindness refers to an erroneous belief that society has 
entered a race-neutral existence, in which dismantling racism is no longer an appropriate 
objective of the government (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). This belief drives changes in public policy 
that dismantle affirmative action, school integration, and other programs designed to advance 
racial equality (Saito, 2015). Under the paradigm of colorblindness, racial disparities can only be 
understood as relics of historic discrimination that continue to exist today for nonracial reasons 




racial inequality is perpetuated by the strength of social, economic, and political institutions, 
which must be changed in order to bring about racial justice (Feagin, 2006). Hampered in its 
ability to acknowledge or intervene in structural racism, colorblind public policy faces major 
limitations to advancing racial justice. This study aims to counter colorblind approaches to flood 
risk reduction and climate adaptation by documenting the racialized geography of buyouts and 
discussing two socio-spatial constructions that might play a role in generating racial 
concentrations of buyouts: poverty and floodplain exposure.  
Methods 
Research questions and hypotheses 
To understand the racial distribution of post-disaster buyouts in North Carolina, this study asks, 
is the incidence of buyouts associated with the share of racial minorities in a neighborhood or the 
degree of segregation? If an association is found, could it be explained by (1) coincident higher 
levels of poverty or (2) concentrations of racial minorities in the floodplain? The following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Neighborhood racial composition is associated with buyouts. 
H 1-1:  The share of African Americans in a neighborhood is associated with more 
buyouts 
H 1-2: The level of local segregation is associated with more buyouts 
If evidence supports Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 proposes that two nonracial variables could play 
a role. 
Hypothesis 2: After controlling for poverty and/or flood vulnerability, the association between 




H 2-1: After controlling for poverty, the association between neighborhood racial 
composition and buyouts is no longer statistically significant. 
H 2-2: After controlling for flood vulnerability, the association between neighborhood 
racial composition and buyouts is no longer statistically significant.  
Data 
Data used in this study come from state and federal sources, summarized in Table 5. 
Administrative data come from the North Carolina Emergency Management Division (NCEM). 
NCEM provided data on all projects funded by HMGP in North Carolina, including, but not 
limited to, buyouts. These projects occurred with funding made available after disasters that 
occurred between 1996 and 2010. During this time period, 5,532 HMGP projects were 
completed in the state, of which 4,715 were buyouts.7 The geocoding was done with ESRI 
ArcMap and it was cross-referenced with Google Maps and county tax parcel data. Buyouts were 
agglomerated by Census tract, which was the geography used to represented neighborhoods.  
The study also uses data on flood vulnerability. Floodplain data come from the National 
Flood Hazard Layer, which supports the National Flood Insurance Program. These floodplain 
data were overlaid with spatial data on the location of all buildings in the state of North Carolina, 
which come from the North Carolina Flood Risk Information System (FRIS).8 Using this 
overlay, it was possible to calculate the share of buildings in each tract exposed to differently 
defined floodplains in each Census tract. Floodplains considered in the analysis include the 100-
year or 1% chance floodplain, the 500-year or 0.2% chance floodplain, and the coastal V-zone, 
                                                             
7 Multi-unit buyouts – for example, of a small mobile home park – are represented as the number of units that were 
bought out.  
8 North Carolina Flooplain Mapping Program provides the Flood Risk Information System as a means for the public 




which is a 100-year floodplain with special risk due to risk of high wave heights. Flood 
vulnerability metrics also included a binary variable that indicated whether the tract was in a 
county declared a disaster after Hurricanes Fran and Floyd. These two hurricanes occurred in 
1996 and 1999, respectively, and account for the funding for 94.4% of the buyouts. 
Finally, these tract-level data on buyouts and flood vulnerability were joined with 
demographic and economic data on neighborhood characteristics. These characteristics are 
captured by the U.S. Census. Census data from 1990 were used because these data pre-date the 
hurricanes of the 1990s and their subsequent buyout programs. Most of the buyouts (4,463 or 
97.2%) were funded in association with disasters that occurred prior to 2000. The key racial 
characteristic pulled from the Census was share of population that is African American. Racial 
justice critiques of buyouts, especially those in North Carolina, have mostly been based in places 
that are home to African Americans (Bullard & Wright, 2012; Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, & Laska, 
2007; B. Phillips et al., 2012). These data were interpolated from the 1990 Census to 2010 
Census geography by the Longitudinal Tract Database (Logan, Xu, & Stults, 2014). 
In addition to the racial composition of neighborhoods, the data also include a measure of 
segregation, the Dissimilarity Index. The Dissimilarity Index is a measure of evenness that 
indicates the share of people in a particular county that would need to move among its composite 
Census tracts in order for the share of each Census tract to match that of the county. More 
segregated counties have higher levels, and vice versa. The Dissimilarity Index requires the 
specification of two groups for comparison; whites and African Americans are used in this study. 
The final key independent variable in the dataset is the share of people living in households 
under the poverty line is taken from the Census. Additional control variables include share of 




$100,000 (1989 dollars), share of housing built before 1950, share of housing built after 1980, 
percent rural as defined by the Census, county population, county population growth rate, and 
census tract population. These additional control variables come from the Census. 
Table 5. Variables Used in Study 
Variable Name Definition Measurement Source(s) 
Buyouts (Dependent variable) Number of buyouts in the tract Count NCEM 
African Americans Proportion of African Americans in tract Proportion Census 1990 
Dissimilarity Index Share of people within county who would need to move so that 
every tract’s share of white and nonwhite residents was equal 
Proportion Census 1990, 
calculated by 
author 
Poverty Share of people in households under the poverty line Proportion Census 1990 
Vulnerability: 100-year 
floodplain 
Share of buildings in the tract located in 100-year floodplain Proportion FRIS 
Vulnerability: 500-year 
floodplain 
Share of buildings in the tract located in the 500-year floodplain Proportion FRIS 
Vulnerability: V-zone Share of buildings in the tract located in the coastal V-zone Proportion FRIS 
Vulnerability: Hurricane Fran Tract located in county declared for major disaster and FEMA 
Individual Assistance after Hurricane Fran (1996)  
Binary (0|1) FEMA 
Vulnerability: Hurricane Floyd Tract located in county declared for major disaster and FEMA 
Individual Assistance after Hurricane Floyd (1999)  
Binary (0|1) FEMA 
HMGP participation Tract located in jurisdiction that administered HMGP Binary (0|1) NCEM 
Control Variables    
Senior citizens Share of population 65 years old or older Proportion Census 1990 
Mobile Homes Share of housing units that are mobile homes Proportion Census 1990 
Housing under $100K Share of housing valued under $100,000 in 1989 dollars Proportion Census 1990 
Older homes Share of housing units that were built before 1950 Proportion Census 1990 
Recent development Share of housing units that were built after 1980 Proportion Census 1990 
Rural Share of housing units???? In rural areas Proportion Census 1990 
County population Population count Count Census 1990 
County population growth rate Growth rate in county, 1970-1990 Proportion Census 1990 
Census tract population Population of Census tract Count Census 1990 
 
Distribution of the dependent variable and effect on models 
The association between buyouts (dependent variable) and neighborhood characteristics 
(independent variables) in populated census tracts (n=2,171) was assessed with multivariate 
regression. Two characteristics of the distribution of the dependent variable influenced the 
research design: an excess of zeroes and an excess of extreme positive outliers. In the dataset, 88 
percent of the census tracts (n = 1,936) contain zero buyouts. Data with an excess of zeroes are 
termed zero-inflated. Zero-inflated data create or reflect two different problems  (Lambert D, 




to biased results. Second, zero-inflated data can occur when two distinct conditions or processes 
are governing a model: one which generates zeroes, and another which generates variation in 
non-zero values (Lambert D, 1992; Mullahy, 1986; Washington, Karlaftis, & Mannering, 2004). 
In either situation, a zero-inflated count model can be used. A zero-inflated model is comprised 
of two steps. The first step is a model that examines the influence of independent variables on the 
zero-generating process by modeling the dependent variable as a binary outcome: zero for all 
zero values, and one for all nonzero values. Then, in the second step, a separate count model 
examines the variation in the nonzero dependent variable observations. This is specified as a 
Poisson or negative binomial model, and includes only the non-zero values of the dependent 
variable. The Poisson distribution assumes equidispersion, or the condition in which mean equals 
the variance of the dependent variable, while the negative binomial model relaxes this 
assumption. The buyout data are overdispersed, as determined by a Pearson’s chi-square test 
(p<.0000), so a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) was selected.  
This analysis adapts the zero-inflated model to capture two distinct conditions in zero-
buyout tracts. Most tracts (n = 1,577) with zero buyouts were located in a jurisdiction that ran an 
HMGP program, but there were no buyouts in that tract. Households in that tract may have taken 
a different type of HMGP project, such as home elevations. Other tracts have zero buyouts 
because they are located in jurisdictions that did not administer a Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program during the study period (n = 582), despite the fact that all North Carolina local 
governments were eligible to participate. Because these tracts had no possibility of having any 
buyouts, these observations are “structural zeroes.” 
The process governing local governments’ decisions to administer HMGP is assumed to 




buyouts in an area where the local government is participating. Therefore, the zero-inflated 
model distinguishes between structural zeroes and all other observations, including non-
structural zeroes. In the first step, Model 1, the dependent variable is a binary indicator of 
whether the tract was in an area that administered HMGP, or in other words, whether or not the 
tract is a structural zero. Model 1 (n=2,171) uses a logit model to test the association of this 
dependent variable with race and segregation, poverty, flood vulnerability and all control 
variables. The second step, Model 2 only includes tracts in jurisdictions that administered 
HMGP (n=1,592). Model 2 uses a negative binomial model to examine the association between 
the dependent variable, the count of buyouts, and the same set of independent variables. Because 
three independent variables are measured at the county level (segregation, county population, 
and county growth rate), the standard errors for these models and all others are clustered at the 
county level. 
In addition to excess zeroes, the data also have extreme positive outliers, indicated by a 
kurtosis measure of 581, where a kurtosis measure greater than 3 is considered high 
(Wooldridge, 2013). Among tracts with at least one buyout, the average number of buyouts was 
18, but there was a large variation in that number, up to 565 in one tract, as illustrated in Table 6. 
These extreme outliers matter from a policy perspective. We may not expect one buyout to have 
a major effect at the neighborhood scale, but that possibility becomes more tangible at 10 
buyouts, and even more likely at 100 buyouts. Therefore, the neighborhoods with the largest 
numbers of buyouts – those extreme outliers – are of special interest. Without data on threshold 
effects of buyouts, there is no singular logical way to segment the outliers from other 
observations. A typical definition of an outlier is any value outside 1.5 times the value of the 




tracts in places that administered HMGP. Therefore, three different methods are used and the 
results are compared in Models 3 through 5. Models 3 and 4 use a binary dependent variable to 
differentiate extreme outliers from other observations, excluding structural zeroes (n=1,592). In 
Model 3, the outliers are defined as any tract above one standard deviation from the mean (>18 
buyouts). In Model 4, the outliers are defined as any tract above two standard deviations from 
the mean (>36 buyouts). Model 5 uses a negative binomial model and the full count data, but 
includes only those observations with at least one buyout (n=258). 
Considering vulnerability and poverty as confounders 
Pre-buyout flood vulnerability creates a problem for studying the relationship between 
race and buyouts, and this problem has both statistical and real-world significance. From a 
statistical perspective, flood vulnerability could separately influence both race and buyouts, and 
this joint influence could confound the results if race and buyouts are not independently related. 
There are reasons to anticipate the joint influence of flood vulnerability. Tracts with greater flood 
vulnerability may have greater numbers of buyouts because flood vulnerability likely motivates 
household participation in HMGP. Racial minorities might be more likely to live in the 
floodplain due to historic discrimination and higher poverty rates (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990, 
2017). Together, these problems suggest a relationship between race and buyouts could be 
explained, fully or in part, by vulnerability or poverty.    
Understanding flood vulnerability and poverty as potential confounders also serves policy 
recommendations and brings to light the relevance to different conceptual frameworks of justice. 
If a disparate racial geography of buyouts is explained by flood vulnerability or poverty, it would 
suggest a distributive justice intervention focused on fairer access to wealth building or housing 




between race and buyouts, procedural aspects like power and representation in decision-making 
might play more of a role. In either case, it is important to identify the intermediary drivers of 
racial disparities so that they can be addressed through policy and other types of interventions. 
Therefore, instead of simply controlling for flood vulnerability and poverty, they are added to the 
model one by one to illustrate the degree to which each accounts for the statistical relationship 
between race and buyouts. The models within each step-wise regression are indicated by a letter 
after the number of the model (i.e. Model 2a excludes poverty and flood vulnerability, Model 2b 
adds poverty only, Model 2c adds poverty and flood vulnerability). 
A final methodological concern is the potential for multicollinearity between race and 
poverty in the dataset. A high degree of multicollinearity among key independent variables 
makes coefficient estimates unreliable because it is difficult statistically to distinguish their 
effects on the dependent variables. The correlation coefficient between percentage African 
American and percent in poverty is 0.65, which indicates that the two variables are correlated, 
but they do not exceed the recommended maximum correlation coefficient for multivariate 
regression, 0.8 (Menard, 2011). Variance inflation factors (VIF) were also used to test for 
multicollinarity. A VIF above 10 is generally considered the threshold for unacceptable levels of 
correlation (Wooldridge, 2013). None of the VIFs exceed 3.1. By both of these metrics, the 
results are not compromised by multicollinearity. For reference, a table of correlation 
coefficients is included as Appendix 3.1. To further ensure that results were not compromised by 
multicollinearity, three alternative specifications add and drop certain variables to test for 
sensitivity to changes that would indicate that multicollinearity is a problem. The findings are 




multicollinearity between share of African Americans and poverty level is generating unreliable 
estimates in the main models.  
Results 
Buyouts are more frequent in African American neighborhoods 
There are 2,171 populated Census tracts in the state, of which 12% had at least one 
buyout in the study period (Table 6). On average, tracts with at least one buyout had a greater 
share of African Americans (32.1%) than tracts without buyouts (18.5%), and higher rates of 
poverty (17.7% versus 11.6% in neighborhoods without buyouts). Segregation was lower in 
tracts with buyouts than in tracts without buyouts. Finally, tracts with buyouts have a greater 
share of buildings the 100-year and 500-year floodplains, but fewer buildings in the coastal V-
zone, on average.  
 
Table 6. Characteristics of Census Tracts in North Carolina 





buyout Min Max 
Buyouts      
 Has at least one buyout (%) 0.119 0 1 0 1 
  (0.324) (0) (0) 
  
 Number of buyouts 2.172 0 18.28 0 565 
  (17.20) (0) (46.94) 
  
 HMGP participation (%) 0.732 0.696 1 0 1 
  (0.443) (0.460) (0) 
  
Race and Segregation      
 African American  0.202 0.185 0.321 0 0.995 
  (0.218) (0.207) (0.256) 
  
 Dissimilarity Index (Segregation) 0.435 0.442 0.384 0 0.671 
  (0.142) (0.140) (0.151) 
  
Poverty      
 Poverty 0.123 0.116 0.177 0.003 0.668 





Flood Vulnerability      
 Impacted by Hurricane Floyd (1999) 0.653 0.631 0.818 0 1 
  (0.476) (0.483) (0.387) 
  
 Impacted by Hurricane Fran (1996) 0.590 0.558 0.822 0 1 
  (0.492) (0.497) (0.384) 
  
 100-yr Floodplain 0.0361 0.0285 0.0923 0 1 
  (0.0974) (0.0859) (0.147) 
  
 Coastal V-zone 0.00367 0.00378 0.00286 0 0.816 
  (0.0364) (0.0372) (0.0302) 
  
 500-yr Floodplain 0.0141 0.0114 0.0344 0 0.719 
  (0.0483) (0.0446) (0.0665) 
  
Other Controls      
 Seniors 0.120 0.119 0.132 8.91E-05 0.472 
  (0.0552) (0.0562) (0.0454) 
  
 Rural 0.519 0.517 0.536 0 1 
  (0.425) (0.424) (0.434) 
  
 Mobile Homes 0.155 0.152 0.178 0 0.791 
  (0.134) (0.133) (0.138) 
  
 Homes with value < $100K 0.777 0.767 0.856 0 1 
  (0.223) (0.225) (0.189) 
  
 Older Housing 0.166 0.162 0.194 0 0.841 
  (0.134) (0.135) (0.124) 
  
 New Development 0.312 0.3206 0.246 0 0.972 
  (0.173) (0.176) (0.125) 
  
 County population (10k) 18.64 19.47 12.46 0.541 51.143 
  (16.40) (16.50) (14.25) 
  
 County growth (20 year) 0.374 0.385 0.292 -0.134 2.252 
  (0.262) (0.264) (0.229) 
  
 Total Population 3,025.7 2,923.1 3,786.3 1 10,340 
  (1,483.0) (1,470.4) (1,350.8) 
  
Observations 2171 1913 258     
 
The regression findings in Table 7 measure the association between buyouts (the 
dependent variable) and race, segregation, poverty, flood vulnerability and other neighborhood 
characteristics. Model 1 is the first step in the ZINB model, and the dependent variable is a 




estimates the association between this dummy and the full set of independent variables. The 
results show no association between HMGP participation and African Americans or segregation.  
 
Table 7. Buyouts & Neighborhood Characteristics: Regression Results 
    Model 1 Model 2(a) Model 2(b) Model 2(c) 
Race and Segregation     
 African American -0.41 2.80*** 2.41*** 2.44* 
  (0.85) (0.55) (0.71) (0.99) 
 Segregation -0.06 0.81 0.78 0.18 
  (2.50) (1.79) (1.78) (1.87) 
      
Poverty & Flood Vulnerability    
 Poverty 4.67  1.63 -1.65 
  (2.82)  (1.99) (2.22) 
 Hurr. Floyd -0.41   -1.11 
  (1.00)   (1.97) 
 Hurr. Fran 2.12*   1.51 
  (0.94)   (1.83) 
 100-yr FP 24.94   11.63* 
  (13.72)   (5.17) 
 500-yr FP 9.62   1.41 
  (9.87)   (3.00) 
 V-zone -2.07   -13.36* 
  (2.93)   (6.07) 
      
Other Controls     
 Seniors -7.77* 7.14 7.28 4.55 
  (3.39) (4.06) (3.97) (3.89) 
 Rural -0.56 -0.94 -0.93 -0.23 
  (0.56) (0.58) (0.59) (0.63) 
 Mobile Home 2.92 4.67** 4.78** 2.09 
  (1.57) (1.76) (1.78) (1.83) 
 Home Value < $100K -1.28 -0.41 -0.54 -0.13 
  (0.76) (0.51) (0.53) (0.47) 
 Older Homes 1.31 -0.55 -0.77 0.11 
  (1.05) (1.23) (1.36) (1.50) 
 New Homes 1.85** -3.79** -3.77** -3.28** 
  (0.66) (1.39) (1.32) (1.19) 
 County Pop. 0.08** -0.04** -0.04* -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 County Growth -0.23 -0.05 -0.19 -0.86 
  (1.31) (1.12) (1.08) (1.22) 
 Total Population 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Constant -0.84 -1.28 -1.33 -2.01 




 lnalpha  2.67*** 2.67*** 2.55*** 
      (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
 Observations 2171 1592 1592 1590 
  Pseudo R-squared 0.340 0.066 0.066 0.081 
 Standard errors in parentheses    
 ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"   
 
The results from the second step of the ZINB, Models 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c), find that there 
is a statistically significant, positive association between the count of buyouts and the share of 
African Americans in a tract (p<0.05). This association is not eliminated by controlling for 
potential confounders poverty and flood vulnerability. Segregation is not associated with the 
count of buyouts in this model. Among the flood vulnerability variables, the share of buildings in 
the 100-year floodplain was positively associated with the count of buyouts but the share of 
buildings in the coastal V-zone was negatively associated with the count of buyouts (p<0.05 for 
both). All models control for size of county, population growth, rural/urban characteristics, share 
of senior citizens, value and age of housing, share of recent housing development, and mobile 
homes.  
When using maximum likelihood estimation, a typical indicator of the fit of the model is 
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. Pseudo R-squared values are lower than R-squared values; 
pseudo R-shared values of 0.2 to 0.4 are considered an “excellent fit” (McFadden, 1977). By this 
rubric, the model for the first stage of the ZINB has an excellent fit (0.34) but the models for the 
second stage do not (0.07-0.08).  
High-buyout areas have more African Americans and higher segregation 
Models 3, 4, and 5 find that there are greater shares of African Americans and higher 
rates of segregation in high-buyout tracts, measured in three different ways. These results are 




greater than one and two standard deviations from the mean, or >19 and > 36 buyouts, 
respectively. Model 3(a) shows a positive association between African Americans and high-
buyout tracts, but this association goes away when controlling for poverty and flood vulnerability 
in Model 3(c). However, all variations of Model 4 find a strong association between African 
Americans and high-buyout tracts, even after controlling for poverty in Model 4(b) and both 
poverty and flood vulnerability in Model 4(c) (p<0.01).  
Table 8. Regression Results for High Buyout Neighborhoods 















Race and Segregation          
 African American 2.57*** 2.22* 1.39 3.19*** 3.52*** 3.08*** 0.79* 0.78 0.28 
  (0.66) (0.96) (1.14) (0.68) (0.70) (0.85) (0.39) (0.49) (0.50) 
 Segregation 2.32 2.27 3.94** 3.21 3.25 4.68** 2.91** 2.90** 3.08*** 
  (1.46) (1.48) (1.44) (1.84) (1.83) (1.74) (0.91) (0.89) (0.77) 
Poverty and Vulnerability         
 Poverty  1.33 -0.55  -1.27 -4.30  0.04 -1.34 
   (2.51) (2.81)  (2.22) (2.29)  (1.43) (1.35) 
 Hurr. Floyd   0.07   0.32   0.69 
    (0.70)   (0.89)   (1.25) 
 Hurr. Fran   2.23*   1.64   -0.14 
    (0.99)   (1.03)   (1.25) 
 100-yr FP   3.74***   2.44   1.30 
    (0.99)   (1.87)   (0.83) 
 500-yr FP   6.00***   8.93***   4.82** 
    (1.71)   (2.50)   (1.59) 
 V-zone   0.00   0.00   -7.67*** 
    (.)   (.)   (1.34) 
Other Control Variables          
 Seniors 2.59 2.61 2.94 8.69* 8.80* 11.06** 1.95 1.97 2.20 
  (3.61) (3.60) (4.27) (3.82) (3.86) (4.24) (3.36) (3.42) (3.11) 
 Rural -1.98** -1.95** -1.27 -1.51 -1.54 -0.47 -1.12** -1.12** -0.64 
  (0.67) (0.67) (0.84) (0.82) (0.85) (1.20) (0.40) (0.41) (0.49) 
 Mobile Home 5.98** 5.94** 4.12 6.60** 6.73** 3.74 3.78** 3.78** 1.95 
  (2.00) (1.98) (2.66) (2.42) (2.40) (3.40) (1.18) (1.19) (1.35) 
 Home Value < $100K -1.28 -1.38 -0.57 -1.63 -1.50 -0.40 -0.28 -0.28 0.20 
  (1.59) (1.54) (1.89) (2.22) (2.40) (3.21) (0.59) (0.60) (0.50) 
 Older Homes -0.93 -1.11 -1.17 -4.12* -3.92 -4.66 -0.38 -0.39 -0.47 
  (1.19) (1.22) (1.42) (2.09) (2.15) (2.87) (1.01) (1.09) (1.01) 
 New Homes -2.66 -2.62 -2.52 -5.41* -5.41* -4.93* -2.57* -2.57* -1.84 
  (1.64) (1.63) (1.73) (2.62) (2.63) (2.42) (1.29) (1.26) (1.10) 
 Total Population 0.00* 0.00* 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00* 




 County Pop. -0.12** -0.12** -0.13* -0.11** -0.11* -0.11 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 County Growth -1.65 -1.72 -1.74 -1.62 -1.56 -1.66 0.04 0.03 -0.43 
  (1.34) (1.27) (1.46) (1.35) (1.36) (1.48) (0.57) (0.58) (0.50) 
 Constant -2.35 -2.38 -5.83* -3.42* -3.43* -7.11* 1.78 1.78 0.60 
  (1.33) (1.35) (2.35) (1.41) (1.45) (2.80) (0.94) (0.95) (0.94) 
 lnalpha       0.30*** 0.30*** 0.19* 
                (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
 Observations 1592 1592 1519 1592 1592 1519 258 258 258 
  Pseudo R-squared 0.244 0.245 0.334 0.264 0.264 0.352 0.052 0.052 0.068 
 Standard errors in parentheses         
 ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"        
 
The fully controlled Model 3(c) and Model 4(c) and all variations of Model 5 find that 
segregation is statistically significantly associated with high buyout tracts (p<0.05). Model 5 
uses a negative binomial model to examine the association between independent variables and 
the count of buyouts in a tract, comparing only those tracts that had at least one buyout. The 
positive association between segregation and greater numbers of buyouts is particularly strong in 
all variations this model (p<0.001). Model 5 does not find a statistically significant relationship 
between share of African Americans and greater numbers of buyouts. None of the models of 
high-buyout areas find a statistically significant association with poverty. Among flood 
vulnerability variables, the share of tracts in the 500-year floodplain was the only statistically 
significant predictor of high-buyout areas across all models that included flood vulnerability, 
Models 3(c), 4(c), and 5(c) (p<0.01). In Model 5(c), the coastal V-zone is strongly and 
negatively associated with higher counts of buyouts (p<0.001). 
Alternative specifications 
Three alternative specifications examine whether multicollinearity between share of 
African Americans and poverty could result in unreliable estimates. Alternative Specification A 




African Americans: share of homes built before 1950 and share of homes valued under 
$100,000. It is possible that these variables contribute to overspecification of the model, which 
would reduce the explanatory power of the poverty and share of African Americans variables. 
The results from Alternative Specification A for Models 1-5 (fully specified versions only, i.e. 
Models 2c, 3c, 4c, and 5c) are detailed in Appendix 3.2. After dropping variables with mild 
collinearity, poverty still is not statistically significant, except in Model 4, where the coefficient 
estimate on poverty is negative. Dropping these variables does not change the statistical 
significance of the variable for share of African Americans in any of the models.  
Next, Alternative Specifications B and C add a variable for the share of African-
American poverty. If African-American poverty was a statistically significant variable, or if 
adding this variable changed the significance of African-Americans population share, it would 
suggest that the relationship between buyouts and African American neighborhoods was specific 
to poor African American neighborhoods. It would suggest that poverty and race were 
simultaneously playing a role. Alternative Specification B added African-American poverty, and 
Alternative Specification C added African-American poverty and took out overall poverty. As 
illustrated in Appendix 3.2, adding a variable for African-Americans poverty in Alternative 
Specifications B and C did not change the statistical significance and direction of the main model 
results, nor was the new variable statistically significant, with the exception of Model 1, where 
the dependent variable is participation in HMGP. As a whole, the fifteen models run under these 
Alternative Specifications A, B, and C do not suggest that multicollinearity is a problem for the 
primary findings of the main models about the statistical association between the share of 






Race and segregation in buyouts 
The results demonstrate that buyouts have a racial neighborhood geography with respect 
to African Americans and segregation. Most evidence supports Hypothesis 1-1: The share of 
African Americans in a neighborhood is associated with more buyouts, and Hypothesis 1-2: The 
level of local segregation is associated with more buyouts. However, this racial geography likely 
is not explained by disparate neighborhood exposure to floodprone areas. Adding controls for 
flood vulnerability changed only the results of Model 3. Therefore, the evidence does not support 
Hypothesis 2-1: After controlling for flood vulnerability, the association between neighborhood 
racial composition and buyouts is no longer statistically significant. 
The racial geography of buyouts also likely is not explained by an association of race and 
poverty. Before controlling for poverty, the share of African Americans is statistically 
significantly associated with buyouts in Model 2(a), and the high-buyout tracts in Models 3(a), 
4(a) and 5(a). After adding poverty to these models, the share of African Americans loses its 
statistical significance in Model 5 only. Poverty alone is not a statistically significant predictor of 
buyouts in any of the Models 1 through 5. Therefore, moderately strong evidence points against 
Hypothesis 2-2: After controlling for poverty, the association between neighborhood racial 
composition and buyouts is no longer statistically significant.  
Finally, the model results show that the racial geography is specific to buyouts and not to 
overall HMGP participation. Race and segregation were not statistically significant predictors in 
Model 1, which examined their association with participation in the HMGP program. The share 




This finding suggests that the linkage between race, segregation, and buyouts derives from 
buyouts specifically, rather than the overall HMGP program implementation. 
Buyouts in a racialized landscape 
The results suggest that buyouts, despite being a race-neutral intervention, have a 
racialized outcome which is likely not explained by higher flood vulnerability and higher poverty 
rates. The models find that a concentration of African Americans in the floodplain does not 
explain the statistical association between buyout rates and African Americans in a 
neighborhood, and it is likely not explained by higher poverty rates, either. However, there are at 
least two other explanations, one procedural and one distributive, that may shed light on causal 
mechanisms. 
First, buyouts are the end product of a subjective process to design and implement a 
buyout program, which makes room for implicit or explicit racial bias. At the outset, buyouts 
appear to have an objective goal: reduce vulnerability of residents by removing their residences. 
However, across the nation 30 million people live in a floodplain and thousands of homes lie in 
the floodplain in North Carolina alone (Furman Center, 2017). Many of those homes might be 
justified for buyouts under FEMA’s cost effectiveness test, a point which buyouts scholar Siders 
describes in a 2018 review of eight buyout programs, writing that “decisions often involve 
political motivations and rely on cost-benefit logic that may promote disproportionate retreat in 
low-income or minority communities.” Further, Greer and Brokopp Binder write, “As it stands, 
there is no cohesive set of best practices to guide the design and implementation of home buyout 
programs and to help ensure that they consistently facilitate the best possible outcomes for 
participating households and communities” (Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017). The federal 




prioritized for hazard mitigation interventions, other than to encourage states to use a 
prioritization of some kind (FEMA, 1998, 2015a). Often the decision is ultimately up to local 
government, and it is it is possible that local officials who select neighborhoods or homeowners 
to prioritize for buyout applications employed implicit or explicit racial bias.   
The lack of prioritization criteria is compounded by the nondemocratic nature of buyout 
decision-making. There is no requirement that a local package of buyout applications go through 
public review (apart from public comment during environmental review once the package of 
buyouts has been submitted to FEMA) despite major community impacts of a large buyout. A 
review of nine buyout programs finds that “the federal policies that guide the development of the 
programs are lenient, nearly to the point of being a blank check…This also leaves the affected 
communities in a vulnerable position, as there are few checks and balances in place to ensure 
that programs are designed to reflect community needs and interests,” (Greer & Brokopp Binder, 
2017). A study of the post-Sandy New York and New Jersey buyout programs finds that 
“specific target areas were selected not only based on risk analysis but due to political, 
economic, and social factors. The selection of buyout areas and qualification of eligibility occur 
through political decisions at multiple government levels,” (Maly et al., 2017). This top-down 
process particularly raises concerns for segregated communities of color because segregation is 
associated with reduced political capital and poor political representation. The overabundance of 
segregation in areas with buyouts suggests that populations most impacted by buyouts may have 
the least voice in a process with major localized community development impacts. This 
explanation is also supported by previous research, which has found that residents of 
neighborhoods highly impacted by buyouts were not represented in key decisions about the 




 In addition to the politicized and subjective nature of state and local decision-making 
about buyouts, buyouts also operate in a larger landscape shaped by investments that have 
political and racial origins. Capital markets have historically and continually discriminated 
against African American neighborhoods (Apgar & Calder, 2005; Hanson, Hawley, Martin, & 
Liu, 2016; Munnell, Tootell, Browne, & Eneaney, 1996; Rugh, Albright, & Massey, 2015). The 
lack of investment undermines economic security and leads to social problems. Therefore, 
residents of African American neighborhoods may have more reason to want a buyout as an 
opportunity to move to a different neighborhood.  
 If more buyouts occur in neighborhoods with more African Americans because of the 
social and economic benefits of relocation, buyouts may worsen inequality by solidifying 
conditions of disinvestment. During a buyout, equity that was held in real estate in the 
neighborhood is removed and placed elsewhere. Further, buyouts may disproportionately remove 
homeowners from a neighborhood. Homeowners in owner-occupied homes may be more 
interested in a buyout than landlords who want to continue profiting from their rental homes (J. 
C. Fraser et al., 2003). Homeownership provides greater economic and social stability to 
neighborhoods (Haurin, Dietz, & Weinberg, 2003; Rohe & Stewart, 1996) which could be lost 
through a major buyout program. 
Buyouts that are concentrated in areas with more African Americans may also worsen 
inequality through threatening cultural recognition and continuity. Neighborhoods with greater 
numbers of buyouts are subject to greater disruptions of the social and natural environment, and 
the consequential psychological effects and diminishment of place-based group identity. These 
issues have come to light particularly in the case of Princeville, North Carolina, which has a 




and leaders felt that accepting buyout would cause the loss of their history and legacy (B. 
Phillips et al., 2012). African Americans and other marginalized populations are more likely to 
experience permanent dislocation than groups with more power and resources (Morrow-Jones & 
Morrow-Jones, 1991). The concentration of buyouts in African-American communities could 
lead to disproportionate diminishment or loss of African-American histories, memories, and 
place-based identities. 
Conclusions 
Recommendations for buyouts practice 
The analysis presented in this paper suggests several recommendations with respect to 
buyouts practice. The first recommendation is for better community representation and 
participation in the design and implementation of buyout programs. This recommendation is not 
unique to this paper or to issues of racial justice; research has documented that poor community 
engagement is associated with lower satisfaction with buyout programs (Baker et al., 2018). 
Community participation should move beyond traditional public decision-making forums, which 
have been shown to favor more privileged groups in society (Bent Flyvbjerg, 1991). Community 
empowerment requires a process in which qualified representatives of communities’ stakeholders 
have actual decision-making power (Arnstein, 1969; Davidoff, 1965). Capacity building and 
leadership training can generate such representatives from the community itself. These 
approaches require time and funding to succeed. FEMA is in a position to fund decision-making 
and planning processes, or at least could recommend such approaches through their HMGP 
guidance (FEMA, 2015b, 2015a). States similarly could incentivize engaged decision-making 
processes for buyouts through obligation of state funds or through a requirement for the 




A second recommendation is to re-examine options within buyout programs to reduce 
negative consequences, which would reduce disproportionate distribution of burdens even if 
buyouts continue to be concentrated in segregated, African-American neighborhoods. One option 
that Native communities in Louisiana and Alaska are considering is whole community 
relocation. Whole community relocation may reduce some of the community-wide effects of 
buyouts, such as worsening disinvestment among those “left behind” by the buyout, loss of 
social networks, and loss of place attachment and identity. Group identity can be symbolized 
through the creation of a new or different built environment, but only if it is fully recognized and 
ingrained in the design of that place (Low, Taplin, Scheld, & Fisher, 2002). Over 20 years ago, 
emergency management scholars Perry and Lindell outlined insightful recommendations for 
relocating whole communities, with major emphasis on building community capacity, effective 
communication, social and personal needs of relocating households, preservation of social 
networks, and attention to cultural and organizational differences among minority groups (Perry 
& Lindell, 1997). These principles for relocation, if implemented, would permit the reduction of 
flood risk while minimizing community-wide losses that may be especially acute in communities 
of color. 
Outside of whole community relocation, there are other strategies that can reduce the 
unintended negative consequences of buyouts, especially those likely to disproportionately affect 
African American communities. For example, buyout land can become a community amenity 
like a park or natural recreation and education area. It can also house a historic marker or other 
reflection of the site’s history. Homeownership programs and other wealth development 
activities can target areas within and around buyout sites, to reduce the likelihood that the buyout 




homeownership through incorporating these objectives into program design. Achieving these 
outcomes requires planning and financial and political commitments which are not currently 
incentivized by HMGP. Despite this, federal and state officials are in a position to incentivize, 
fund, and/or require additional planning and investment in concert with buyouts.  
Pre-disaster planning and programming is one way in which community engagement can 
be improved, alternative or complimentary solutions can be explored that might reduce 
disproportionate burden of buyouts in African American or other marginalized communities. 
Pre-disaster planning can help state and local governments achieve hazard mitigation goals 
through buyouts while taking into account holistic community development goals (Boyd et al., 
2014; G. Smith, 2014c). Without the time pressure of the disaster recovery, more creative 
options may be explored, which ultimately positions communities to advocate for those solutions 
should a disaster occur. Capacity building programs that build the ability of marginalized 
populations to take part in decision-making, and equally important, that build the ability of the 
government to incorporate participation from diverse stakeholders, have more time to succeed if 
implemented before disaster. 
A final recommendation is for the development of education and outreach materials that 
more adequately represent unintended consequences, racial justice issues, and strategies to 
overcome both. There is a growing grey literature that champions buyouts as a resilience strategy 
aimed at local decisionmakers and the lay public, e.g. (Freudenberg et al., 2016; e.g. NOAA, 
2017). This literature should more fully engage social justice issues and lay out 
recommendations for reducing unintended consequences of buyouts. This grey literature has 
been authored by organizations with land and natural resources missions; those organizations 




organizations that have racial justice missions like the NAACP or organizations with community 
engagement expertise. In addition, a robust education and outreach program aimed at community 
members can generate more community-level awareness about potential benefits and burdens of 
buyouts, which will help them advocate for strategic investments in their community that reduce 
negative consequences. 
Research recommendations 
There is a need for more research on race, social justice, and buyouts or other managed 
retreat strategies. North Carolina bears topographical, demographic, and development patterns 
similar to other southeastern states, which lends external validity to this study. Repeating this 
study in a region of the nation with significantly different social and environmental landscapes 
may yield different results. To achieve this research goal, improved data are needed. FEMA or 
another institution should collect standardized data on buyouts for us in research. Even basic data 
about where buyout participants move is largely lacking (McGhee, 2017). Longitudinal research 
will better capture the effects of buyouts for people and for places. In addition, a greater 
understanding of the relationship between buyouts and community context, such as racial and 
socioeconomic characteristics, will help buyouts researchers and practitioners interpret the racial 
geography of buyouts. For example, buyouts may generate different types of benefits for 
surrounding neighbors in high-wealth areas than in low-wealth areas. Comparative case research 
could provide greater insight on how the socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental features of 
a place affect the outcomes of buyouts. 
Finally, climate adaptation in the United States has focused primarily on reducing 
physical vulnerability, but the field has not as thoroughly addressed reduction in social 




inequality is a major social vulnerability driver. By focusing just on the reduction of physical 
vulnerability, the resilience field misses the opportunity to address inequalities that increase 
social vulnerability and likely affect the distribution of physical vulnerability as well. Buyouts 
are a critical tool for reducing flood risk in vulnerable areas, but without attending to their 
consequences for racial justice, they risk worsening inequality. 
This paper has demonstrated that buyouts in North Carolina have a particular racial 
geography. They are concentrated in African American neighborhoods in counties with high 
levels of segregation. The statistical association between race, segregation, and buyouts is not 
explained by the correlation between race and poverty, nor by a concentration of African 
Americans in locations vulnerable to flood. This racial geography may result from subjective 
buyout processes that make room for implicit or explicit racial bias through politicized decision-
making. Or, historic disinvestments may make residents of African American neighborhoods 
more interested moving out, and therefore interested in taking buyouts. It is critical to improve 
engagement and transparency in buyout decision-making, and to take action to mitigate 
unintended consequences or disproportionate burden experienced by African American 
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CHAPTER FOUR. THE ROLE OF POST-DISASTER BUYOUTS IN NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHANGE: A 20-YEAR ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
Introduction 
Local and state governments use residential buyouts to mitigate flood risk. In a typical 
home buyout, the government purchases a property from a private homeowner located in an area 
at high risk of flooding. The government takes ownership of the property, demolishes the built 
structure, and ensures that the parcel remains open space in perpetuity. As a result, the buyout 
permanently eliminates the exposure of the improved property to floodwaters. The increasing 
popularity of buyouts as a flood mitigation tool coincides with an increase in flooding due to 
development pressures and climate change (Fleming et al., 2018; Hirsch & Archfield, 2015; 
Klotzbach et al., 2018; Mileti, 1999; Slater & Villarini, 2016). The process of moving 
development out of high-risk areas, especially those at facing greater risk due to climate change, 
is termed “managed retreat” (Agyeman et al., 2009; Hino et al., 2017; Siders, n.d.). 
Buyouts are intended to mitigate hazards for an individual property, but they can have 
larger collective effects as well. For one, they reduce the exposure of the public sector to the 
expenses of flood response and recovery and can provide a last-resort option for communities 
with many households that are struggling to recover from flooding (Aronoff, 2017; BenDor, 
Salvesen, Kamrath, & Ganser, 2018; Freudenberg et al., 2016; Godschalk, Rose, Mittler, Porter, 
& West, 2009; Tate et al., 2015). Buyouts may also affect neighbors and towns in the long term 
in other ways. Town officials are often worried about loss of their tax base from out-migration or 




McCann, 2006). An additional concern is whether buyouts generate a disinvestment effect in the 
places where they occur (Freudenberg et al., 2016). By demolishing housing, buyouts remove 
capital investments from a particular place, strategically disinvesting in built assets (G. Smith, 
2014b). Historically, in the neighborhood development context, disinvestment of built capital 
from a neighborhood has been associated with racially concentrated poverty, crime, and decline 
in housing quality, neighborhood amenities, and municipal services (Raleigh & Galster, 2015; N. 
Smith, Caris, & Wyly, 2001; Wyly & Hammel, 1999). For this reason, it is important to track 
whether buyouts, a critical tool for flood hazard mitigation, might have unintended long-term 
effects at the neighborhood scale. Despite the growing popularity of buyouts, researchers have 
only begun to understand long-term effects (Zavar, 2015b; Zavar & Hagelman, 2016). For this 
reason, decision-makers are implementing buyouts without a holistic understanding of their 
potential long-term impact on local communities. 
The present research study aims to address this gap in the research by looking at the 
effect of buyouts on neighborhood change. I examine neighborhood change in places with 
buyouts, and because buyouts necessitate migration, I also look at neighborhood change in 
places near buyouts, where spillover effects might occur. Specifically, I ask whether buyouts are 
associated with change in neighborhood housing stock and the racial mix of neighborhood’s 
residents, two conditions that affect the impact of neighborhoods on residents’ lives (Chetty et 
al., 2014; Flippen, 2004; Massey & Denton, 1993; Squires & Kubrin, 2006; Yen & Kaplan, 
1999). Using data from the State of North Carolina, where 4,800 buyouts were implemented 
after hurricanes in 1996 and 1999, the findings suggest that buyouts are associated with a process 
of disinvestment and white flight. For each house that received a buyout, there was an average 




composition, and region of the state among other factors. Racial effects were most pronounced in 
spillover neighborhoods near buyouts. Adjacency to a high-buyout neighborhood was associated 
with growth in the share of Black residents and decline in the share of White residents. These 
findings are consistent with the theory that buyouts are associated with disinvestment, out-
migration, and white flight. 
The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, I review major theories of 
neighborhood change and explain why they might apply to the buyouts context. Next, I introduce 
more thoroughly buyout policy and North Carolina’s recent disaster history. In the following 
sections, I explain my methods and data sources. In the findings section, I review descriptive 
statistics about neighborhood change in areas with buyouts, and present the modeling results. 
The modeling results are broken into two sections: first, the results that pertain to change in the 
neighborhoods where buyouts occur; these are termed “direct effects.” The second section of the 
results pertains to changes in neighborhoods surrounding buyouts; these are termed “spillover 
effects.” After discussing the results, I provide several implications for buyouts practice and 
research. 
Neighborhood Change Theory 
Neighborhoods are spatially bounded places, smaller than cities, which share social ties 
(Schwirian, 1983). The characteristics of neighborhoods are not limited to urban areas; 
neighborhoods can also refer to suburban and rural nodes of population (National Geographic, 
2019). Neighborhood change refers to transition in the socioeconomic characteristics and 
physical conditions of the neighborhood (Schulze Bäing, 2014; Temkin & Rohe, 1996). Patterns 
of neighborhood change matter because neighborhoods affect residents’ health (Katz, Kling, & 




Garner & Raudenbush, 1991; Harding, 2003), employment status (Anil et al., 2010; Massey & 
Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1996), and intergenerational economic mobility (Chetty et al., 2014). The 
way in which neighborhoods change – both in terms of their conditions and their residents – 
affect the distribution of opportunities and life conditions in the general population. 
Sociologists at the University of Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s developed the earliest 
theories of neighborhood change. Ernest Burgess’ 1925 model of the city featured concentric 
zones, ranging from “socially excluded” near the central business district to “stable low-income” 
to “wealthy.” As new immigrants arrived, ethnic groups moved through the concentric zones of 
status through a pattern that Burgess compared to ecological invasion and succession (Burgess, 
1925). Burgess’ work influenced a large body of neighborhood change models which became 
known as “ecological models.” Ecological models explained neighborhood change as the product 
of external economic forces that act on people and places. Through the twentieth century, 
ecological approaches provided influential, if controversial, explanations of many neighborhood 
change phenomena (Downs, 1981; Duncan & Duncan, 1957; Hoover & Vernon, 1959; Lowry, 
1960; Muth, 1985).  
Two particularly impactful theories that grew from ecological theories are “filtering” and 
“tipping.” Filtering is an early theory of the Chicago School, which holds that as long as cities 
grew, upwardly mobile households would move into newer housing, leaving older housing to 
become affordable to other populations – often residents of color – as it deteriorated in value 
(Fisher & Winnick, 1951; Hoyt, 1933). This theory of neighborhood “succession” provides a 
supply-side explanation for the provision of affordable housing as well as neighborhood decline 
and its racial connotations (Temkin & Rohe, 1996). In 1971, Thomas Shelling introduced a 




migration decisions depend on their socio-demographic preferences for neighbors. When racial 
minorities move into a neighborhood, the White residents tolerate their presence to a particular 
“tipping point,” at which white residents leave en masse, also known as white flight (Card et al., 
2007; Schelling, 1971). Small demographic changes, such as in-migration of a small number of 
minorities, can create major demographic change in a neighborhood. Real estate agents may 
steer minority residents into racially mixed areas at the edge of white neighborhoods to prompt 
the tipping effect (Galster, 1990). 
Almost immediately after the emergence of ecological theories, scholars took issue with 
the assumption that neighborhood change could be explained entirely by larger social and 
economic forces. These researchers, who came to be known as subculturalists, argued that 
specific cultures within a city, called “subcultures,” drive neighborhood development (Firey, 
1945; Fischer, 1975). Today, researchers find that internal, neighborhood-level drivers like 
culture, leadership, and local institutions affect neighborhood change (Saldivar-Tanaka & 
Krasny, 2004; Stoecker, 1994). This research challenges the assumption that whiter 
neighborhoods or wealthier neighborhoods are necessarily more desirable by demonstrating that 
poor neighborhoods and neighborhoods of ethnic minorities offer unique amenities like social 
networks, which are particularly important to poor residents (Gans, 1962; Logan, Zhang, & Alba, 
1975). Related work has demonstrated how residents’ attachment to their neighborhoods affects 
their decisions about where to live, including the context of disaster and climate change 
(Agyeman et al., 2009; Curley, 2010; Lewicka, 2010; Manzo, 2003; Manzo, Kleit, & Couch, 
2008).  
Another field of neighborhood change literature based in political economy emerged in 




investment of capital in cities did not simply rely on the rules of economics but was driven by the 
allied interests of a small number of land-holding elites (Castells, 1977; Lefebvre, 1974; Logan 
& Molotch, 1987). These scholars also critiqued of ecological models for their on the assumption 
that neighborhood change is determined by the social status of in- and out-migrants. They argued 
that patterns of investment and disinvestment in the capital stock of neighborhoods drove 
neighborhood socioeconomic conditions (N. Smith et al., 2001; Stone, 1993).  
Political economists and subculturalists have particularly critiqued ecological models’ 
treatment of race. Scholars of race in the United States have long recognized that segregation 
limits the life opportunities of Black and other minority residents (Jargowsky, 1996; Massey & 
Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1987). The social, health, and economic benefits of living in a 
neighborhood of higher wealth or status are collectively termed “locational attainment” (Logan, 
Alba, Mcnulty, & Fisher, 1996), which captures the linkage between socioeconomic status and 
neighborhood, and the benefits denied by systemic barriers to minority in-migration. Ecological 
theorists argued that as the economic status of racial and ethnic minorities improved, they would 
assimilate into whiter and wealthier neighborhoods (Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1925). This 
theory is known as “spatial assimilation,” and there is some modern research that suggests that 
spatial assimilation occurs, particularly in non-Black immigrant populations (Scopilliti & 
Iceland, 2008). However, most evidence suggests that systems of racial segmentation, from 
redlining to real estate steering, limits the movement of minorities, especially Black households, 
into White neighborhoods (Charles, 2003; Massey, 1985). This phenomenon is termed “place 
segmentation,” to set it apart from the theory of spatial assimilation (Charles, 2003). For 




consider other systemic drivers of segregation and white flight captured by place segmentation, 
such as redlining and discriminatory real estate practices.  
In recent decades, many scholars such as Grigsby et al. (1987) and Temkin and Rohe 
(1996) have acknowledged the evidence that economic, cultural, and political drivers shape 
neighborhoods. Given this synthetic understanding, the hypothesis in this paper, that buyouts 
affect neighborhood change, builds on multiple theories of neighborhood change. A common 
theme among multiple theories of neighborhood change is the motivations and outcomes of 
households’ locational decision-making. This locational decision-making is a core component of 
the buyout process: As part of a buyout, households must affirmatively decide to move. 
Therefore, the idea that a large group of households are making decisions about where to live 
suggests that buyouts may trigger neighborhood change – both in the place where buyouts occur 
but also in the place to which participants move. In addition, buyouts may affect neighborhood 
change through strategic disinvestment that affects a neighborhood’s capital stock, a key element 
of political economists’ understanding of neighborhood change. Finally, the concept of “place 
attachment” is a recurrent theme in research on post-disaster buyouts, which has demonstrated 
that degree of place attachment affects buyout uptake by individual homeowners. 
The hypothesis that buyouts affect neighborhood development conditions is also 
supported by field work conducted for Chapter Two. This field work found that buyouts 
advanced disinvestment in the Kinston neighborhood of Lincoln City, removing homeowning 
households and leaving behind a dumping ground around which homes became dilapidated. In 
addition, in the interview data, one person suggested that buyouts contributed to white flight in 
Kinston. According to this person, buyout participants, mostly black, had moved out of one 




responded by moving out of the city entirely. Both the results from the case study and multiple 
theories of neighborhood change support the hypothesis that buyouts could trigger neighborhood 
change.  
Buyouts and North Carolina Disaster History 
Buyouts have served a prominent role in the hazard mitigation portfolio pursued by the 
State of North Carolina in recent decades. The goal of buyouts is to reduce exposure to disaster 
through permanently removing development. Hazard mitigation interventions that rely on land 
use, like buyouts, which are more fail-safe and flexible than large-scale infrastructure protection, 
and may be less expensive (Burby et al., 1999; Godschalk, 2003).  The first federally funded 
buyouts occurred in the late 1970s in Soldier’s Grove, Wisconsin, where local leaders wanted to 
move its downtown a few blocks away from the river instead of building a large-scale flood 
control project which had been proposed (David & Mayer, 1984; Tobin & Peacock, 1982). The 
Stafford Act of 1988, which guides FEMA’s involvement in all phases of disaster, codified 
funding sources for buyouts through establishing multiple programs that aim to reduce natural 
hazard risk. Of these FEMA programs, the largest is the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP). HMGP funded the approximately 4,800 buyouts in North Carolina which provide the 
basis for the study. 
The goal of HMGP is to allow disaster-stricken areas to mitigate future disasters while 
they build back (FEMA, 2015a). HMGP is triggered by a Presidential disaster declaration. 
HMGP funding levels are determined through a formula that roughly correlates to the severity of 
the disaster, which means that larger disasters usually get more HMGP funding. HMGP does not 
provide direct funding to private property owners; instead, it funds mitigation programs that are 




dollars on projects that reduce disaster risk, but may choose from an array of eligible activities. 
Home elevations, other structural retrofits, generators, planning, as well as buyouts are all 
examples of activities eligible for funding under HMGP.  
FEMA stipulates certain requirements for buyout programs that HMGP funds. The 
government or nonprofit which makes the buyout acquisition must offer market value for the 
home, although it can be either pre-flood market value or post-flood market value (FEMA, 
2015b). After the home is acquired, it must be demolished and the property, now owned by the 
government or nonprofit administrator, must be maintained as open space in perpetuity (FEMA, 
2015a, 2015b). Through this stipulation, FEMA ensures that buyouts are a permanent reduction 
in the flood vulnerability of parcel.  
Despite the growing popularity of buyouts, there is not a lot of research on their long-
term effects on places where they are implemented. The most common land use on buyout 
parcels is vacant lot, followed by recreational uses like park land (Zavar & Hagelman, 2016). 
One study of Lexington, Kentucky, found that where buyout land was used for recreational uses, 
a majority of neighbors perceived the land as a neighborhood amenity (Zavar, 2015a). In a 
survey of buyout participants from four cities, including two in North Carolina, respondents 
reported that their new neighborhoods had lower crime but were further from friends and family, 
employment, transportation, and shopping (J. C. Fraser et al., 2003). There is also anecdotal 
evidence that North Carolina’s buyouts reduced the stock of unsubsidized housing affordable to 
lower income households (J. C. Fraser et al., 2003; G. Smith, 2014a). These studies collectively 
support the theory that buyouts affect the community and the participants in ways that extend 
beyond flood risk mitigation, through the change in land use from residential to open space as 




using an entire state dataset of HMGP buyouts and by specifically looking at neighborhood 
change in and around places with buyouts.  
North Carolina was an early adopter of large-scale buyouts using HMGP funding, which 
makes it an ideal location to examine the role of buyouts in long-term neighborhood change. 
North Carolina experienced two major hurricanes in the second half of the 1990s. After 
Hurricane Fran struck in 1996, the state used HMGP funding to mitigate future damages on 
1,765 homes, including elevating 512 homes and buying out 1,253 others (North Carolina 
Emergency Management, 2016). Just three years later, Hurricane Floyd devastated eastern North 
Carolina, and the state funded the buyout of another 3,057 homes with HMGP funding. After 
both hurricanes, North Carolina incentivized uptake of buyouts through innovative programmatic 
decisions. Homes were purchased for pre-flood market value, as opposed to post-flood value, to 
increase the amount that households would receive. This is typical in HMGP but it is not 
required by all buyout programs run by FEMA (FEMA, 2015b). In addition, the Floyd-specific 
North Carolina State Acquisition and Relocation Fund (SARF) offered additional funding so that 
buyout households could afford equivalent housing elsewhere (McCann, 2006). This funding 
source was critical because the value of homes of buyout participants was relatively low. For 
example, in Kinston, North Carolina, where 800 buyouts occurred, the average pre-flood market 
value of a buyout home was $26,000 ($41,000 in 2019 dollars) (City of Kinston, 2001). This 
practice is not always used but it is becoming more common, and it is often used to incentivize 
local relocation (Baker et al., 2018; Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017)  Finally, the State of North 
Carolina chose to put all of its post-Floyd HMGP funding for residences toward buyouts, not 
elevations (North Carolina Emergency Management, 2016). Each of these practices likely 




Since Floyd, North Carolina has endured several flooding events, notably Hurricane 
Matthew in 2016 and Hurricane Florence in 2018, which flooded land that had been bought out 
nearly twenty years prior in several towns. While the state is currently administering buyouts 
with funds from the Matthew and Florence recoveries, these buyouts are too recent to be 
included in this study on long-term neighborhood change. 
Methods and Data 
Integrating spatial effects in multivariate regression 
To examine the effect of buyouts on neighborhood change, I use a spatial autoregressive 
model based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Spatial regression starts with the 
assumption that what happens in one place may affect nearby places. Capturing the effect of this 
“spatial dependence” is the objective of spatial regression. In this case, I am interested how 
neighborhood change, the dependent variable, is different when buyouts occur in the 
neighborhood or in adjacent neighborhood. The effect of buyouts on neighborhood change in the 
neighborhood where they occur is called the “direct effect,” while the effect of buyouts in nearby 
neighborhoods on neighborhood change is called the “spillover effect” or the “indirect effect” 
(LeSage & Pace, 2009). Including spatial proximity, or a spatial lag, as part of the independent 
variable, generates a spatial cross-regressive model (Anselin, 2002). The general model includes 
a spatially-lagged and a non-spatially lagged term for the buyouts to capture both direct effects 
and indirect effects. It is specified in general form as follows: 
"# = %#&' +)%*&+ + ,#&- + 	/, 
Where: 





Xi is the first key independent variable, frequency of buyouts in neighborhood 
i 
Xj is the second key independent variable, frequency of buyouts in other  
neighborhoods j 
W is the spatial lag, which indicates the spatial relationship between 
neighborhood i and each neighborhood j, such that the terms WXi together 
generate an average of X in neighborhoods contiguous to neighborhood i 
Z is a vector of control variables in neighborhood i 
The coefficient of interest is represented by &', the coefficient on the buyout frequency in 
neighborhood i, and &+,  the coefficient on the buyout frequency in the neighborhoods 
contiguous to neighborhood i. The null hypothesis is that there is no effect of buyouts on 
neighborhoods; the alternative hypothesis is that there is an effect:  
01:	& = 0 
04:	& ≠ 0 
Data  
To analyze the effect of buyouts on neighborhood change, I use administrative and 
publicly available data. These data are aggregated to the block group level (n=6,095). The 2010 
Census block group geography is used. Data sources by variable type are summarized in Table 9. 
Data on buyouts come from North Carolina Emergency Management, which maintains a 
database of all projects funded by the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program from 1996 to present. 
This dataset includes all buyouts that occurred with HMGP funding due to disaster declarations 
1996 to 2006.  Ninety-three percent of these buyouts occurred with funding from Hurricanes 
Fran and Floyd in 1996 and 1999, respectively. These data were geocoded using ESRI software 





Table 9. Variables and Data Sources on Buyouts and Neighborhood Change 
  Variable Source 
KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: BUYOUTS  
 Number of Buyouts (continuous) State of North Carolina 
 High Buyout Block Group (binary) State of North Carolina 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
Neighborhood Change - Housing  
 Change in Housing Units, 1990-2010 Census 1990, 2010 
 Housing Units Built After 2005 Census 2010 
 Change in Vacant Housing Units, 1990-2010 Census 1990, 2010 
Neighborhood Change - Racial Mix  
 Change in Percent White, 1990-2010 Census 1990, 2010 
 Change in Percent Black, 1990-2010 Census 1990, 2010 
 Change in Percent Native American, 1990-2010 Census 1990, 2010 
 Change in Percent Hispanic/Latino, 1990-2010 Census 1990, 2010 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
 Region of North Carolina University of North Carolina Libraries 
 Percent White, 1990 Census 1990 
 Percent Black, 1990 Census 1990 
 Percent Native American, 1990 Census 1990 
 Percent Hispanic/Latino, 1990 Census 1990 
 Percent Owner-Occupied, 1990 Census 1990 
 Percent Housing Units Occupied, 1990 Census 1990 
 Percent Housing Units in Urbanized Area, 1990 Census 1990 
 Percent Residents Age 65 and Older, 1990 Census 1990 
 Block Group Population, 1990 Census 1990 
 Houses Built in 1980s Census 2010 
 Houses Built in 1950s Census 2010 
 Houses Built before 1939 Census 2010 
  Land area (100,000 sq. meters) Census 2010 
 
Two measures of buyouts are used as independent variables. The first is a count of 
buyouts in each tract. Using a count of the buyouts allows for analysis of the average marginal 
effect of each additional buyout, which is helpful for assessing the magnitude of the impact 
especially on other counts, such as housing units. The second measure of buyouts is a binary 
indicator of a high-buyout neighborhood, in which the number of buyouts is greater than 17, 
which is the mean number of buyouts in all block groups plus two standard deviations. By 
capturing neighborhoods that meet this threshold, this binary indicator allows for the exploration 
of patterns or effects that could be more sensitive to concentrated areas of buyouts.  
Neighborhood change, the dependent variable, can be measured in a variety of ways. 




characteristics of the physical housing stock, racial diversity, and economic status. For this 
paper, I select two of these general characteristics, housing and racial mix. It is important to 
include housing stock variables because buyouts eliminate housing units, but it is not known how 
the housing stock, such as vacancies and new construction, might change in response to buyouts. 
To examine housing change, I use four variables: change in number of total housing units, 
change in vacant housing units, and number of new housing units built after Floyd and Fran, 
using both 2000-2010 and 2005-2010 as measures. Racial mix is also a logical measure of 
neighborhood change when discussing buyouts because Chapter Three found that buyouts in 
North Carolina were more common in Black neighborhoods, even when controlling for 
floodplain exposure and poverty. For change in racial mix, I use percent African American, 
percent White, percent Latino of any race, and percent Native American.9 All of the dependent 
variable data come from the Census. These data were interpolated from previous Census to 2010 
Census geography by the Longitudinal Tract Database at Brown University (Logan et al., 2014). 
The period of neighborhood change is defined as the twenty-year period between 1990 
and 2010. The years 1990 and 2010 represent the closest decennial censuses to track change 
from a pre-buyout period to a post-buyout period. Even though the later hurricane, Floyd, 
occurred in 1999, the process of administering buyouts can take several years. Therefore, the 
year 2000 is not a clear pre-buyout or a post-buyout period. Block group data are not available 
for much of North Carolina prior to 1990, which was the first year in which the entire county had 
                                                             
9 Major Census racial categories excluded from this analysis include Asian and Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific 
Islander. Asians are a growing segment of North Carolina’s population, but they represented a very small fraction in 
1990 and the Asian population is concentrated in the central and more urban areas of the state, which is not where 
most buyouts occurred. Only one-tenth of one percent of North Carolina’s population is Native Hawaiian and Other 




tracts and block groups. This is especially true in rural areas, where many of the buyouts are 
located. Control variables are used to minimize impact of self-selection, where buyouts occur in 
places pre-disposed to neighborhood change. These control variables include percent urbanized, 
land area of block group (land area gives a general but not perfect reflection of development 
density), age of the housing stock, region of the state, percent senior citizens, and percent of 
different racial groups. 
Regional concentration of buyouts 
Buyouts are found across the entire state of North Carolina but they are concentrated in 
Eastern North Carolina. Seventy-seven percent of the block groups with buyouts are located in 
Eastern North Carolina, and 60 out of 65 high-buyout block groups in the state are located in this 
region (see Table 10).  Therefore, regional development patterns specific to Eastern North 
Carolina could confound the association between buyouts and neighborhood change. To address 
this problem, I use region as a variable in two different ways, both designed to eliminate 
potential confounding. First, I use region as a control variable. Second, I run the same model 
specification but including only the block groups located in the Eastern region of North Carolina. 
Regions were defined as the Eastern Plains, Central Piedmont, and Western Mountains according 
to a reference map published by the North Carolina Maps Collection by the University of North 
Carolina (UNC Libraries, 2019).   
Table 10. Regional Differences in Buyouts 
 
Total Block Groups Block Groups w/ Buyouts 
Region Number Percent of 
Total 
Number Percent of 
Total 
Western 988 16% 39 10% 
Central 3,344 54% 52 13% 
Eastern 1,823 30% 298 77% 







This analysis includes 6,095 block groups, which excludes block groups with zero 
population. Table 11 provides descriptive statistics, including differences across three groups of 
observations: (1) the entire dataset, (2) block groups with at least one buyout, and (3) high-
buyout block groups. The mean number of buyouts per block group is less than one, but the 
range is 0 to 337, which reflects spatial clustering of buyouts in certain neighborhoods. Only 65 
block groups, one percent of the statewide total, are “high buyout block groups” (defined as >17 
buyouts). These high buyout block groups have an average of 53 buyouts.  
Areas with buyouts have distinct patterns of development and racial mix. For example, 
places with buyouts have higher shares of Black residents and lower shares of White residents, a 
pattern which is consistent and pronounced in the high-buyout neighborhoods. High-buyout 
block groups are 58 percent White and 41 percent Black on average, compared with 78 percent 
and 20 percent, respectively, statewide. Two characteristics, land area and percent urbanized, set 
high-buyout block groups apart from all block groups with at least one buyout. High-buyout 
block groups are smaller and more urban than all block groups with any buyouts, despite having 
similar population counts. This suggests that high-buyout block groups are in more urban 
neighborhoods while other block groups with buyouts tend to be in more rural areas. High-
buyout block groups had much lower growth in housing between 1990 and 2010, 65 units versus 
172 units for all block groups with buyouts and 248 average statewide. While one might attribute 
that lower growth to the removal of housing in buyouts, high-buyout block groups also saw the 




2010.  Some characteristics are more balanced among the three groups of observations, including 
the average rate of occupied housing, the proportion of seniors, and the proportion of Latinos and 
Native Americans. 
Table 11. Selected Characteristics for (1) All Block Groups, (2) Block Groups with at Least One Buyout, and (3) High-Buyout Block 
Groups  

















Number of buyouts in BG 0.77 12 53 0 337 
High-Buyout Block Group 0.01 0.17 1.00 0 1 
Population ** 1082 1283 1338 1 9719 
Land Area (100,000 sq. meters) 204 394 269 1 7837 
Housing Units  462 546 555 1 2874 
Vacant Housing Units  49 56 45 0 2264 
Proportion White  0.78 0.66 0.58 0 1 
Proportion Black  0.20 0.32 0.41 0 1 
Proportion Latino  0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.25 
Proportion Native American 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.97 
Proportion Seniors 0.13 0.13 0.13 0 0.87 
Proportion Owner-Occupied HU 0.70 0.67 0.64 0 1 
Proportion HUs Occupied 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.07 1 
Proportion HUs in Urban Area 0.64 0.53 0.68 0 1 
County Growth '80-'90 0.35 0.27 0.22 -0.13 2.25 
Region = Western 0.16 0.10 0.05 0 1 
Region = Central 0.55 0.13 0.03 0 1 
Region = Eastern 0.29 0.77 0.92 0 1 
Change in Housing Units 1990-2010 248 172 65 -887 3442 
Change in Vacant Housing Units 1990-2010 46 39 29 -225 1558 
Housing Built 2000-2010 110 94 74 0 2436 
Housing Built 2005-2010 38 30 16 0 824 
Change in Proportion White, 1990-2010 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -1 0.91 
Change in Proportion Black, 1990-2010 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.92 1 
Change in Proportion Latino, 1990-2010 0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.15 0.81 
Change in Proportion Native American, 1990-2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.29 0.12 
n 6,095 389 65           
* Block groups with zero population are excluded from the analysis    
** All data are from 1990 unless otherwise specified     
 
Direct Effects 
The results find that buyouts are negatively associated with housing unit change. Table 
12 presents the results from spatial autoregressive models which examine the association 
between buyouts, the independent variable, and 20-year change in housing units, the dependent 
variable. Across the entire state, the average marginal effect associated with each additional 
buyout is a loss of 1.5 housing units in the same block group (the direct effect). This average loss 




findings are statistically significant (p<0.01). These average marginal effects for the state and the 
Eastern region are larger than 1:1 ratio of buyouts-to-housing loss that would be expected if 
housing removal was caused only by households that participated in the buyout. These effects 
hold after controlling for other predictors of housing change, such as the degree of urbanization 
in the neighborhood, the age of housing units, the share of seniors in the neighborhood, and the 
share of homeowners. These and all other control variables are also shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Regression Results: Buyouts and Change in Number of Housing Units, 1990-2010 
    Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains 
DIRECT EFFECT     
 Number of Buyouts -1.505*** -1.653***   
  (0.487) (0.486)   
 High-Buyout Block Group   -85.52** -92.25** 
    (36.90) (38.32) 
SPILLOVER EFFECT     
 Number of Buyouts -0.0388 -0.0297   
  (0.990) (0.987)   
 High-Buyout Block Group   -33.64 -38.33 
    (74.79) (76.70) 
CONTROL VARIABLES     
 Proportion White 1,291*** 1,378* 1,289*** 1,312 
  (249.4) (820.3) (249.5) (821.3) 
 Proportion Black 1,226*** 1,255 1,223*** 1,186 
  (248.1) (818.8) (248.2) (819.8) 
 Proportion Latino 1,208*** 343.7 1,201*** 287.2 
  (343.2) (772.6) (343.8) (774.3) 
 Proportion Native American 1,290*** 1,252 1,287*** 1,185 
  (253.8) (818.2) (253.9) (819.2) 
 Proportion Seniors -498.9*** -896.8*** -499.8*** -899.6*** 
  (58.66) (123.0) (58.68) (123.2) 
 Proportion Owner-Occupied HU 297.3*** 263.9*** 297.5*** 265.1*** 
  (21.37) (43.54) (21.38) (43.67) 
 Proportion HUs Occupied -233.4*** -123.9*** -231.5*** -119.7** 
  (35.07) (47.79) (35.14) (47.95) 
 Proportion HUs in Urban Area 119.5*** 78.23*** 119.6*** 78.09*** 
  (10.59) (18.37) (10.60) (18.41) 
 Block Group Population -0.142*** -0.0878*** -0.142*** -0.0894*** 
  (0.00839) (0.0129) (0.00839) (0.0129) 
 Land Area (100,000 sq meters) 0.0667*** 0.0262* 0.0671*** 0.0268** 
  (0.0107) (0.0135) (0.0107) (0.0135) 
 Housing Units Built in 1980s (2010) 0.815*** 1.081*** 0.815*** 1.077*** 
  (0.0443) (0.0848) (0.0443) (0.0849) 
 Housing Units Built in 1950s (2010) -0.508*** -0.554*** -0.508*** -0.555*** 
  (0.0788) (0.154) (0.0788) (0.154) 
 Housing Units Built Before 1939 (2010) -0.236*** -0.210 -0.232*** -0.203 
  (0.0802) (0.166) (0.0802) (0.166) 
Region (Western  = reference)     
 Central 34.83***  34.78***  
  (10.54)  (10.54)  
 Eastern 23.03**  23.70**  
  (11.70)  (11.79)  
 Constant -973.9*** -1,079 -972.9*** -1,014 
  (250.0) (823.5) (250.1) (824.5)       
Observations 6,096 1,780 6,096 1,780 
Pseudo R-square 0.246 0.290 0.246 0.287 
Standard errors in parentheses     





For neighborhoods with concentrations of buyouts, the results were similar. High-buyout 
block groups are associated with a statistically significant loss in housing units (p<0.05). The 
average differential effect associated with being a high-buyout neighborhood, in comparison to 
all other neighborhoods, is 86 fewer housing units in the 20-year change. This number rises to 92 
fewer units when including just the Eastern region. Statewide, high-buyout block groups had an 
average of 53 buyouts (Table 11), so again, the estimated magnitude of the effect on housing 
units is greater than could be explained by buyout demolitions alone. 
For the most part, buyouts are not associated with other statistically significant changes in 
the composition of the housing stock, including change in the number of vacant units and new 
constructions in the years 2000-2010 or 2005-2010. The one exception is high-buyout 
neighborhoods in Eastern North Carolina, which are negatively associated with new 
constructions between 2005 and 2010, but this is only weakly statistically significant (p<0.10). 
This holds across both the continuous count of buyouts and the binary indicator of a high-buyout 
neighborhood. These results are summarized in Appendix 4.1, Tables 14-15. 
There is mixed evidence that, within a given neighborhood, buyouts are associated with 
an increase in the share of Blacks and a decrease in the share of Whites. Table 13 explores the 
association of buyouts with change in racial mix. High buyout neighborhoods were associated 
with an increase of 3.0 percentage points in the share of Blacks across the entire state (p<0.05). 
In the Eastern Plains, a similar magnitude of association was found between high buyout block 
groups and increase in the share of Blacks, but the statistical significance is only at the p<0.1 




3.1 percentage points in the share of whites (p<0.05). None of the models show a statistically 
significant change associated with the continuous buyout variable, which suggests that effects 
are more prominent in areas of concentrated buyouts. Buyouts do not have a statistically 
significant association with change in the share of Latinos or Native Americans (see modeling 
results in Appendix 4.1, Tables A4-A5)
 
 
Table 13. Buyouts and Change in Racial Mix 
    Change in Proportion Black   Change in Proportion White 
VARIABLES Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains  Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains 
DIRECT EFFECTS                  
 Number of Buyouts 0.000184 0.000156    -0.000228 -0.000245   
  (0.000197) (0.000190)    (0.000225) (0.000196)   
 
High-Buyout Block 
Group   0.0298** 0.0291*    -0.0278 -0.0305** 
    (0.0149) (0.0149)    (0.0170) (0.0154) 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS                   
 Number of Buyouts 0.00183*** 0.00162***    -0.00147*** -0.00141***   
  (0.000401) (0.000386)    (0.000457) (0.000398)   
 
High-Buyout Block 
Group   0.153*** 0.133***    -0.135*** -0.129*** 
    (0.0303) (0.0299)    (0.0345) (0.0308) 
CONTROL VARIABLES                   
 Proportion White -0.157 -1.459*** -0.158 -1.460***  -0.165 0.536 -0.164 0.537 
  (0.101) (0.321) (0.101) (0.320)  (0.115) (0.331) (0.115) (0.330) 
 Proportion Black -0.409*** -1.651*** -0.410*** -1.653***  0.0759 0.732** 0.0769 0.734** 
  (0.101) (0.320) (0.100) (0.319)  (0.115) (0.330) (0.114) (0.329) 
 Proportion Latino -0.634*** -1.649*** -0.610*** -1.613***  0.0157 0.607* -0.00740 0.568* 
  (0.139) (0.302) (0.139) (0.302)  (0.158) (0.311) (0.159) (0.311) 
 
Proportion Native 
American -0.142 -1.431*** -0.140 -1.429***  -0.120 0.606* -0.122 0.604* 
  (0.103) (0.320) (0.103) (0.319)  (0.117) (0.330) (0.117) (0.329) 
 Proportion Seniors -0.0134 0.0885* -0.0144 0.0861*  0.117*** 0.00302 0.118*** 0.00495 
  (0.0238) (0.0481) (0.0237) (0.0480)  (0.0271) (0.0496) (0.0271) (0.0494) 
 
Proportion Owner-
Occupied HU -0.0816*** -0.0887*** -0.0813*** -0.0882***  0.160*** 0.0993*** 0.160*** 0.0982*** 
  (0.00869) (0.0170) (0.00869) (0.0170)  (0.00990) (0.0176) (0.00990) (0.0175) 
 Proportion HUs Occupied 0.115*** 0.170*** 0.112*** 0.167***  -0.145*** -0.222*** -0.143*** -0.219*** 
  (0.0142) (0.0187) (0.0142) (0.0187)  (0.0162) (0.0193) (0.0162) (0.0192) 
 
Proportion HUs in Urban 
Area 0.0628*** 0.0559*** 0.0627*** 0.0555***  -0.0817*** -0.0442*** -0.0816*** -0.0438*** 
  (0.00433) (0.00719) (0.00433) (0.00717)  (0.00494) (0.00741) (0.00493) (0.00739) 
 Block Group Population -1.42e-05*** -1.68e-05*** -1.44e-05*** -1.74e-05***  2.73e-05*** 2.23e-05*** 2.75e-05*** 2.28e-05*** 
  (3.40e-06) (5.05e-06) (3.40e-06) (5.04e-06)  (3.88e-06) (5.21e-06) (3.87e-06) (5.19e-06) 
 Area (100,000 sq. meters) 4.15e-07 -9.41e-06* 2.04e-07 -9.64e-06*  -5.84e-06 1.28e-05** -5.63e-06 1.31e-05** 





    Change in Proportion Black   Change in Proportion White 
VARIABLES Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains  Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains 
 
Housing Units Built in 
1980s (2010) 5.33e-05*** 4.82e-05 5.43e-05*** 5.12e-05  -7.45e-05*** -9.26e-05*** -7.55e-05*** -9.57e-05*** 
  (1.80e-05) (3.32e-05) (1.79e-05) (3.31e-05)  (2.05e-05) (3.42e-05) (2.04e-05) (3.41e-05) 
 
Housing Units Built in 
1950s (2010) 0.000218*** 0.000296*** 0.000219*** 0.000296***  -0.000280*** -0.000355*** -0.000281*** -0.000354*** 
  (3.19e-05) (6.01e-05) (3.19e-05) (5.99e-05)  (3.64e-05) (6.19e-05) (3.64e-05) (6.17e-05) 
 
Housing Units Built 
Before 1939 (2010) -0.000219*** -0.000150** -0.000219*** -0.000146**  0.000293*** 0.000113* 0.000293*** 0.000110 
  (3.25e-05) (6.50e-05) (3.25e-05) (6.48e-05)  (3.70e-05) (6.70e-05) (3.70e-05) (6.68e-05) 
 Region = Central 0.0350***  0.0352***   -0.0541***  -0.0543***  
  (0.00427)  (0.00427)   (0.00487)  (0.00486)  
 Region = Eastern 0.0564***  0.0546***   -0.0501***  -0.0483***  
  (0.00474)  (0.00477)   (0.00541)  (0.00544)  
 Constant 0.120 1.409*** 0.123 1.411***  0.103 -0.522 0.100 -0.525 
  (0.101) (0.322) (0.101) (0.321)  (0.115) (0.332) (0.115) (0.331) 
           
Observations 6,095 1,780 6,095 1,780  6,095 1,780 6,095 1,780 
Pseudo R-square 0.286 0.292 0.287 0.296  0.278 0.299 0.279 0.302 
Standard errors in parentheses          








Being located near a neighborhood with buyouts is associated with a distinct pattern of 
neighborhood change, including an increase in the share of Blacks and a decrease in the share of 
Whites.   Each additional buyout, averaged across contiguous neighborhoods, was associated 
with an increase of 0.18 percentage points in the change in the share of Blacks across the state 
(0.16 percentage points in Eastern North Carolina). Being surrounded by high-buyout 
neighborhoods is associated with a change in the share of Blacks 15.3 percentage points higher 
than in a neighborhood with no contiguous high-buyout neighborhoods (13.3 percentage points 
higher in Eastern North Carolina).  
The associated change in the share of whites is of similar magnitude, but in the opposite 
direction. An increase of one buyout in the average number of buyouts in contiguous 
neighborhoods was associated with a decline of 0.15 percentage points in Whites in the state as a 
whole and 0.14 percentage points in Eastern North Carolina. A neighborhood surrounded by 
high-buyout neighborhoods has an expected change in share of whites 13.5 percentage points 
lower than a neighborhood without any contiguous high-buyout neighborhoods across the state, 
12.9 percentage points in Eastern North Carolina. All results for spillover effects on the share of 
blacks and whites are statistically significant at p>0.01. As with direct effects, being located next 
to block groups with buyouts was not associated with any statistically significant difference in 
change in the share of Latinos or Native Americans (see Appendix 4.1, Table 16). 
Unlike racial mix, there were no statistically significant spillover effects on change in 
housing characteristics in neighborhoods near buyouts. This finding holds across changes in the 




homes. These findings are detailed in Table 12 for change in overall housing units, and in 
Appendix 4.1, Tables 14-16 for the other variables. 
Discussion 
Findings from this study suggest that buyouts are part of a process of disinvestment and 
white flight. Buyouts dampened 20-year growth in housing, and this phenomenon could be 
explained in a few different ways. In general, the count of housing units primarily changes 
through two components: the construction of new units and the demolition or destruction of old 
units. The inventory of housing in buyout neighborhoods still grew on average (Table 11), even 
though buyouts have a negative effect on that change. One possibility is that fewer new units are 
being built in buyout neighborhoods. The estimated associations between buyouts and new 
construction are negative (Table 15, Appendix 4.1), but they are not statistically significant, with 
the exception of high-buyout neighborhoods in Eastern North Carolina, which is only weakly 
statistically significant (p<0.10). According to the components of housing unit change, the other 
primary possibility is that neighborhoods with buyouts had elevated levels of housing loss 
outside of the buyouts – losses due to unremediated flood damage or neglect. Both these 
explanations – fewer new construction units and losses due to complete deterioration – have a 
common theme of disinvestment. 
At the same time as buyouts had negative effects on change in housing units, 
concentrations of buyouts were not statistically significantly associated with changes in vacant 
housing. Given the negative effect on housing inventory, if buyout participants were moving to 
other units within their original neighborhood and all else remained equal, one would expect to 
see the count of vacant units go down. There are two possible explanations for the lack of 




participating in the buyouts are moving to a destination outside of their original neighborhood, 
which is reflected in case study administrative data from Kinston discussed in Paper 1. The other 
is that buyout households move within their neighborhood but other households move out just as 
fast. These two explanations are not mutually exclusive, but they may reflect different 
motivations and implications. 
It is likely that the findings reflect at least a degree of out-migration of buyout 
participants to other neighborhoods. There are a few potential explanations for this diaspora. 
First, this out-migration of buyout participants could reflect locational attainment, or moving to 
areas of higher socioeconomic status. The motivations described in interview data from the 
Kinston case study (Paper 1) suggest that locational attainment was a motivating factor. On the 
other hand, it is possible that all available housing units were located outside of buyout 
neighborhoods, in which case buyout participants may not have had a choice about where to 
move, and might have preferred to stay in the neighborhood if they could. Or, participants may 
move to other neighborhoods for other reasons, such as proximity to family or employment. 
Out-migration of buyout participants could also relate to self-selection of buyout 
participants. Self-selection could operate at the household level or the neighborhood level. 
Households with lower place attachment or stronger desire for locational attainment might have 
greater motivation to take a buyout rather than stay in place and rebuild. Because buyouts are a 
voluntary program, the element of self-selection is likely to be present to some degree in most 
places. However, researchers have found that many buyout participants feel they have no good 
alternatives other than to take a buyout (de Vries & Fraser, 2012; J. C. Fraser et al., 2003), which 




It is also possible that self-selection influences participant out-migration at the 
neighborhood scale. Neighborhoods that are already declining in socioeconomic status may be 
places where homeowners are more likely to accept a buyout. Or, neighborhoods with pre-
buyout out-migration may be more likely to interest local government officials as an appropriate 
area to target for buyouts, because the tax base may already be declining. Because many parts of 
the rural United States were not covered by Census tracts and blocks before the 1990 Census, the 
pre-1990 data that might offer support to this explanation is unavailable. The research design in 
the present study aimed to limit the effect of neighborhood self-selection on the results by 
controlling for characteristics that have been associated with growth and development in recent 
decades, including the percent urbanized and the region of the state. Nonetheless, further 
research on self-selection and the motivations of residents and decision-makers is needed. 
The results also support a finding that white flight is occurring in and around buyout 
areas. As captured by the literature on “tipping,” during white flight, white households move out 
of a neighborhood in reaction to people of color, especially Black households, moving in. There 
is some evidence that white flight is occurring in buyout neighborhoods, but the clearest 
evidence is that white flight is occurring in neighborhoods around buyouts. Chapter Three 
demonstrated that buyouts are associated with higher shares of African Americans in a 
neighborhood. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that buyout participants are 
disproportionately African-American. In conjunction with the finding that buyout participants 
are likely relocating outside their original neighborhood to an adjacent neighborhood, this 
suggests that buyouts result in an influx of black households moving into neighborhoods near 
buyouts, which causes a “tipping” effect in which white residents move out. The white flight 




statistically significant associations with change in housing inventory or vacant units, while they 
did see clear change in racial mix, which suggests that buyout participants replace other 
residents. 
A critical question is whether real estate agents might have used racial steering to prompt 
buyout residents. Despite its illegality, racial steering continued to be a pervasive practice 
through at least the 1990s (Charles, 2003). Real estate agents can actually benefit from pushing 
neighborhood turnover because it spurs additional real estate transactions for them. Local 
governments or housing counselors could also have influenced the location of the housing that 
buyout participants considered for relocation. The question of agency in neighborhood racial 
turnover associated with buyouts merits further detailed investigation of program 
implementation. 
The suggestion that buyouts play a role in disinvestment and white flight refer to data 
from North Carolina but they shed light on patterns of buyouts and neighborhood change that are 
likely to be found in other parts of the nation. While North Carolina was extraordinary in its 
early and widespread adoption of buyouts, buyouts are becoming more and more popular. 
Buyouts in North Carolina almost exclusively took place in locations adjacent to rivers and 
streams, rather than beaches and bays, which is typical of buyout programs across the United 
States10. Finally, the reasons that buyout participants in North Carolina may have self-selected 
into buyouts, such as lower place attachment and the desire to move to a neighborhood of higher 
socio-economic status, are not unique to North Carolina. A limitation of this research is that 
                                                             
10 Two exceptions are the post-Sandy New York buyouts and the post-Ike Bolivar Peninsula (Texas) buyouts which 




most, but not all, of North Carolina’s buyouts occurred in smaller towns along rural landscapes. 
Buyouts concentrated in areas with urban development pressures may play different roles in 
neighborhood change. 
Implications 
There are multiple policy and planning strategies that could mitigate the effects of 
buyouts on disinvestment. All governmental stakeholders, including local, state, and federal 
government, ought to be sensitive to the effects of disinvestment and disproportionate impacts in 
African-American communities. State and local decision-makers need to identify whether the 
current housing stock is likely to accommodate buyout participants. Opportunities for developers 
to build new housing or redevelop in safer parts of the buyout neighborhood should be 
highlighted, and public-private partnerships can assist in implementation. The local government 
should plan for the buyout land itself, to ensure that it does not become a disamenity for the local 
population, which could engender further disinvestment. For example, managing land as a park 
or community garden, or allowing adjacent neighbors to use the land as yard space or a garden, 
could provide local benefits. 
One major challenge to adopting these recommendations is limited capacity of local 
governments to implement them. Particularly in the months after a devastating flood, local 
officials are overloaded with responsibilities. Even under blue skies, officials in smaller 
communities often play multiple roles, and developing the expertise or funding to manage the 
buyout land or develop relocation housing may not be realistic. Therefore, other partners with 
existing capacity need to be identified. These actors can include state government, regional 
government, or nonprofit partners. For example, councils of government or regional planning 




addition, capacity may be needed at the neighborhood level to advocate for generating 
neighborhood amenities through buyout land. This capacity can be built through community 
organizing and training local organizations, houses of worship, and residents about involvement 
and advocacy in local government. 
There are also special roles that state and federal government can play. State governments 
are often the formal HMGP applicant, and as such they have the ability to set some standards 
about how the program will be implemented. North Carolina set forth several policies that likely 
reduced the disinvestment effect, such as purchasing buyout homes at pre-flood value and 
providing additional flexible funding for households through the State Acquisition and 
Relocation Fund. Alternatively, FEMA allows up to $31,000 in a supplemental payment to 
buyout participants under certain circumstances (FEMA, 2015, p. 26). These practices should be 
replicated in other places that pursue buyouts. 
In addition, the emerging body of guidance on buyouts should identify the challenges of 
disinvestment and highlight strategies to overcome disinvestment. FEMA issues formal policy 
guidance on HMGP, and many nonprofits have issued their own reports on buyouts or opinion 
pieces with recommendations. Some of these reports mention concerns with disinvestment but 
most focus on the mitigation benefits or the ecological benefits (Freudenberg et al., 2016; 
Kihslinger & Salvesen, 2017; Scata, 2017).  All guidance that deals with intended and 
unintended outcomes of buyouts should at least mention, and preferably address, the issue of 
disinvestment. This may require expertise from groups outside of the environmental conservation 




Some who advocate for buyouts as a means of managed retreat may not see 
disinvestment in a negative light, because it signals further removal of development from risky 
areas. HMGP may be a tool for managed retreat, but the overall goal of retreat from an area must 
be addressed outside the context of HMGP alone. The goal of retreat must be supported by local 
leadership, community conversation, and comprehensive planning, which is not required by 
HMGP and demands a much longer timeframe than the implementation of HMGP after a 
disaster. This planning and conversation should occur in highly vulnerable regions before 
disaster or otherwise outside the immediate period of response and recovery, where there is little 
capacity for such difficult deliberation. 
 White flight is a more vexing challenge to address through governmental or stakeholder 
action. White flight is rooted in individual prejudice and centuries of unequal treatment that 
privileged the accumulation of wealth through homeownership among white households. It may 
be exacerbated by racial steering among real estate agents or by the placement of new housing 
for buyout participants. The practice of racial steering by real estate agents has actually increased 
in recent years (Oh & Yinger, 2015), so fair housing enforcement ought to be implemented 
during buyout programs. When the state or local government builds new housing that is intended 
to serve buyout participants, that housing should not perpetuate segregated neighborhoods or 
segregated housing markets. Changing individual prejudices is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but there are general findings from the research literature about policies that support or challenge 
white flight. Fiscal policy that spreads tax base and community services over a larger geography 
disincentivizes the formation of enclaves of wealthy or white residents, or at least, it mitigates 




testing can combat the housing discrimination and racial steering that is still present in today’s 
housing market.  
This paper also highlights the need for further research in this growing area of policy and 
practice. The first major area of need is more research on the neighborhood change impacts of 
buyouts. A parcel-by-parcel analysis of housing unit change in buyout areas, compared with non-
buyout areas, will inform an understanding of the degree to which disinvestment is occurring 
through a lack of new construction or through the loss of additional existing units. Longitudinal 
case studies are needed to provide a more in-depth understanding of the processes of 
neighborhood change in buyout areas, and particularly how disinvestment and racial dynamics 
interface with one another. Greater research on the roles of local officials, program officials, 
housing counselors, and real estate agents should examine their potential roles in racial steering. 
Exceptional neighborhoods where buyouts encourage new investment or racial integration 
should be understood, as well. All of these research questions should examine buyout programs 
funded by other federal agencies, as well, as programmatic rules and regulations could change 
program design and therefore neighborhood effects. 
A second area of research need is qualitative research on the impact of program and 
policy design decisions and their impact on the outcome of buyouts. For example, practitioners 
and researchers would benefit from a greater understanding of how additional relocation funds 
affect the residential decision-making of residents and the subsequent neighborhood change 
impacts. A foundation for this research has been laid by several buyouts researchers who studied 
how the design of buyout policies and programs has evolved, and how it affects participant 
satisfaction (Baker et al., 2018; Brokopp Binder & Greer, 2016; Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017). 




Sandy buyout programs in New York and New Jersey, are too early in implementation to 
connect program and policy design to long-term community change. However, ongoing 
collection of evidence on the effect of policy and program design on participants is critical to 
support recommendations for implementing buyouts in an equitable and just manner. 
This paper has demonstrated that post-disaster buyouts affect neighborhood change. 
Buyouts are associated with disinvestment and retrenchment of racial segregation patterns. These 
findings are supported by statewide data from North Carolina and twenty years of neighborhood 
change data documented by the Census. They suggest the need for policies and programs that 
encourage equitable investment in safer parts of buyout neighborhoods, support community 
development in and near buyout areas, and discourage the racially disparate impacts of white 
flight. Further research on the neighborhood change effects of buyouts will provide a service to 
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CHAPTER FIVE. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has explored the ways in which buyouts reflect or interface with pre-
existing systems of racial and economic inequality. Through qualitative and quantitative 
methods, I have demonstrated that buyouts reflect and generate significant social equity 
concerns. Policy and program design may resolve some of the equity issues in buyouts, but 
others require a more fundamental re-thinking of how land use is changed after disaster, and how 
property owners and communities are empowered during the process of decision-making and 
implementation. 
Summary of Research Findings 
In the first paper, using a comparative case study approach, I find that two local 
governments representing marginalized communities made different decisions about 
environmental relocation based on differences in leadership, perception of climate risks, and 
competing priorities. In one community, buyouts permanently reduced flood risk and bolstered 
home equity for participants. However, the buyout program also had negative consequences for 
the area around the buyout land because the buyout generated an environmental disamenity and 
supported a cycle of disinvestment. By comparison, not taking a buyout garnered publicity and 
greater recognition that benefitted the other community. However, that decision against buyouts 
resulted in devastating flood losses just 17 years later. These cases demonstrate several problems 
pertaining to social equity in buyouts, including potential concentration of marginalized 
communities in buyout programs, designing a fair decision-making process, and unintended 




social networks. Addressing these problems should guide the research and innovation agenda on 
equitable climate adaptation toward workable solutions to these enduring problems. 
In the second paper, I find that buyouts are concentrated in segregated, African American 
communities in Eastern North Carolina. The association between buyouts and race holds even 
after controlling for poverty and floodplain exposure. I explore a few explanations for these 
findings. The historic disinvestment in African American communities may lead town officials 
to identify African American neighborhoods as target buyout areas, or this disinvestment may 
lead residents of those neighborhoods to take buyouts as a means to move elsewhere.  
Finally, in the third paper, I find that buyouts are negatively associated with change in the 
number of housing units in a neighborhood. I also find that buyouts triggered racial turnover 
from white to African American in the neighborhoods adjacent to buyouts. These findings 
suggest that buyouts have contributed to disinvestment effects in the neighborhoods where they 
occur. The findings of this study warrant additional quantitative and qualitative investigation, 
including a close analysis of the relocation process for buyout participants, to understand if racial 
steering is at play.  
Together, these studies make two primary contributions to fill gaps in the literature on 
buyouts. First, this research examines long-term outcomes associated with buyout 
implementation, both through the comparative case study and the analysis of neighborhood 
change associated with buyouts. The research literature on buyouts has blossomed in recent 
years, but much of the analysis has focused on more recent buyout programs, such as the post-
Sandy buyouts, which were implemented in the years since the storm in 2012. More importantly, 




implementation, such as participant experiences and program design, which leaves a major gap 
in understanding how buyouts affected people and places after implementation. As demonstrated 
in Chapter Two, there are similar gaps in climate adaptation research in general, because of the 
newness of adaptation efforts. This dissertation demonstrates that in North Carolina, buyouts 
have had some negative impacts on the communities that implement them, as they spur 
disinvestment over time in the neighborhoods where they occur. By articulating these long-term 
impacts, this dissertation offers support for researchers and practitioners to explore how 
unintended negative consequences might be mitigated in the future.  
In addition, this dissertation contributes to the research literature on buyouts because it 
uses empirical data to analyze social equity issues. Only two academic research papers have 
actually focused on social equity in buyouts, and both of them analyze the government 
administration of buyouts (de Vries & Fraser, 2012; Siders, 2018). This dissertation provides an 
explicit focus on race in buyouts, and explores issues across the buyout lifecycle, from decision-
making to long-term impacts. It demonstrates that buyouts reflect and may perpetuate racial 
inequality in communities where they are implemented, through the administration of buyouts, 
the geography of their implementation, and their long-term impacts. Through bringing to bear 
this variety of perspectives on the social equity problems in buyouts, this dissertation contributes 
findings as well as analytical approaches that merit repetition and expansion by further research. 
Limitations of the Research 
Like all research, this dissertation has limitations. Its exclusive focus on North Carolina is 
one. The racial profile of the state’s rural eastern plains, where buyouts were concentrated, is 
similar to other Southern states, with a white majority but significant black minority and a Native 




plains. However, other places that have pursued buyouts, such as New York after Hurricane 
Sandy, have different sociodemographic characteristics. In addition, while some urban buyouts 
occurred in North Carolina, the majority were in rural areas without strong real estate markets. 
Equity issues related to buyouts in urban settings or other places with hot real estate markets like 
oceanfront towns, may look different.  
In addition, the time period of the study created limitations for both the quantitative and 
qualitative portions. The quantitative analysis was limited by a lack of pre-1990 data at the 
neighborhood level, which made it challenging to control for pre-existing trends like out-
migration at the neighborhood scale. For the qualitative analysis, interviewing key informants 
about events that occurred nearly two decades prior generates a risk that interviewees are limited 
by their memories and the passage of time. Other key informants were unable to be located or 
had passed away due to the length of time between the buyouts and this dissertation. 
Implications for Policy and Planning 
Buyouts work for reducing risk of property loss and human suffering in areas prone to 
repeat flooding. In the current scheme of disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation, buyouts 
may be one of the most effective tools available, especially to communities and households 
which do not have their own resources to invest in physical resilience. That said, there are 
entrenched systems of inequality embedded in our land use patterns, political systems, and 
private property values, and each of the three papers in this dissertation finds that buyout 
programs in North Carolina became entangled in these inequalities in multiple ways. The 
findings from each paper suggest potential strategies that could reduce buyouts’ engagement of 
systemic inequalities. I review these policy and planning implications in the following section, 





The first major recommendation, one which encompasses all the recommendations that 
follow, is to use principles of community development planning to guide buyouts. Practices from 
community development planning are uniquely suited to assist in decisions, in which the 
decision is irreversible, as with buyouts, and when information about the future is uncertain, as in 
the case of future flood events (Hopkins, 2001). These techniques span visioning, community 
engagement, goal-setting, scenario exercises, mapping and spatial data analysis, visualizations, 
conflict resolution, implementation guidance, and synthesis of multiple perspectives and data 
sources (G. Smith, 2011, 2014c). Through its interdisciplinary approach, planning can help 
buyouts achieve their goals of hazard mitigation while also reducing unintended negative 
consequences for marginalized communities. Planners also typically deal with time frames of 
twenty years or more, examining how a place might develop and change over time. This skill is 
badly needed for buyouts planning. As the findings from this dissertation identify a range of 
issues that surface over the twenty years following buyouts, from repeat disasters to 
neighborhood change. Planning is also uniquely suited for dealing with interdependencies 
(Hopkins, 2001) and this dissertation has shown that buyouts have complex community and 
societal impacts from land use to social capital to wealth generation. Decisions about buyouts 
should be made in light of, and in conjunction with, other decisions on alternative or redundant 
mitigation strategies, community development investments, historic preservation and continuity 
of social networks, and open space maintenance.  
Planning for buyouts should ideally occur before disaster strikes. A community that plans 
for a buyout program has more time for meaningful public engagement and consideration of 




recovery. Areas which have had repetitive flooding or know that climate change will worsen 
their vulnerabilities should particularly consider pre-disaster planning for buyouts. However, 
using techniques of community planning after the disaster still offers significant opportunities to 
align multiple objectives in the implementation of a buyout program.  
There are a number of existing vehicles for buyouts planning, depending on the local 
government. For example, a hazard mitigation plan is an ideal context for buyouts planning, 
because of the alignment of objectives and because hazard mitigation plans are required by 
FEMA to be updated regularly. Comprehensive plans and their implementing code are another 
logical context for buyouts planning. Comprehensive plans typically integrate a broad range of 
issues, such as housing, land use, and economic development, which is an approach that could 
serve the interrelated equity impacts of buyouts in areas like housing, community development, 
and open space amenities. Some local jurisdictions have disaster recovery plans and/or 
redevelopment plans, which also could be a natural home for buyouts planning. Of course, 
planning for buyouts can occur independently of ongoing planning efforts as well.  
Engagement and accountability 
 Addressing the racial and social justice problems presented by buyouts requires an 
approach that spans both procedural justice – inclusion in decision-making – as well as 
distributive justice – equity in the distribution of resources and opportunities. Achieving greater 
procedural justice requires improving community representation and participation in the design 
and implementation of buyout programs. High quality community engagement is a sensible 
strategy for buyouts programs in general; research has documented that poor community 
engagement is associated with lower satisfaction with buyout programs (Baker et al., 2018). 




their interests is critical to reducing unintended consequences and improving the impact of 
buyouts on communities which have historically been marginalized and under-resourced (Siders, 
2018).  
 There are several instruments which can contribute to more inclusive decision-making 
processes. These processes might address the tension, illustrated in the case comparison between 
Kinston and Princeville, between engaging the community in a collective decision about a 
buyout while respecting individual homeowners’ ability to decide for themselves about selling 
their homes. Best practices in planning call for a decision-making structure which does not 
simply consult the public, but empowers communities with voices and authority to affect the 
decision (Arnstein, 1969; Forester, 1982; Innes, 1996; Innes & Booher, 2004). It is also 
important to recognize that buyout participants and the neighborhoods where buyouts occur are 
not monolithic groups. They may have diverse needs and values which should be recognized and 
addressed. Mediated consensus-building is one approach that can provide a structure and role for 
community interests that may not otherwise have political power. Consensus-building processes 
are particularly useful in situations of complex environmental decisions with multiple 
stakeholders and multiple interests (G. Smith, 2011; Susskind, McKearnan, & Thomas-Larmer, 
1999), but have not been tested for post-disaster buyouts, to my knowledge. This approach could 
allow community representatives to articulate the value of their homes and land and their 
interests in payments or relocation services, which ideally would inform a buyout program with 
higher uptake, higher satisfaction, and fewer racial and social justice implications. For example, 
neighbors may have insights about the benefits that would convince potential participants to sell 
their properties, ways to memorialize a community lost to a buyout, or priorities for the use of 




Consensus-building also supports conflict resolution in contentious policy environments, which 
buyouts can easily become, as the Princeville case study demonstrates. Consensus building is 
just one of many techniques that can be used for quality community engagement. 
 This engagement is not the sole responsibility of the local government, although the local 
government should play a significant role, as the first paper demonstrates is typical for an HMGP 
buyout. FEMA is in a position to fund decision-making and planning processes for HMGP 
buyouts. States similarly could incentivize engaged decision-making processes for buyouts 
through obligation of state funds or through the implementation of HMGP or other federally 
funded programs.  
 For the sake of accountability, local government and other implementers that consider 
buyouts should communicate honestly among themselves and to the public about their plans, 
capacity and commitment to implement any programming beyond what is required by a federal- 
or state-funded program. Local goals, strategies, and commitments related to the buyout should 
be formalized in writing and adopted by the appropriate decision-making body to reduce the 
effect of low political will down the line, which limited follow-up investments in the buyout land 
in Lincoln City. 
A major challenge to adopting these recommendations is that the general responsibilities 
of disaster recovery already overload the limited capacity of local governments. It may not be 
realistic for local government to lead quality planning or execute the implementation of a 
multifaceted buyout program. However, if the local officials are committed to this outcome, 
partnerships with state or regional government, nonprofits, or academia can assist, and there are 




Seidman, 2013). In addition, capacity may be needed at the neighborhood level to advocate for 
generating neighborhood amenities through buyout land. For example, as interview data for 
Paper 1 show, in Kinston, there have been multiple plans for their buyout land, but there is no 
political will to implement the plans in a highly distressed, poor, African American 
neighborhood. This capacity can be built through community organizing and training local 
organizations, houses of worship, and residents about involvement and advocacy in local 
government. 
 Finally, to support greater community engagement and accountability, grey literature on 
buyouts should detail engagement and accountability techniques and case studies. There is a 
growing body of guidance on buyouts put out by both government agencies and nonprofits 
(FEMA, 2015b, 2015a; Freudenberg et al., 2016; Kihslinger & Salvesen, 2017; NOAA, 2017). 
However, coverage of community engagement issues – and of issues affecting marginalized 
communities in general – remains poor. This grey literature should address these critical issues. 
Organizations with racial justice, social justice, or housing missions could have the relevant 
expertise to author or co-author such publications. 
Reducing unwanted and unintended consequences 
Addressing the equity problems with buyouts also requires investing in distributional 
equity. There are several strategies, discussed in the previous chapters and reviewed here, which 
could reduce negative impacts and improve participant and community outcomes in places that 
implement buyouts. These strategies should center the needs and experiences of communities 




First, buyout land can become an amenity for its neighbors. This strategy would address 
the problem demonstrated by the Kinston study, in which buyout land became a disamenity for 
the residents “left behind.” There are multiple open space land uses allowable under FEMA 
regulations, including outdoor recreational facilities, a park, a community garden, or a restored 
ecosystem. A historic marker or other reflection and preservation of the site’s history can also 
preserve memories and histories that may be marginalized or simply untold. Creating a 
community amenity of buyout land may help stem the housing disinvestment associated with 
buyouts that was documented in Paper 3. However, without proactive planning, it is unlikely that 
these value-added uses will occur in places that are poor or isolated from development assets, 
such as Lincoln City in Kinston.  
Second, buyouts can promote or sustain homeownership and wealth generation. For 
example, with the additional funding provided by the State Acquisition and Relocation Fund, 
buyout participants in Kinston were able to increase the equity in their new, higher-value home. 
This incentive program was designed to address affordability issues in relocating participating 
households to housing of an equivalent size elsewhere. However, sustaining homeownership and 
generating wealth for participants are not incompatible with the hazard mitigation goals of 
buyouts – a buyout program might have multiple objectives. Federal and state government are in 
a position to incentivize, fund, or require additional planning to ensure that affordability or 
homeownership goals are incorporated into the design and implementation of buyouts. 
In addition, programs should proactively plan for resident relocation. In Kinston, the 
local government did significant work to redevelop sites that could house buyout participants, 
and housing counselors worked with buyout participants to facilitate simultaneous closings – 




Without such support, it is easy to imagine that participants, especially those who are less literate 
or do not have experience purchasing a home, could get lost in the program or fail to find new 
housing that properly uses their buyout proceeds and any additional funds from the program. 
Relocation support should include wraparound services that address the complex needs of 
households that are moving – not just selecting a new home, but addressing changes in 
transportation or access to healthcare that may accompany such moves. 
New approaches to buyouts and resilience  
 In this final section of implications for policy and planning, I would like to present a few 
thoughts on new or different ways to approach buyouts and resilience that may have potential to 
serve communities in more equitable and still effective ways. First, I recommend that 
government officials and other proponents of buyouts move from a conception of buyouts as a 
property-based hazard mitigation program to an understanding of buyouts as a relocation 
program. Buyouts have impacts on places and people, and without a deliberate focus on the 
needs of people and their futures after the buyout, it is easy to brush off the inequitable impacts 
to Black communities or other marginalized populations as outside the scope of the program. 
Modern federal relocation programs, such as The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s Move to Opportunity or HOPE VI programs, have learned many well-
documented lessons about the needs and outcomes of participants in relocation programs. These 
lessons ought to be understood as relevant to buyouts, and incorporated into buyouts policy. This 
is the topic of a forthcoming paper that I am writing. 
 An alternative to parcel-by-parcel buyouts is whole community relocation. Whole 
community relocation may reduce some of the community-wide effects of buyouts, such as 




loss of place attachment and identity. Over 20 years ago, emergency management scholars Perry 
and Lindell outlined insightful recommendations for relocating whole communities, with major 
emphasis on building community capacity, effective communication, social and personal needs 
of relocating households, preservation of social networks, and attention to cultural and 
organizational differences among minority groups (Perry & Lindell, 1997). These principles for 
relocation, if implemented, would permit the reduction of flood risk while minimizing 
community-wide losses that may be especially acute in communities of color. As Perry and 
Lindell write, whole community relocation requires deep engagement and careful planning to be 
successful.  
 A final thought on new directions in buyouts and resilience concerns social vulnerability. 
Social vulnerability is understood as the ways in which social systems make people of different 
characteristics differentially vulnerable to disaster (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). In 
the United States, our risk reduction and resilience programs focus on reducing physical 
vulnerability, but we might also consider how investment in socioeconomic sources of 
vulnerability increase disaster resilience. This practice is more common in developing countries 
but it also holds the relevance in the United States and other developed nations (Broto, Oballa, & 
Junior, 2013; Bulkeley, Edwards, & Fuller, 2014; Kuhlicke et al., 2011). Investment in poverty 
reduction and wealth generation increases the ability of households to withstand disasters and 
recover without permanent setback and loss. With greater economic security, households live in 
higher quality houses, can afford flood insurance, and have economic resources to tap when in 
need. Social resilience also relies on social networks for strength. Investing in strong community 
bonds and building capacity for civil engagement will support resilience in addition to providing 




While the conversation about disaster resilience in the United States primarily concerns 
infrastructure, insurance, and land use, enhancing resilience through addressing underlying 
drivers of social vulnerability may better meet the challenge of entrenched inequalities. 
Future Research Needs 
 This research demonstrates the need for more research on racial and social justice 
components of buyouts programs in their design, implementation, and the lived experience of 
participants and neighbors. In this dissertation, I asked questions about who participates in 
buyouts and where they happen, and about the benefits and burdens of buyouts for participants as 
well as for the communities where buyouts happen. While I have answered these questions in the 
context of North Carolina and FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, they need repeat 
analysis in other places and across other buyout programs funded through different mechanisms.  
North Carolina bears topographical, demographic, and development patterns similar to other 
southeastern states, which lends external validity to the dissertation results, but repeating these 
lines of inquiry may yield similar or different results in other places. The buyouts field needs to 
understand the patterns in the social equity implications of buyout programs.  
Additional longitudinal research on buyouts is especially needed. Longitudinal research 
will better capture the effects of buyouts for people and for places. For example, a controlled 
study could compare households that took buyouts to those that did not, to better understand how 
the lived experience of relocation and flood risk reduction affects life changes and opportunities 
later on. A parcel-based analysis could examine how property values change in response to 
proximity to buyout sites over time. Understanding the long-term interplay between 
sociodemographic context and buyout outcomes will better inform buyouts decision-making in 




housing affordable to low- and moderate-income households, must be understood. The 
opportunity to study places and people many years after buyout will only become more tenable 
as many buyout programs have been implemented in the past twenty years. 
To achieve this research, improved data are needed. Standardized data on buyouts for use 
in research is completely lacking. Even basic data about where buyout participants move is 
largely missing (McGhee, 2017). FEMA might collect and track this information, as might HUD 
whose CDBG-DR program also frequently funds buyouts. A national nonprofit or academic 
group with an interest in buyouts might work to develop a standardized database of who takes 
buyouts, where they move, and what happens to the buyout land in subsequent years and 
decades.  
A final area of research that is needed is an analysis of the ethical issues raised by the 
first paper, which documented the ways in which Kinston encouraged people to take buyouts 
through a construction moratorium. Construction moratoria are recommended in the grey 
literature on post-disaster recovery and buyouts (e.g. FEMA, 2013; A. Siders, 2013), and 
ostensibly a moratorium allows for more time for deliberation about how to rebuild, but some 
places such as Kinston have used them to encourage buyout take-up (de Vries & Fraser, 2012). It 
is unclear if it is ethical for a voluntary program to steer its residents toward an outcome by 
eliminating alternatives – especially when their alternatives are already limited by their economic 
background. Hazard mitigation and resilience advocates may believe that such measures are truly 
the right thing to do because they reduce participants’ exposure to future risk. However, local 
governments may not be the most appropriate actor to determine what’s in the best interest of 




 This dissertation has demonstrated that buyouts, a permanent land use solution to 
development located in areas at risk for flooding, reflects and engages longstanding racial and 
social inequalities. The field of buyouts research is maturing rapidly, and as the scholarly 
conversation advances, it is critical that the lens of justice and equity be applied to this work. 
With careful planning and additional research, it is conceivable that buyouts programs can be 
implemented with more progressive outcomes for social justice. Since the research for this 
dissertation began in 2016, North Carolina has experienced two major flooding disasters, 
Hurricanes Matthew and Florence, that caused catastrophic damage to the housing stock. Many 
homes were rebuilt after Matthew, only to be damaged again by Florence. As climate change 
brings more increasing flood risk, government officials, researchers, and community leaders 
need to prioritize the intentional inclusion of racial and social justice in our recovery and 
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APPENDIX 2.1. LINCOLN CITY WITH RESPECT TO CENSUS TRACTS 
 


















































































































African American 1.000                 
Segregation -0.092 1.000                
Poverty 0.661 -0.171 1.000               
Hurr. Floyd 0.253 -0.276 0.125 1.000              
Hurr. Fran 0.181 -0.261 0.142 0.673 1.000             
100-yr FP 0.007 -0.151 0.137 0.133 0.054 1.000            
500-yr FP 0.060 -0.138 0.156 0.151 0.083 0.547 1.000           
V-Zone -0.078 -0.059 -0.030 0.073 0.055 0.309 0.211 1.000          
Seniors 0.021 -0.083 0.220 -0.101 -0.016 0.139 0.085 0.063 1.000         
Rural -0.263 -0.373 -0.062 -0.022 -0.021 0.105 0.069 0.065 0.050 1.000        
Mobile Home -0.162 -0.424 0.019 0.072 0.117 0.108 0.098 0.046 -0.075 0.758 1.000       
Home Value 0.383 -0.202 0.456 0.002 -0.014 -0.024 -0.029 -0.123 0.116 0.089 0.248 1.000      
Older Homes 0.261 -0.030 0.446 -0.032 -0.026 0.021 0.009 -0.080 0.500 -0.097 -0.135 0.343 1.000     
New Development -0.325 0.055 -0.412 0.031 0.055 0.018 0.027 0.106 -0.457 0.121 0.094 -0.538 -0.653 1.000    
County Pop. 0.050 0.553 -0.249 -0.145 -0.115 -0.225 -0.169 -0.073 -0.384 -0.478 -0.461 -0.392 -0.210 0.268 1.000   
County Growth -0.138 0.040 -0.176 0.131 0.104 0.236 0.214 0.206 -0.189 -0.041 -0.017 -0.412 -0.276 0.413 0.296 1.000  





APPENDIX 3.2. ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
Alternative Specification A 
    Model 1 Model 2(c) Model 3(c) Model 4(c) Model 5(c) 
Race and Segregation     
 African American -0.66 2.40** 1.48 3.40*** 0.38 
  (0.81) (0.74) (1.01) (0.71) (0.41) 
 Segregation -0.23 0.27 4.14** 5.06** 3.14*** 
  (2.50) (1.87) (1.57) (1.89) (0.79) 
Poverty and Vulnerability     
 Poverty 4.51 -1.62 -0.78 -5.77* -1.48 
  (2.42) (1.52) (2.79) (2.36) (1.17) 
 Hurr. Floyd -0.37 -1.07 0.22 0.52 0.67 
  (1.00) (1.98) (0.72) (0.91) (1.24) 
 Hurr. Fran 2.14* 1.51 2.15* 1.60 -0.13 
  (0.94) (1.85) (0.95) (0.97) (1.25) 
 100-yr FP 24.64 11.31* 3.20*** 2.44 1.36 
  (13.40) (4.95) (0.95) (1.86) (0.86) 
 500-yr FP 10.64 1.59 6.24*** 8.33*** 4.66** 
  (10.33) (2.98) (1.83) (2.52) (1.66) 
 V-zone -1.86 -13.08* 0.00 0.00 -7.99*** 
  (2.98) (5.89) (.) (.) (1.39) 
Other Controls      
 Seniors -6.55 5.58 4.99 10.22* 1.39 
  (3.40) (3.89) (4.35) (4.85) (2.99) 
 Rural -0.51 -0.24 -1.29 -0.58 -0.60 
  (0.56) (0.62) (0.86) (1.19) (0.49) 
 Mobile Home 2.21 2.18 4.39 4.39 1.94 
  (1.60) (1.87) (2.31) (2.87) (1.37) 
 New Homes 1.81* -3.11** -0.82 -1.56 -1.75 
  (0.77) (0.99) (1.66) (2.07) (1.10) 
 County Pop. 0.08** -0.02 -0.13* -0.10 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) 
 County Growth -0.04 -0.91 -1.88 -1.91 -0.38 
  (1.31) (1.16) (1.46) (1.58) (0.51) 
 Total Population -0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Constant -1.65 -2.30 -7.30*** -9.30*** 0.73 
  (1.74) (1.59) (2.00) (1.62) (0.86) 
  lnalpha   2.57***     0.19* 
   (0.16)   (0.08) 
 Observations 2178 1597 1526 1526 258 
  Pseudo R-squared 0.336 0.079 0.328 0.338 0.068 
 Standard errors in parentheses    





Alternative Specification B 
    Model 1 Model 2(c) Model 3(c) Model 4(c) Model 5(c) 
Race and Segregation      
 African American -0.24 2.50** 1.61 3.10*** 0.29 
  (0.87) (0.97) (1.27) (0.93) (0.51) 
 Segregation 0.21 -0.07 3.99** 4.70** 3.01*** 
  (2.56) (1.90) (1.49) (1.74) (0.79) 
Poverty and Vulnerability     
 Poverty 3.40 -2.75 -1.11 -4.52 -1.35 
  (2.97) (2.55) (3.41) (2.57) (1.30) 
 Afr. Amer. Poverty 0.97* 1.68 0.62 0.21 0.09 
  (0.49) (0.89) (1.13) (1.38) (0.51) 
 Hurr. Floyd -0.39 -1.01 0.17 0.26 0.48 
  (1.01) (2.26) (0.68) (0.89) (1.44) 
 Hurr. Fran 2.20* 1.38 2.52* 1.61 0.10 
  (0.95) (2.08) (1.08) (1.04) (1.40) 
 100-yr FP 27.09 12.02* 3.91*** 2.44 1.32 
  (15.38) (5.34) (1.10) (1.91) (0.86) 
 500-yr FP 8.80 1.71 5.95*** 8.90*** 4.82** 
  (9.93) (3.39) (1.70) (2.49) (1.61) 
 V-zone -2.44 -11.60 0.00 0.00 -7.70*** 
  (3.11) (6.29) (.) (.) (1.48) 
Other Controls      
 Seniors -8.60* 3.33 3.23 10.95** 1.97 
  (3.48) (3.90) (4.21) (4.18) (3.11) 
 Rural -0.77 -0.43 -1.39 -0.46 -0.65 
  (0.53) (0.62) (0.84) (1.19) (0.50) 
 Mobile Home 3.97* 2.72 4.52 3.70 2.07 
  (1.55) (1.81) (2.56) (3.39) (1.35) 
 New Homes 1.70** -2.98** -2.36 -4.93* -1.78 
  (0.65) (1.07) (1.71) (2.42) (1.13) 
 County Pop. 0.08** -0.01 -0.13* -0.11 -0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) 
 County Growth -0.36 -1.14 -1.71 -1.64 -0.53 
  (1.33) (1.19) (1.44) (1.49) (0.54) 
 Total Population 0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Home Value < $100K -1.43 -0.23 -0.81 -0.41 0.08 
  (0.81) (0.42) (1.85) (3.20) (0.55) 
 Older Homes 1.51 0.06 -1.47 -4.68 -0.42 
  (1.09) (1.51) (1.48) (2.87) (1.11) 
 Constant -0.96 -2.30 -6.34** -7.04* 0.64 
  (1.81) (1.68) (2.42) (2.81) (0.92) 
 lnalpha  2.54***   0.19* 
      (0.17)     (0.08) 
 Observations 2122 1556 1491 1491 251 
  Pseudo R-squared 0.357 0.084 0.348 0.350 0.068 
 Standard errors in parentheses     






Alternative Specification C 
    Model 1 Model 2(c) Model 3(c) Model 4(c) Model 5(c) 
Race and Segregation           
 African American 0.50 1.92** 1.34 2.15* 0.01 
  (0.70) (0.67) (0.79) (0.86) (0.39) 
 Segregation 0.37 0.03 4.04** 4.88** 3.01*** 
  (2.59) (1.90) (1.48) (1.83) (0.80) 
Poverty and Vulnerability     
 Afr. Amer. Poverty 1.43** 1.24 0.27 -1.41 -0.22 
  (0.54) (0.76) (1.08) (1.28) (0.53) 
 Hurr. Floyd -0.43 -0.85 0.22 0.52 0.57 
  (0.99) (2.23) (0.65) (0.90) (1.46) 
 Hurr. Fran 2.24* 1.35 2.51* 1.57 0.09 
  (0.93) (2.07) (1.08) (1.01) (1.42) 
 100-yr FP 28.86 11.65* 3.89*** 2.40 1.17 
  (15.21) (5.25) (1.11) (1.72) (0.83) 
 500-yr FP 8.42 1.87 5.89*** 8.52*** 4.80** 
  (9.48) (3.51) (1.68) (2.38) (1.65) 
 V-zone -2.64 -11.72 0.00 0.00 -7.81*** 
  (3.10) (6.18) (.) (.) (1.47) 
Other Controls      
 Seniors -8.36* 3.84 3.35 11.29** 2.57 
  (3.46) (3.88) (4.28) (4.24) (3.13) 
 Rural -0.77 -0.44 -1.38 -0.37 -0.64 
  (0.52) (0.62) (0.83) (1.22) (0.50) 
 Mobile Home 4.15** 2.90 4.51 3.56 2.14 
  (1.48) (1.84) (2.55) (3.41) (1.38) 
 Home Value < $100K -1.25 -0.37 -0.88 -0.67 0.02 
  (0.74) (0.44) (1.88) (2.88) (0.53) 
 Older Homes 1.84* -0.43 -1.57 -5.05 -0.64 
  (0.94) (1.24) (1.35) (2.78) (1.00) 
 New Homes 1.67** -3.09** -2.38 -5.10* -1.78 
  (0.64) (0.99) (1.71) (2.45) (1.09) 
 County Pop. 0.08** -0.01 -0.13* -0.11 -0.01 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) 
 County Growth -0.31 -1.28 -1.73 -1.64 -0.62 
  (1.32) (1.14) (1.46) (1.51) (0.53) 
 Total Population -0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Constant -1.07 -2.44 -6.34** -7.06** 0.52 
  (1.82) (1.64) (2.42) (2.62) (0.91) 
 lnalpha  2.54***   0.20* 
   (0.17)   (0.08) 
  Observations 2122 1556 1491 1491 251 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.354 0.083 0.348 0.346 0.067 
  Standard errors in parentheses         






APPENDIX 4.1. RESULTS OF ADDITIONAL MODELS 
 
Table 14. Regression Results: Buyouts and Change in Number of Vacant Housing Units, 1990-2010 
    Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains 
DIRECT EFFECT     
 Number of buyouts -0.199 -0.223   
  (0.122) (0.141)   
 High-Buyout Block Group   -8.861 -10.48 
    (9.225) (11.14) 
SPILLOVER EFFECT     
 Number of buyouts 0.0998 0.195   
  (0.247) (0.287)   
 High-Buyout Block Group   5.955 15.39 
    (18.70) (22.30) 
CONTROL VARIABLES     
 Proportion White 60.13 274.3 59.58 262.5 
  (62.36) (238.8) (62.37) (238.7) 
 Proportion Black 62.15 279.7 61.42 267.4 
  (62.04) (238.4) (62.05) (238.3) 
 Proportion Latino 49.98 136.1 51.64 134.2 
  (85.83) (224.9) (85.96) (225.1) 
 Proportion Native American 1990 68.28 265.9 67.94 254.6 
  (63.48) (238.2) (63.48) (238.1) 
 Proportion Seniors 48.67*** -25.23 48.51*** -25.96 
  (14.67) (35.79) (14.67) (35.81) 
 Proportion Owner-Occupied HU 26.68*** 31.24** 26.77*** 31.76** 
  (5.344) (12.68) (5.346) (12.70) 
 Proportion HUs Occupied -338.9*** -365.5*** -338.9*** -365.5*** 
  (8.771) (13.91) (8.786) (13.94) 
 Proportion HUs in Urban Area 1.254 11.73** 1.246 11.65** 
  (2.649) (5.347) (2.650) (5.352) 
 Block Group Population 0.00727*** 0.00518 0.00715*** 0.00483 
  (0.00210) (0.00376) (0.00210) (0.00376) 
 Land Area (100,000 sq meters) 0.00505* 0.000229 0.00508* 0.000281 
  (0.00267) (0.00393) (0.00267) (0.00393) 
 Housing Units Built in 1980s (2010) 0.0311*** 0.0728*** 0.0312*** 0.0726*** 
  (0.0111) (0.0247) (0.0111) (0.0247) 
 Housing Units Built in 1950s (2010) 0.0260 0.00953 0.0260 0.00913 
  (0.0197) (0.0447) (0.0197) (0.0447) 
 Housing Units Built Before 1939 (2010) -0.0123 0.0258 -0.0118 0.0274 
  (0.0200) (0.0483) (0.0200) (0.0484) 
Region (Western  = reference)     
 Central -8.822***  -8.798***  
  (2.635)  (2.636)  
 Eastern -14.60***  -14.71***  
  (2.926)  (2.947)  
 Constant 262.7*** 57.43 263.2*** 69.12 
  (62.52) (239.7) (62.54) (239.7) 
      
Observations 6,096 1,780 6,096 1,780 
Psuedo R-Square 0.245 0.327 0.245 0.326 
Standard errors in parentheses     






Table 15. Regression Results: Buyouts and Newly Constructed Housing Units 
 
  
Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains
DIRECT EFFECTS
Number of buyouts -0.0466 -0.120 -0.113 -0.136
(0.272) (0.242) (0.120) (0.113)
High-Buyout Block Group -15.08 -17.96 -13.41 -15.27*
(20.63) (19.09) (9.127) (8.901)
SPILLOVER EFFECTS
Number of buyouts -0.186 -0.233 -0.161 -0.145
(0.554) (0.493) (0.245) (0.230)
High-Buyout Block Group 1.744 -2.653 -11.19 -6.873
(41.81) (38.21) (18.50) (17.82)
CONTROL VARIABLES
Proportion White 838.8*** 1,003** 838.7*** 997.8** 313.8*** 402.9** 313.9*** 399.6**
(139.5) (409.4) (139.5) (409.1) (61.71) (191.0) (61.70) (190.8)
Proportion Black 816.2*** 955.4** 816.2*** 949.9** 304.7*** 382.6** 304.8*** 379.4**
(138.8) (408.7) (138.8) (408.4) (61.40) (190.6) (61.39) (190.4)
Proportion Latino 791.0*** 494.0 791.5*** 492.2 403.1*** 414.3** 400.3*** 409.3**
(192.0) (385.6) (192.2) (385.7) (84.94) (179.8) (85.04) (179.9)
Proportion Native American 1990 767.1*** 879.6** 767.1*** 874.3** 281.7*** 351.1* 281.5*** 347.6*
(142.0) (408.4) (142.0) (408.1) (62.82) (190.5) (62.81) (190.3)
Proportion Seniors -232.8*** -402.9*** -232.9*** -403.5*** -72.24*** -134.3*** -72.31*** -134.8***
(32.81) (61.37) (32.81) (61.37) (14.52) (28.62) (14.52) (28.62)
Proportion Owner-Occupied HU 96.83*** 67.66*** 97.11*** 68.78*** 34.45*** 22.48** 34.50*** 22.97**
(11.95) (21.73) (11.96) (21.75) (5.288) (10.14) (5.289) (10.15)
Proportion HUs Occupied 53.79*** 86.40*** 53.66*** 86.24*** 22.66*** 39.04*** 22.99*** 39.34***
(19.62) (23.85) (19.65) (23.89) (8.680) (11.13) (8.692) (11.14)
Proportion HUs in Urban Area 76.58*** 52.23*** 76.69*** 52.44*** 32.43*** 23.70*** 32.49*** 23.85***
(5.924) (9.167) (5.926) (9.171) (2.621) (4.276) (2.622) (4.277)
Block Group Population -0.0330*** -0.00315 -0.0330*** -0.00317 -0.0104*** 0.000143 -0.0104*** 0.000120
(0.00469) (0.00645) (0.00469) (0.00644) (0.00208) (0.00301) (0.00208) (0.00300)
Land Area (100,000 sq meters) 0.0328*** 0.0158** 0.0328*** 0.0158** 0.0126*** 0.00622** 0.0127*** 0.00628**
(0.00598) (0.00674) (0.00598) (0.00674) (0.00265) (0.00314) (0.00265) (0.00314)
Housing Units Built in 1980s (2010) 0.139*** 0.268*** 0.139*** 0.268*** 0.0352*** 0.101*** 0.0350*** 0.0999***
(0.0248) (0.0423) (0.0248) (0.0423) (0.0110) (0.0197) (0.0110) (0.0197)
Housing Units Built in 1950s (2010) -0.351*** -0.397*** -0.351*** -0.396*** -0.133*** -0.157*** -0.133*** -0.157***
(0.0441) (0.0767) (0.0441) (0.0766) (0.0195) (0.0358) (0.0195) (0.0357)
Housing Units Built Before 1939 (2010) -0.177*** -0.188** -0.177*** -0.189** -0.0713*** -0.0833** -0.0710*** -0.0835**
(0.0448) (0.0829) (0.0448) (0.0829) (0.0198) (0.0387) (0.0198) (0.0386)
Region (Western  = reference)
Central 34.07*** 34.05*** 11.82*** 11.77***
(5.894) (5.895) (2.608) (2.608)
Eastern 25.25*** 25.17*** 10.74*** 10.95***
(6.544) (6.591) (2.895) (2.916)
Constant -846.8*** -984.3** -846.9*** -979.5** -326.6*** -409.0** -327.0*** -406.2**
(139.8) (411.0) (139.8) (410.7) (61.87) (191.7) (61.87) (191.5)
Observations 6,096 1,780 6,096 1,780 6,096 1,780 6,096 1,780
Pseudo R-square 0.125 0.162 0.125 0.162 0.089 0.129 0.089 0.129
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Table 16. Regression Results: Buyouts and Change in Racial Mix (Latinos and Native Americans) 
 
 
VARIABLES Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains Entire State Eastern Plains
DIRECT EFFECT
Number of Buyouts 0.000114 0.000220* -1.13e-05 -1.41e-05
(0.000141) (0.000116) (1.96e-05) (3.25e-05)
High-Buyout Block Group 0.00430 0.0111 -0.00150 -0.00176
(0.0107) (0.00912) (0.00148) (0.00256)
SPILLOVER EFFECT
Number of Buyouts -0.000279 -0.000115 -6.17e-05 -6.03e-05
(0.000287) (0.000235) (3.98e-05) (6.60e-05)
High-Buyout Block Group -0.00670 0.0131 -0.00458 -0.00507
(0.0216) (0.0183) (0.00301) (0.00512)
CONTROL VARIABLES
Proportion White 0.0814 0.496** 0.0809 0.496** -0.00191 0.00321 -0.00190 0.00309
(0.0722) (0.196) (0.0722) (0.195) (0.0100) (0.0549) (0.0100) (0.0548)
Proportion Black 0.102 0.481** 0.101 0.482** 0.00111 0.00752 0.00110 0.00741
(0.0718) (0.195) (0.0718) (0.195) (0.00997) (0.0548) (0.00997) (0.0547)
Proportion Latino 0.592*** 0.710*** 0.594*** 0.723*** -0.0263* -0.0231 -0.0269* -0.0247
(0.0994) (0.184) (0.0995) (0.184) (0.0138) (0.0517) (0.0138) (0.0517)
Proportion Native American 1990 0.106 0.487** 0.106 0.488** -0.0997*** -0.100* -0.0998*** -0.100*
(0.0735) (0.195) (0.0735) (0.195) (0.0102) (0.0547) (0.0102) (0.0547)
Proportion Seniors -0.0995*** -0.108*** -0.0993*** -0.108*** 0.00650*** 0.0200** 0.00653*** 0.0201**
(0.0170) (0.0293) (0.0170) (0.0293) (0.00236) (0.00822) (0.00236) (0.00822)
Proportion Owner-Occupied HU -0.0863*** -0.0205** -0.0861*** -0.0196* 0.00111 0.00537* 0.00112 0.00536*
(0.00621) (0.0104) (0.00621) (0.0104) (0.000863) (0.00291) (0.000863) (0.00291)
Proportion HUs Occupied 0.0128 0.0467*** 0.0125 0.0453*** 0.00228 0.00404 0.00236* 0.00418
(0.0102) (0.0114) (0.0102) (0.0114) (0.00141) (0.00320) (0.00141) (0.00320)
Proportion HUs in Urban Area 0.00881*** -0.0228*** 0.00881*** -0.0228*** -0.00120*** -0.00260** -0.00119*** -0.00258**
(0.00310) (0.00438) (0.00310) (0.00438) (0.000430) (0.00123) (0.000430) (0.00123)
Block Group Population -5.57e-06** -6.11e-06** -5.54e-06** -6.02e-06* 9.83e-07*** 2.56e-06*** 9.87e-07*** 2.58e-06***
(2.43e-06) (3.08e-06) (2.43e-06) (3.08e-06) (3.38e-07) (8.64e-07) (3.38e-07) (8.63e-07)
Area (100,000 sq. meters) 8.71e-07 -4.61e-06 8.44e-07 -4.71e-06 2.98e-07 -4.89e-07 3.06e-07 -4.77e-07
(3.28e-06) (3.22e-06) (3.28e-06) (3.22e-06) (4.56e-07) (9.03e-07) (4.56e-07) (9.03e-07)
Housing Units Built in 1980s (2010) 2.79e-05** 4.40e-05** 2.80e-05** 4.50e-05** 2.87e-06 4.54e-06 2.85e-06 4.39e-06
(1.28e-05) (2.02e-05) (1.28e-05) (2.02e-05) (1.78e-06) (5.67e-06) (1.78e-06) (5.67e-06)
Housing Units Built in 1950s (2010) 9.19e-05*** 4.77e-05 9.16e-05*** 4.68e-05 -3.16e-06 -1.59e-05 -3.20e-06 -1.59e-05
(2.28e-05) (3.66e-05) (2.28e-05) (3.66e-05) (3.17e-06) (1.03e-05) (3.17e-06) (1.03e-05)
Housing Units Built Before 1939 (2010) -3.39e-05 0.000110*** -3.41e-05 0.000109*** -1.65e-06 1.03e-06 -1.62e-06 9.17e-07
(2.32e-05) (3.96e-05) (2.32e-05) (3.96e-05) (3.22e-06) (1.11e-05) (3.22e-06) (1.11e-05)
REGION
Region = Central 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0 0.000487 0.000481
(0.00305) (0.00305) (0) (0.000424) (0.000424)
Region = Eastern -0.0111*** -0.0114*** -0.443** 0.00183*** 0.00188***
(0.00339) (0.00342) (0.196) (0.000471) (0.000474)
Constant 0.0275 -0.442** 0.0280 0 -0.000779 -0.0109 -0.000854 -0.0108
(0.0724) (0.196) (0.0724) (0) (0.0101) (0.0551) (0.0101) (0.0550)
Observations 6,095 1,780 6,095 1,780 6,095 1,780 6,095 1,780
Pseudo R-square 0.130 0.061 0.130 0.060 0.255 0.303 0.255 0.303
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Change in Proportion Latino Change in Proportion Native American
